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argues that idealization is not even incidental to these problems since, when conceived properly, the
aforementioned theoretical constraints can be shown to be adequately satisfied by idealizing theories. By
clarifying the role of idealization, my dissertation generates important lessons for how we should pursue
the most fundamental questions within moral and political philosophy
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ABSTRACT
IDEALS FROM A DISTANCE: ASSESSING OBJECTIONS TO IDEALIZATION
WITHIN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
Chetan Cetty
Samuel Freeman
In Ideals from a Distance, I defend the practice of idealization within moral
and political philosophy. We idealize when we represent the world and the agents
within it as being more perfect than their actual versions. For instance,
philosophers have often articulated theories about what is good, just, and morally
right on the grounds that rational or fully informed versions of us would endorse
them. Idealization, they argue, is indispensable because it enables us to step back
from our actual, imperfect points of view to consider such questions in a rational
and impartial manner. Recently, some have challenged such use of idealization,
contending that by idealizing, these theories fail to tell us what morality and
justice require for actual agents who lack such capacities. This suggests that
employing idealization within moral and political philosophy is generally
problematic.
My dissertation argues that there is nothing generally problematic with
idealization and that criticism of its use stems from an improper understanding
of what should constrain our normative ethical and political projects. I examine
four prominent objections to idealization: (1) that idealizing theories fail to be
iii

action-guiding; (2) that the ideal worlds they imagine are infeasible; (3) that their
recommendations for what is good for us are alienating; and (4) that these
theories’ justification for why we should appeal to idealized responses is ad hoc.
I argue that once we cast each of these constraints (action-guidingness, feasibility,
non-alienation, and adequate motivation) in their proper light, the respective
theories can be shown to satisfy them. Idealization is unproblematic, on my view,
if theories employing it can meet these constraints. I respond by showing first
that idealization cannot be the source of these problems since, as I demonstrate,
it is neither necessary nor sufficient for their occurrence. The remainder of the
dissertation argues that idealization is not even incidental to these problems
since, when conceived properly, the aforementioned theoretical constraints can
be shown to be adequately satisfied by idealizing theories. By clarifying the role
of idealization, my dissertation generates important lessons for how we should
pursue the most fundamental questions within moral and political philosophy.
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INTRODUCTION
1. OVERVIEW
When we reflect on fundamental questions concerning morality and our
personal well-being, we often view the answers we arrive at when thinking
carefully, dispassionately, and without erroneous beliefs, as having special
authority on us. For instance, at various points in our lives, we might remark, “if
only I knew what I know now, I would have done things differently.” When we
utter such statements, we do not simply assert the truth of a counterfactual
concerning how we could have acted differently in the past, but something
stronger. What we wish to emphasize is that our present judgment about what our
past selves ought to have done carries greater weight because of our present
selves’ superior epistemic position. Occupying our current epistemic vantage
point, we think that we have greater access to the relevant facts of the matter and
that we are able to consider things more calmly and rationally than we did before.
And we take these differences to enable us to arrive at more objective verdicts
about what is important to us personally and morally. This is an indelible feature
of our lived experience.
The idea that the verdicts and responses of better informed and rational
versions of us have greater veracity when it comes to questions of morality and
1

personal welfare is commonplace not just in everyday thought, but also in the
history of modern moral and political philosophy. Many philosophers have
argued for views concerning such matters by appealing to the verdicts of our

idealized selves, that is, more perfect versions of us. The ways in which these
idealized counterparts of us are conceived has varied. In some cases, such as in
contractarian theories of John Rawls and others, our motivation and
commitments to the principles underlying social cooperation are idealized. In
other cases, such as in the influential moral theories of Henry Sidgwick, David
Hume, Adam Smith, and others, it is our cognitive and imaginative capacities that
are idealized.1 Regardless, the point in both is the same: idealization plays an

important role in enabling us to arrive at objective and true verdicts concerning
the most fundamental questions in moral and political philosophy.
Indeed, the role of idealization in determining ideals is integral to human
civilization itself. As long as we can remember, we have been telling stories of
individuals and societies which exhibit heroic qualities which then serve as the
bedrock of religious and moral values. For instance, the oldest recorded piece of
literature, the Epic of Gilgamesh, tells the story of a cruel man-king who becomes

1

To be sure, Rawls also imagines agents as being rational and mutually disinterested, among other
things. That said, his assumption that agents will be generally motivated to comply with the
principles of justice is very much unlike the idealizations employed by both other social
contractarians and moral theorists. Moreover, it is the idealization that has received the most
attention within his theory.
2

a just ruler as a result of friendship and love.2 Similarly, the ancient Hindu epics,
the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, depict heroic and sage-like characters
whose ethical and religious teachings have significantly influenced the moral
code of India past and present.3 Indeed, history is littered with such larger-thanlife illustrations of human excellence and virtue, which exist in every culture and
epoch, and these depictions are viewed not merely as enthralling pieces of
literature but essential sources of moral wisdom. Even though both the moral
ideals and the individuals exhibiting them are beyond the reach of virtually all of
us, we continue to regard them as worthwhile standards by which to measure
ourselves and our actions. As such, the practice of idealizing, that is, the activity
of imagining some more perfect version of ourselves, is as old as human thought
and culture itself.
Despite its centrality to human life, the use of idealization has been heavily
criticized in recent years. Much of this criticism takes the form of skepticism
about why the verdicts of our idealized selves should have any normative import
for us, actual, imperfect agents. After all, we can never be perfectly rational, fully
informed, and maximally attentive to the relevant facts when assessing moral and

2

Mitchell, Gilgamesh: A New English Version. Interestingly, Saddam Hussein depicted himself
as akin to King Gilgamesh in his novel Zabibah and the King, in which an initially tyrannical
ruler eventually turns more just. See Damrosch, The Buried Book: The Loss and Rediscovery of
the Great Epic of Gilgamesh, 254–272.
3
Narayan, The Indian Epics Retold: The Ramayana, the Mahabharata, Gods, Demons, and
Others.
3

evaluative matters. Nor can we be expected to always comply with the
requirements of justice, as the hypothetical agents within Rawls’s social contract
theory are assumed to be. As a result, why should we care about what conclusions
we would arrive at if we possessed such attributes?
It might seem that those raising this question are clearly mistaken. After
all, if we think that our more informed and rational assessments of such
fundamental normative questions have greater veracity because we are more
informed and rational when making them, then the perspectives of perfectly
rational and informed agents should be even more veracious. And yet, we also
generally balk at the idea that some else’s judgments about fundamental
questions of moral and personal importance should have authority over us. What
matters, we often think, is what we would judge. One way to understand the
skeptical challenge raised in the previous paragraph is as making this very point.
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, some critics of idealization argue that the verdicts
of our idealized counterparts lack normative import for us because they are
significantly dissimilar to us. In other words, the verdicts of our counterparts are
not our verdicts. Thus, the wider skepticism about idealization is not borne out of
a rudimentary misunderstanding of the intuitive idea motivating its use in
everyday thought and discourse.
This dissertation investigates the two theories whose use of idealization
has received the greatest attention in the recent literature: ideal theory and ideal
4

observer theory. Ideal theory is what Rawls calls his contractarian theory of
justice. Ideal theory articulates principles of justice by asking which principles
agents committed to living in a well-ordered society would select.4 Rawls takes the
arrived-at principles of justice to serve as standards by which to evaluate all actual
and possible societies. While the assumption that all contracting parties would
generally comply with the principles of justice is peculiar to (or at least most
explicitly expressed within) Rawls’s theory, other idealizations he employs are
characteristic of social contract theory more generally. For instance, agents in
Rawls’s hypothetical contract situation are assumed to be deliberating rationally
and mutually disinterestedly. The idea that the rules for ordering society are those
we would rationally consent to goes back to canonical thinkers such as Hobbes,
Locke, Rosseau, and Kant. Ideal observer theory, meanwhile, states that our wellbeing, moral goodness, and rightness consist in what we would endorse if we
were rational, impartial, and fully informed. Sidgwick’s “point of view of the
universe” is perhaps the most classical expression of this idea. Similarly, Hume’s
“judicious spectator” and Smith’s “impartial spectator” express the idea that our
judgments, when occupying a more objective vantage point, have greater veracity
than our actual perspectives. The “ideal observer” is merely a more perfect (and

4

Rawls defined a well-ordered society as a society in which “(1) everyone accepts and knows that
the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally
satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 4.
5

thus non-actual) version of ourselves, to the verdicts of whom we should confer
greater authority.
As mentioned, both theories argue that idealization is indispensable
because it enables us to step back from our actual, imperfect points of view and
consider such questions in a rational and impartial manner. Critics take these
theories to be fatally flawed because they idealize. But what specifically is the
problem with these theories? I investigate four different objections to these
theories in relation to their use of idealization. The first two objections I discuss
concern ideal theory, while the latter two are targeted at ideal observer theory.
The four objections, in brief, are as follows: first, many argue that by merely
specifying a vision of a perfect society, ideal theory fails to tell us what we ought
to do here and now. Second, critics contend that the perfectly just society is
infeasible for us. Third, with respect to ideal observer theories, critics argue that
our idealized counterparts’ recommendations are alienating for us given their
dissimilarity to us. The fourth objection holds that ideal observer theories cannot
supply a principled motivation for why the relevant responses are those of
idealized rather than actual agents. Each of these objections raises a distinct
challenge to the theories in question. What unifies them is the thought that there
is something generally problematic about these theories because of their
idealization. This dissertation evaluates each objection as part of this wider claim.

6

In response to these objections, I argue that there is nothing generally
problematic about the role that idealization plays in ideal theory and ideal
observer theory. Instead, the problem, if it exists at all, concerns how such
idealizing theories might fail to respect the theoretical constraints pertinent to
each objection, that is, action-guidingness, feasibility, non-alienation, and nonad hoc justification. In Chapter 1, I show why idealization, despite appearances,
is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating each of these four objections.
Further, I argue that nothing about how idealization operates within these
theories suggests that it is inherently problematic. Thus, any problems we might
have with idealizations stem from their interaction with other aspects of the two
aforementioned theories. The remaining chapters show how the ideal and ideal
observer theories can meet the four aforementioned constraints.

2. CLARIFICATIONS
Before I proceed to summarize my arguments in the remaining four
chapters, let me make four important clarifications regarding the dissertation
project. First, my interest is in both instrumental and constitutive uses of
idealization within moral and political theorizing. Idealization is understood as
playing an instrumental role when it is employed, for instance, in order to make
a problem space more tractable. An example of this is Rawls’s assumption that
societies are closed. Rawls assumes away movement across state borders in order
7

to bracket the extra complication it would create to the question of domestic
justice.5 By contrast, ideal observer theories conceive of idealization as
constituting the normative. For instance, Peter Railton argues that “an
individual's good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to pursue,
were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully and vividly
informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive
error or lapses of instrumental rationality.”6 Idealization in this case does not
simply help get at the right answers; it is what makes the answers right. I do not
exclusively attend to one or the other form of idealization. Both forms are of
interest to me. Indeed, chapters 2 and 3, which focus on ideal theory, might be
thought of as a defense of theorizing that employs idealization instrumentally.
Chapters 4 and 5, by contrast, focus on whether it is justified for a theory about
moral and nonmoral value to ground such properties in the responses of idealized
agents.
Secondly, I do not attempt or claim to offer a general theory about
idealization. My goal is not to offer a descriptive theory concerning the role it
actually plays in such theorizing, nor a normative theory concerning its proper
use. Rather, I focus on the particular uses of idealization within the two
aforementioned theories and the resultant normative outputs, that is, the

5

Of course, we might argue that we should not idealize away this fact when ascertaining principles
to domestic justice, but this is a different matter.
6
Italics added. Railton, “Facts and Values,” 16.
8

principles, action-prescriptions, and evaluative claims, generated by these
theories. The aim is to defend the practice of idealization as it is employed within

these theories, given their prominent role within the history of moral and political
thought. I am skeptical that a general theory of idealization can be offered, in part
because idealization is employed for a variety of purposes, such as in the two ways
just described. Moreover, different theories idealize different facts, and for
different reasons. At the very least, I wish to emphasize here that in not offering
a general theory, my defense of idealization should not be viewed as less
significant. Even if a general theory of idealization could be offered, articulating
why particular idealizations and the theories which employ them are
unproblematic can serve as an important stepping stone to an eventual
unification of their general value to normative theorizing. I lack the space to
address this issue in this dissertation though it is an important one for theorists
to pursue.
The third clarification pertains to idealization in the sciences. We might
consider drawing from lessons concerning the use of idealization within the
natural and social sciences to clarify and defend its use in normative theorizing.
I think this is a worthwhile endeavor, especially since it is widely employed in
these disciplines and in ways that seem to generate less controversy than in

9

normative philosophy.7 Moreover, there does seem to be at least one overlapping
use of idealization within both scientific and normative theorizing, namely, for
the purpose of simplifying a problem-space. For instance, scientists might
idealize by subtracting away friction when measuring the effect that the mass of
an object has on its acceleration down a plane. Retaining friction would otherwise
complicate the measurement.8 This seems analogous to Rawls’s closed society
assumption. That said, given the variety of uses of idealization within normative
theorizing, it is unclear whether such parity exists in all or even most cases. For
instance, the idea that idealized responses constitute the truth (about normative
properties) seems to have no clear analogue in the sciences, where idealization is
used to merely track the truth. Likewise, certain kinds of scientific idealizations
do not seem to apply in the normative case. For instance, a common type of
idealization, which Michael Weisberg calls minimalist idealization, involves
“constructing and studying theoretical models that include only the core causal
factors which give rise to a phenomenon.”9 Moral and political philosophers are
generally focused on doing something other than providing causal models, and
as such, it is unclear how this kind of idealization would map onto their projects.

7

For an influential characterisation of the use of idealization in the sciences, see Weisberg, “Three
Kinds of Idealization." Also see Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement; GodfreySmith, “Abstractions, Idealizations, and Evolutionary Biology."
8
Weisberg calls this a “Galilean idealization.” The function of such an idealization is to make a
measurement task easier.
9
Weisberg, “Three Kinds of Idealization,” 642.
10

More generally, the goal of normative theorizing is to identify the truth about the
normative. What normative values and principles consist in is left open, with our
theorizing aimed at discovering them. By contrast, in the sciences, the targets of
our inquiry are in a sense “given to us” by our sensory and experimental
observations. The goal here is instead to explain the target phenomena. Thus,
there seems to be a basic difference in the kind of role that idealization is bound
to play in each theoretical domain. That said, I do not wish to claim that there are

no valuable lessons to be gleaned from such a comparison. Even if we can learn
from scientific uses of idealization, my claim is that we can still make important
progress by assessing whether normative theorists are justified in employing
idealizations given the aims of their theories.
The fourth clarification concerns one particular idealization that has
generated much attention. This is Rawls’s “full compliance assumption.” Rawls
stipulates that agents deciding on principles of justice will generally comply with
the terms of the contract to which they consent. While I dedicate two chapters to
criticisms of ideal theory, neither focuses squarely on this assumption. One might
wonder why this is so. After all, many have argued that this assumption renders
ideal theory irrelevant to our current society, and for a variety of reasons. For
instance, some like David Schmidtz argue that the fact of partial compliance is

11

central to the question of distributive justice.10 Others like Charles Mills argue that
assuming full compliance prevents us from reckoning with the many injustices in
our society, thereby guaranteeing that the ideals we end up proposing will never
be realized.11 A satisfactory defense of ideal theory thus seems to require that we
grapple with and overcome these worries about the full compliance assumption.
Let me make two responses here. First, not all objections that purport to
target the full compliance assumption actually aim at it. Mills’s objection,
expressed here, is concerned more with the realizability of ideal justice given the
assumption of full compliance, rather than with the assumption itself. As I argue
in Chapter 1, we might struggle to realize the ideals articulated by our best
theories of justice even if they did not assume full compliance. To the extent that
our concern is something like realizability, this dissertation does tackle this
problem. This occurs in chapter 3 where I discuss the feasibility objection. By
contrast, Schmidtz’s objection more directly targets the theoretical merits of
idealizing. His objection would stand even if idealization does not generate
undesirable outputs, such as infeasible or non-action guiding principles. In fact,
Schmidtz’s objection is closely related to the topic of scientific idealization. That

10

See Schmidtz, “Nonideal Theory." Schmidtz argues that assuming full compliance is analogous
to abstracting away air resistance when measuring the movement of a parachute; we would be
ignoring the very thing we are trying to measure. As he notes, “to set aside that we live amongst
agents—beings who decide for themselves whether to comply—is to set aside the defining problem
of political theory.” Schmidtz, “Ideal Theory,” 341.
11
Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” 170.
12

said, I want to provide a second, and different rationale for setting his objection
aside. Some, like John Simmons, have responded to Schmidtz by arguing that
assuming full compliance is justified because setting it aside enables Rawls’s
hypothetical deliberators to evaluate each candidate principle in its best light.12
Even if this is right, focusing on the role of this assumption within Rawls’s theory
would be to narrow our target unduly. The reason is that skepticism about ideal
theory has mushroomed far beyond the particulars about how and why Rawls
assumed away the fact of partial compliance. The focus has shifted to a more
general worry, namely whether the following kind of theory is relevant to us: one

that articulates an abstract set of principles of justice whose realization seems to
require significant revisions to our present institutional structure. This concern
is much broader, and one that would remain even if we clarified and defended
the plausibility of this assumption, for such a defense would not alter the distance
between our actual societies and one that adequately realizes Rawls’s principles
of justice. While my dissertation avoids the temptation of providing a general
theory of idealization, it nonetheless aims at saying something about the general

12

The idea here is to imagine a fully working version of each principle by imagining a society that
would instantiate them fully. If the fact of partial noncompliance was kept, then we would not
know whether the merits of each candidate principle (and the societies we imagine would
instantiate them) are attributable to what they can offer to those living under them, or instead to
the effect that noncompliance would have on all members. For noncompliance can undermine
the ability of a society’s social and political structure to deliver its promised benefits to members.
See Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory."
13

challenges faced by theories which employ it. Hence, we should set aside the
question of the plausibility of the full compliance assumption in our discussion.

3. CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Having defended the contours of this dissertation, let me outline how I go
about meeting the four objections to idealization. As mentioned, Chapter 1
concludes by noting that the problem lies not with the kinds of idealization
employed by the two theories, but whether the theories, as a result of their
idealizations, can be shown to meet the respective theoretical constraints. Each
of the remaining chapters explores a different constraint. My broad strategy in
each chapter is to argue that each constraint, upon reflection, needs to be
reframed, after which, ideal theory and ideal observer theories can be shown to
meet the respective constraints.
In Chapter 2, I take on the claim that ideal theory cannot be action-guiding
due to its focus on articulating principles for the the most general political and
social institutions, namely, the political constitution, the property rights scheme,
the design of the economic system, and the various rights and responsibilities
they articulate for all members in their role as citizens. David Wiens and Elizabeth
Anderson have articulated the most developed version of this criticism. They
argue that our justice-based solutions should be targeted in nature, focusing
directly on the particular sites of injustice. Thus, in their view, and in contrast to
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Rawls, we should focus directly on what is needed to remedy injustice, in say,
education, and housing, as opposed to first identifying changes at the basic
structure level. In response, I argue that we should not satisfy the actionguidingness constraint by merely applying our favorite principles of justice
directly to the sites of injustice. Doing so, I contend, might commit us to a
practically inconsistent set of institutional reforms given the deep and complex
interactions between different institutions. I call this the problem of
incompossibility. The problem of incompossibility highlights the need to take
seriously the compatibility of our preferred solutions in different institutional
contexts, and what this implies for the types of principles and rules we need in
order to arrive at action-guiding prescriptions. Both ideal and nonideal theory
must confront this problem and the threat it poses to their ability to offer actionguiding prescriptions. Nevertheless, I contend that ideal theory does better with
respect to this problem. Ideal theory’s focus on the morally significant role of the
basic structure in shaping people’s lives gives us a strong moral reason for
favoring it over its counterpart. In addition, I provide a sketch of how a carefully
crafted set of basic structure-level institutions might yield a feasible way to
constrain and resolve more local-level institutional conflicts. In the remainder of
the chapter, I explain how my defense of this approach can pave the way for ideal
theorists to focus on the perfectly just basic structure. While this does not serve
as a full defense of ideal theory, it nonetheless provides an important reason to
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favor ideal theory over nonideal theory. Ideal theory, thus, offers a more morally
(and perhaps also a practically) satisfying way to deal with the problem of actionguidingness.
Chapter 3 focuses on the problem of infeasibility. David Schmidtz argues
that ideal theory is infeasible because we are unlikely to comply with its
requirements anytime in the near future. This, in his view, renders the theory
irrelevant. Jerry Gaus has argued that attempting to realize an ideally just society
is analogous to trekking up a mountain without a map; we lack the ability to tell
which set of actions would get us closer to the peak. Given the degree of risk
involved, he argues that we should instead be realizing much more modest
reform to our present social arrangements. In response to Schmidtz, our nearterm unwillingness to comply with the requirements of justice does not show that
the theory is infeasible, because (1) we might be able to comply in the longerterm, and (2) the question of compliance (short-term or otherwise) might not be
answerable without us first experiencing what it would be like to live in the ideal
society. In response to Gaus, I argue that the epistemic infeasibility objection
either completely nullifies the possibility of meaningful reform for any political
theory or is merely a warning for ideal theory to exercise caution when
articulating how we should implement just institutions. The first disjunct obtains
since skepticism about the possibility of social reform can also be extended to
justify skepticism about the possibility of reinforcing the status quo. After all,
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underlying Gaus’s epistemic infeasibility objection is a general doubt about
whether social science can provide us with the tools to explain and predict the
effects of large-scale political action. But if this is true, then even attempts to
preserve the status quo would be implicated since they too count as political
action. The version of this skeptical argument that Gaus needs to maintain the full
force of his objection of ideal theory undermines the possibility of all political
action. In contrast, if we opt for a more moderate reading of Gaus’s objection,
then it can be taken as an exhortation to political philosophers to aim at more
cautious forms of reform. I argue that the ideal theorist can embrace this message
of caution by requiring that we prioritize altering social norms and fundamental
political attitudes. I conclude by noting that the feasibility challenge can be met
by even ideal theorists if they aim for such measured forms of political change.
In Chapter 4 of my dissertation, I evaluate the objection that the advice of
our idealized counterparts would be alienating for us. Connie Rosati argues that
our idealized counterparts, when appropriately construed, must undergo such
dramatic transformations so as to render them wholly different in personality
from us. Given this, we would not care about their recommendations for us. I
respond to this objection by showing that it relies on an implausible test. What
matters, in my view, is not whether we are psychologically similar to our idealized
counterparts, but whether we would care about their advice. I motivate this idea
by constructing a thought experiment which shows that we would care about the
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verdicts of future versions of us even if they were sufficiently different from us.
We would care about their advice, I argue, because we can appreciate how they
came to issue the verdicts they did, and the fact that they have our best interests
at heart. This, however, does not yet show that we would care about the verdicts
of our idealized counterparts. In the next stage of this chapter, I establish this next
step by making two arguments. First, I note that unlike when making mundane
decisions (e.g., what to eat, what to wear, etc.) during which we care foremost
about what we desire, when making major life decisions, we are willing to give
more weight to the desires/concerns others have for us. Rosati’s test for nonalienation ignores this fact. Secondly, we often take seriously the life advice we
get from those we consider to be more experienced and wiser than us. While their
advice might not constitute our good, we factor it into our deliberation. This
motivates taking seriously the advice of our ideal counterpart seriously (since she
is wiser in the same sense and has our best interests at heart). Our idealized
counterpart represents the maximally experienced, wiser, and rational version of
the friends and family whose advice we take so seriously. These two
considerations show that we would care for the advice of our idealized
counterparts.
The remainder of the chapter takes on a series of objections, including that
we cannot make a rational decision about major life choices without undergoing
what L.A. Paul calls “transformative experiences”, that is, experiences that would
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acquaint us with the phenomenal experience needed for determining what is
valuable for us. In response, I argue that what matters is access to the value of
those experiences, which we can obtain even without undergoing them. Once the
non-alienation constraint is properly conceived then, idealizing theories about
our good can be shown to satisfactorily meet it.
Chapter 5 focuses on David Enoch’s contention that ideal observer theories
cannot adequately motivate the idealizations they employ. Enoch’s challenge
focuses on a tension between two features of ideal observer theories. The first
feature is their internalism. Such theories hold that objective values are grounded
in our responses. That is, what makes something good for me or morally right is
determined not by facts that exist independently of me and other agents, but by
the responses of agents. The second feature concerns their motivation for
idealization. Many such response-dependence views often idealize in order to
ensure that normative properties do not reduce to responses of agents with
defects such as false beliefs, irrational judgments and limited attention. This,
however, is ad hoc, Enoch argues, for it departs from the internalist motivation
of the theories. If normative properties should be grounded in our desires, then
it is unclear why the fact that our desires are sometimes based on false beliefs is
relevant. If we choose to idealize to arrive at what we antecedently take to be the
correct views about the normative, then our idealization would merely serve to
track rather than constitute the normative. Thus, this cannot be the rationale for
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idealization. I argue that we can justify grounding normative values in the
response of idealized agents by appealing to the nature of our ordinary linguistic
practices. Here I appeal to the work of Joshua Gert. Our use of ordinary language
suggests that the correct judgments about such values would merit our
endorsement if we were well informed and rational. Moreover, such practices are
pragmatically and socially useful. This provides a principled ground for
idealization. I clarify Gert’s proposal and show how it can provide scope for
idealization in a way that avoids Enoch’s challenge. However, Enoch can maintain
that since meritedness is a normative attribute, ideal observer theorists have yet
to meet his wider challenge, namely, explaining how normativity properties like
goodness and well-being can reduce to purely natural facts concerning the
responses of idealized agents. This is significant for ideal observer theories since
they have traditionally aimed to provide a naturalist ground for normativity. I
respond to this wider challenge by sketching a descriptive reading of
meritedness, according to which a merited response is merely the response that
a rational agent would have. Rationality, I suggest, can be understood in terms of
a purely descriptive reading of its constituents such as coherence. The ad hocness
challenge, as well as the more general challenge to naturalism it relates to, can
thus be shown to be met by ideal observer theories.
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CHAPTER 1: IS IDEALIZATION INHERENTLY
PROBLEMATIC?
Idealization, as we have already noted, is ubiquitous in both everyday
discourse on evaluative matters as well as the theoretical approaches moral and
political philosophers have employed to make intellectual progress on such
matters. At the same time, many philosophers have questioned its traditional
place in value theorizing. The unifying question posed by them, as mentioned, is
“why should we care about theories which assume agents and states of affairs to
be more perfect than they actually are?" What more, some of these challenges
might appear to show that there is something inherently wrong with idealization
as a practice. Thus, we might wonder whether, first, it can be shown to be
justifiable in principle, and second, whether the common ways in which it is
employed can be salvaged.
The aim of this chapter is to focus on the first question and ask if
idealization can survive in spite of the various objections leveled against it. I argue
here that it can. I consider four distinct challenges to idealization, two in political
philosophy, and two in moral philosophy. Put together, these four objections
suggest that there is something deeply problematic about idealizing when
theorizing about moral and political values. I argue that this sentiment is
misguided. Idealization is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of
these four problems. Moreover, in recognizing this, we also discover that the real
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problem for moral and political theories which idealize concerns something else,
namely, their ability to satisfy certain important theoretical constraints. After
demonstrating this, I explain, in the final section of this chapter, what the residual
worry about idealization will look like if my responses succeed. My contention
here is that, at best, idealization is problematic merely because it undermines the
prospect of satisfying the theoretical constraints that are implicated in each of the
four objections discussed.
In what follows, I first define and clarify the role that idealization normally
plays in normative theory. Then, in section II, I summarize each of these
criticisms, mentioning at points multiple versions of each. Following this, in
section III, I attempt to unify the three objections, articulating what I take to be
common amongst them. After this, in section IV, I begin responding to each
criticism. My task in this section is to show that idealization is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the occurrence of each of these objections. I conclude by briefly
outlining the implications of my arguments. I take the primary upshot of my
arguments here to be that idealization is merely incidental to each of these
problems.

1.

WHAT IS IDEALIZATION?
What’s common among all the examples provided thus far is the presence

of some falsehood that is deliberately introduced to aid some theoretical task.
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There is of course much variation in the type of falsehoods normative theories
entertain and the kinds of roles they play. Some might involve a greater departure
from some aspect of psychological or social reality than others. Some
idealizations play a supporting role, helping in the determination of the
normative results of theories whereas others appear to constitute the very
normative outputs. The thing of concern to us here, though, is the fact that they
involve a deliberate departure from reality. Accordingly, I shall take as an

idealization in normative theory, any statement made by the theory that involves
appeal to features or states of affairs in some possible world, however remote, to
arrive at results that are normative for our actual world.
Before proceeding, let me make two general remarks here. First, the way
the term “idealization” is used in this chapter is also supposed to be neutral with
respect to the distinction often made in science between its namesake and close
relative “abstraction."13 Godfrey-Smith views idealization in science as the
introduction of a distortion, and abstraction as the subtraction or omission of
features in a description.14 The latter, he notes, is almost always present in any
description we provide since including every single detail is virtually impossible,
whereas idealization is entirely optional. Others like Michael Weisberg
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Some like McMullin see the two as flipsides of each other since they both involve a simplified
(and inaccurate) representation of the real world. See McMullin, “Galilean Idealization."
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Godfrey-Smith, “Abstractions, Idealizations, and Evolutionary Biology,” 48. Also see
Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, 187; Jones, “Idealization and
Abstraction."
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characterize abstraction as the omission of everything but the core causal
features of a phenomenon.15 This second description of the term is of little
relevance to moral and political theorizing since normative theories are primarily
concerned with determining the correct normative results rather than identifying
and

explaining

the

causes

of

natural

phenomena.

Godfrey-Smith’s

characterization of abstraction, likewise, is trivially present in normative theories
but of little significance to us in this chapter. Whether we characterize the
falsehood as one introduced or the result of the removal of other true features of
the reality, what is key is the fact that either process results in a distortion. The
concern of the chapter is whether such distortions can be justified in spite of the
variety of criticisms advanced in their direction.
Second, idealizations are not always assumed as part a normative theory.
While many theories do assume, say, that everyone is rational, or mutually
disinterested, as a premise in their arguments for normative principles and
standards, others simply focus on some altered version of reality to arrive at some
normative result. Ideal advisor views are prototypical examples of theories
employing idealization in this second way. When attempting to determine what I
should do in a situation, an ideal advisor account asks what a relevantly perfect
version of me would do in that situation. My perfect counterpart’s action is the
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one that I must perform. Of course, it is plausible to read this as an instance of the
first employment of idealization (i.e., as an assumption added to the theory), but
such accounts need not assume that I am perfectly constituted in the relevant way
(e.g., perfectly rational) to deliver their normative verdicts. My ideal counterpart
need not be me at all, and yet, his actions are still binding on me all the same. So
such theories need not ask what the right thing for me to do is on the assumption
that I am, say, perfectly rational. They could simply argue that I should emulate
some other agent who possesses the traits needed to act rightly. Thus, what they
need appeal to, is the relevant counterfactual involving my ideal counterpart.
To be sure, some defenders of “ideal advisor” views of the good do in fact
describe the actual agent as being the ideal agent in some relevant sense.16 The
non-necessity claim made here is meant simply to not exclude other views of
similar ilk that do not idealize in this way. For instance, virtue theory and virtue
ethics generally does not present the idealized agent as being like any actual agent
for whom the virtuous agent’s actions are binding. The reason for this is that
virtue theory is supposed to yield an externalist account of the relevant normative
value. What is good or right for you, according to such theories, need not be
connected up with your subjective motivational set in the sort of way that
internalist accounts of reasons often argue. This chapter is meant to include both
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standardly internalist and externalist normative accounts in the list of theories
that make appeal to idealization.

2.

FOUR CRITICISMS OF IDEALIZATION
I will present the four criticisms in relatively broad terms. To be sure, the

proponents of each of these criticisms might formulate their objections in slightly
different ways. What I hope to sketch, in brief here, is the essence of each. Then
I’ll argue that there is one central idea unifying these objections to idealization,
which will pave the way for the general strategy I employ in defense of it in section
IV.

2.1.

The action-guidingness objection

Many political theories aim at articulating what a perfectly just society
looks like. As mentioned in the introduction, such theories are generally called

ideal theories. Rawls popularized the use of the term “ideal theory,” and it has
now come to be associated with his theory of justice (“justice as fairness”), but
ideal theorizing is widely employed across the history of political philosophy,
from Plato’s ideal republic to the contractarian theories of Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. All these theorists imagined a perfect vision of society in which agents
performed what justice required of them. For instance, Rousseau’s “general will”
represents what obtains when citizens set aside their personal, self-interested
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concerns and concern themselves solely with the common good. It is another
matter that such a will is at best, an approximation of what obtains within actual
democratic societies. But the first objection we will look at concerns not the
remote prospect of realizing such ideals, but their seeming irrelevance to what
might be viewed as the central aim of political philosophy: how should we remedy
our actual, imperfect society, in the here and now? The issue concerns both the
importance of addressing the present moment and the injustices which define it.
How can a theory which merely imagines perfection tell us how to address the
severe imperfections we currently face? This is exactly how David Wiens, one of
the main exponents of this criticism puts the point:
Ideal analysis typically assumes an idealized, perhaps infeasible, world. As
a result, political ideals abstract from urgent normative issues that arise
from (for example) acute resource scarcity...racial or gender injustice…or
profound political conflict...How can normative theories that abstract
from real-world challenges help us figure out what to do in a markedly
nonideal world?17
This objection is viewed as undermining the practical relevance of ideal theory.
The core contention here is any plausible political theory must be capable of
guiding action, failing which, it is of little use to us. In this sense, the objection is
grounded in a rejection of G.A. Cohen’s famous claim that the point of political
philosophy is to tell us “not what we should do but what we should think, even
when what we should think makes no practical difference."18
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Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” 243.
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2.2.

The feasibility objection

The second objection levelled against theories employing idealization
concerns the feasibility of the normative requirements they generate. Various
moral and political theories idealize to yield requirements which are unlikely to
ever be realized. Take Rawls’s two principles of justice. It is clear that no society
has or is likely to ever realize a basic structure that apportions everyone an
adequate scheme of the set of equal basic liberties as well as arrange socioeconomic inequalities in accordance with the equality of opportunity and
difference sub-principles. This is in spite of the fact that Rawls takes his vision of
ideal justice to be a realistic one, that is, one operating within the bounds of
human capability.19 Large scale social and institutional changes would have to
take place for any liberal society to realize these principles, especially given the
present political climate.
The loftiness of these standards has prompted critics like David Schmidtz,
among others, to question their normative significance. They argue that such a
theory cannot issue recommendations for justice as it concerns us, flawed
individuals living in imperfectly just circumstances, due to the assumptions it
makes about persons and what they can collectively accomplish.
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Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 6.
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Schmidtz presents one form of this criticism when he argues that Rawls
errs by idealizing away the fact that people only partially comply with the rules.
Rawls, as part of his contractarian argument for the two principles, assumes that
all deliberators behind the veil of ignorance will comply with the terms of the
contract they will form (i.e., the basic structure they will agree to live under). He
takes this to be a simplifying assumption designed to set aside worries about noncompliance that might otherwise severely complicate the deliberative procedure.
Schmidtz argues that we should not care about the output of such a decision
procedure because it is not one that is feasible for us.20 The reason it is not feasible
is that full compliance with the principles is not something we are all capable of
achieving.
Of course, Rawls is not alone in making such simplifying assumptions
about human behavior, and so, neither is his theory the sole victim of the type of
attack Schmidtz advances. Feasibility worries affect any account of individual and
societal perfection that seems out of reach for us. For instance, socialist theories
of justice such as G.A. Cohen’s, are even more culpable than Rawls’s theory since
they advance even more infeasible standards. In all such theories, idealization is
readily employed, and so, it is caught in the crossfire.
The problem of infeasibility can also arise in a different way. Consider first
the following response by a Rawlsian theorist to Schmidtz: even if it is true that
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requiring any actual society to transform itself into the ideally just one is
infeasible, the actual society might be perfectly capable of moving to a more
proximate ideal on the way to reaching the high peak, namely, that of ideal
justice. Simmons makes this very point by highlighting the intermediate role that
“non-ideal theory” plays for Rawls. The function of ideal justice is to orient us in
the right direction as we move from the status quo up to the next relevant peak
and beyond.21 Thus, we address infeasibility concerns once we understand the
proper role the account of ideal justice is to play.
Gaus responds to this type of defense by arguing that progress towards the
ideal does not involve following a clear path but instead, wandering aimlessly that
might set us further back from the highest peak of justice. Put in terms of the
infeasibility problem at hand, the criticism would be the following: the product
of idealization in normative theories such as Rawls is beyond our reach because
it does not provide us a clear and executable road-map telling us how to realize
the normative standard in question.22 This type of infeasibility objection differs
from the previous one by focusing not on the motivational incapacities of the
actual agents but rather their seeming inability to acquire the knowledge needed
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to realize the ideal. Accordingly, I will consider both these variants in my
response.

2.3.

The alienation problem

Alienation worries target the psychological differences between actual
agents and their ideal counterpart. The complaint here is that idealization severs
the connection between the two such that the ideal agent’s reactions or judgments
no longer count as being binding for her actual counterpart.23 Let’s look at this
objection more closely.
The kinds of choices we make come to affect our personalities and in turn,
future choices we make. Along the way, it is natural to ask whether we could step
back from our preferences and past choices made and examine what is truly good
for us. As Connie Rosati explains, we might seek “a standpoint fully informed
about our possible lives that we as individuals might occupy but that would
encompass all the distinct points of view we would have as the persons leading
these different lives.”24 To determine what is good for us, it seems that we need a
vantage point from which to evaluate both the actual and possible trajectories our
lives take. A natural reason for idealizing then, is to obtain that vantage point. An
agent, suitably idealized with full information about all our possible lives, would

23

Firth argues since the good is just constituted by the relevant mental state of the ideal agent, it
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presumably be able to tell us wherein the good lies.25 Rosati labels all theories of
the good that idealize in this way “Ideal Advisor Views."
Rosati highlights that for the outputs of ideal advisor accounts to be
normatively binding on the relevant actual persons, they must satisfy the
constraints that fall out of the internalist picture that motivated them in the first
place. Specifically, the outputs must be ones that an actual agent would care about
if she had full information about herself and was attending to that information
properly, that is, she is not being distracted or overlooking some bits of that
information).26 What is crucial here is that the ideal advisor has the same base
motivational set that her real-world counterpart does; all she should differ in is
the amount of information she has and her cognitive powers. Despite the fact that
the idealized agent differs from her counterpart with respect to the body of
information she has access to and her reasoning powers, her reactions to what is
good, must be ones that her real-world counterpart can meaningfully assent to
without thinking that she is assenting to the reactions of someone else. In other
words, what is required is that she be able to see herself as the ideal advisor for
the latter’s reactions to be binding on her.
Ideal advisor views fail to address this problem because the changes they
make to the actual agent yield an ideal advisor who ends up differing so greatly in
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both cognitive and conative terms so as to be alien to her. The specific failing on
their part is their underappreciation of how much change is needed to ensure that
someone would respond appropriately to the information she has after the
idealization. Besides having full information and the requisite cognitive powers,
one must also have had the relevant life experiences that motivate one to attend
to that information. But once we idealize to ensure that this too is present in an
ideal counterpart, being her seems to be very different from being the actual
agent. And since the ideal advisor was supposed to be an advisor for that agent
and not just any other, her psychological disparities nullify the normative
authority of her reactions to what is good.

2.4.

The inadequate motivation objection

David Enoch advances the third major challenge to the practice of
idealizing in value theory. He argues that theories that attempt to reduce the
normative to the responses of agents (response-dependence theories) fail to
provide adequate motivation for reducing it to that of idealized agents. I will
articulate Enoch’s objection in general terms before considering two ways to
interpret it.
The illustrations Enoch uses to make his central point involve comparison
between the need for idealization in non-normative domains and its use in
normative ones. Say we are trying to figure out which of two adjacent skyscrapers
33

is taller. Absent the ability to measure precisely, we would simply gauge by
stepping back and looking. Of course, we would recognize that this method is
faulty, and so, we might want to consider what we would have observed if, say,
we were looking at their relative heights from the right point (e.g., from a third
skyscraper at an appropriate distance away from them). This counterfactual
claim involves an idealization introduced to get us the right result. What
motivated us to engage in the measurement task was to get at some independent
fact, namely, the relative height of the two skyscrapers. The idealization was
warranted because it aided in that task. By contrast, when response-dependence
theories idealize, they do not attempt to successfully track some independent fact
of the matter about the normative. Rather, they argue that the normative standard
or value in question just is the theorized agent’s response. Given this fact, it is
clear, Enoch argues, that they cannot employ the tracking-rationale for
idealization. But what is their rationale for the idealization then? Enoch notes that
such theories generally wish to avoid the counter-intuitive results that actual
response-dependence accounts generate. For instance, if what I have a reason to
do is simply what I desire to do, then assuming I have a desire to drink the glass
of petrol that I believe contains gin, I have, as the famous example goes, a reason
to drink the glass of petrol. When response-dependence theories idealize to
discard such results, the idealization, as he puts it, is objectionably ad-hoc.27 After
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all, if what they wanted was to get the right results they antecedently endorsed,
then why even pursue a response-dependence theory?
We could read Enoch as essentially pressing idealizing theorists for
adequate justification for their idealizations. This is one way to interpret his
criticism. Whatever motivated such theorists to pursue response-dependence in
the first place is undermined when they idealize away the psychological and
sociological facts that yield undesired results. What they need to show is that the
idealizations are integral to the response-dependence view and not simply tacked
on to avoid counterexamples. Otherwise, he argues, this would be akin to “a
utilitarian who responds to the transplant case by restricting the Principle of
Utility so as not to apply to cases involving organ failure.” 28 This way of reading
his complaint would make virtually all response-dependence theories vulnerable
since such theories do seem to idealize for the sake of avoiding unpalatable
results.
However, we might instead read him as pressing on such theories on a
meta-ethical point. What he might be arguing, is that there is no good reason to
conclude that the normative thing of concern for such theorists is reducible to the
ideal-agential response they propose. In other words, the complaint might not be
that one cannot assume away faulty psychologies to avoid counterexamples;
rather, such theorists have not shown that the normative property being
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theorized reduces to the specific natural thing they claim it does. He might be
arguing against the naturalist reductionist aspect of such accounts. The
difference in the two interpretations is that addressing Enoch’s complaint in its
first form is compatible with the latter still looming large. That is, even if we could
show that the idealization was essential to the response-dependence account, this
open-question style challenge would persist.
There is some motivation for this latter reading of Enoch’s criticism. For
instance, he notes:
my critique is more powerful against naturalist, reductivist, and rather
strongly internalist views than against other idealizing views, because it is
harder to see how a naturalist, reductivist, internalist responsedependence theorist—compared to one who is willing to reject reduction,
qualify her internalism, and indeed be flexible about her naturalism—can
supply a rationale for idealization.29
The idea here seems to be that the rationale needed for idealization should
be much stronger for naturalist, reductionist views since the relevant normative
result is not merely supposed to be epistemically justified in virtue of the idealized
agent’s response, but metaphysically reducible to it. The two interpretations
canvassed here are of course compatible. Enoch might be challenging both ideal
response-dependence theorists as well as the naturalist reductionist ones
amongst them for further justification. The latter set of theorists would have to
provide extra justification given their meta-ethical aims. In my response to his
objection, I will aim to respond to both these variants.
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3.

IDEALIZATION IN TROUBLE
Each of these four criticisms targets different aspects of idealizing

normative theories. The first three worries target only the output, not challenging
the rationale for the idealization itself. Enoch’s criticism, of course, focuses on
the reason, or the alleged lack thereof, for including idealization as an input. His
criticism seems to attack idealization from the opposite direction of the other two:
while the infeasibility and alienation worries object to idealization on the grounds
that it delivers implausible outputs, Enoch argues that we cannot simply idealize

in order to deliver the right outputs. Thus, for instance, if the idealizing theorists
were to modify their idealizations to deliver outputs that escape the first three
concerns, they would succeed only in slipping down into the pitfall of ad-hocness.
This eventuality, however, does not seem likely, for these concerns, at least as
expressed by critics, seems to follow from any meaningful attempt to idealize
from actuality. This is to say, the action-guidingness, infeasibility and alienation
worries seem to arise whenever one attempts to idealize for the purpose of
determining the correct normative principles. For instance, given the rationale
for the idealization, an infeasible result seems almost guaranteed. Likewise, the
specific concern that motivates internalist theorists about the good or welfare,
namely, the need to identify what is genuinely good for an agent, seems to require
that we idealize away various actual features of that agent to the point where she
can no longer relate to her counterpart and her responses. Given the theoretical
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goals that motivate it, idealization seems to guarantee the respective implausible
outputs.
This last point captures the type of existential threat to idealization that
each of the three criticisms pose: they each seem to point to something inherently
wrong with any meaningful attempts to idealize. The qualifier “meaningful” is
worth noting here. We might idealize in ways that do not give rise to these
problems. For instance, if our idealization involves only a very mundane
departure from the actual world, such as the hair color or the shoe size of the
actual agent in question, these problems are unlikely to ever arise. What we want
to consider are the types of idealizations that are generally thought to be relevant
to the normative theoretic projects that motivate idealizers in moral and political
philosophy. Providing a full description of what the relevant facts to idealize are
is difficult, but naturally, they are likely to involve various cognitive, conative,
and physiological capacities necessary for deliberating and acting on whatever
are the correct normative requirements. To be sure, even without a precise
account of what the normative requirements themselves are, we can assess what
abilities might be needed to fulfill them. We can take these to be the objects of
meaningful idealizations. Henceforth, I will assume that any talk of idealizations
refers only to such meaningful idealizations.
The three criticisms seem to target any instance of idealization. In other
words, they seem to pose an in-principle challenge to the possibility of idealizing,
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such that idealizing thus would not yield normatively binding results. At the very
least, I will assume as much for the rest of this chapter.30 When put together, their
success would appear to leave little scope for idealization at all in normative
theorizing given what it is generally employed for. Thus, what seemed like a
mundane aspect of normative theorizing seems like a fatal flaw if these objections
go through.

4.

IS IDEALIZATION IN-PRINCIPLE OBJECTIONABLE?
If there is something inherently problematic about idealization, then it

would follow that there is no instance of idealization that is not problematic in the
relevant sense. Of course, this is compatible with there being overriding reasons
to idealize despite these problems. But that is precisely the concern: if you wish
to idealize as part of your normative theory, and idealization is inherently
problematic, then you would have to hope such overriding reasons exist to bail
the practice out. The aim of this section is to demonstrate why each of the three
criticisms in fact does not target idealization per se. In what follows, I consider
again each objection, and explore what role idealization plays in each. I explore
whether idealization is sufficient for the occurrence of the problem and argue
that there is no good reason to think it is. This by itself would nullify the in-
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The task of the preceding chapter will be to argue for this specific conclusion about the three
objections mentioned.
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principle concern about idealization since it would show that merely idealizing
does not produce these worries. However, I go further and explore whether
idealization is necessary for each of the three objections and argue that this too is
not the case. If all of this is correct, then it undermines the focus on idealization
as the source of the critics’ concerns. Idealization, it would seem, would well and
truly be off the hook.

4.1.

Idealization neither necessary nor sufficient for action
guidingness

The action-guidingness objection contends that idealizing theories are
unable to tell us how to address injustices in the here and now. The reason
idealization seems to be the source of the problem is that idealization results in
relevant empirical facts being bracketed by the theory. For instance, a theory that
idealizes agents by making them fully compliant to the demands of justice, as
Rawls’s does, seems to set aside the many injustices that have occurred precisely
because of noncompliance with these demands. As Wiens mentioned, it seems
unclear how such a theory could tell us anything about what to do when people
do not comply with the demands of justice.
However, there are good reasons for rejecting this pessimistic conclusion
about the ability of such theories to deliver action guidance. First, notice that
idealization alone cannot be sufficient for generating this problem. For instance,
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an economic theory that idealizes agents by making them perfectly rational could
still tell us something interesting about how actual, imperfectly rational agents
should conduct their economic affairs. One reason for this is that we might still
be capable of approximating the conduct of perfectly rational agents. In much the
same way, idealizing theories of justice can provide us with a blueprint for how
we, imperfectly rational agents, ought to conduct ourselves. Of course, it might
turn out that we are incapable of fulfilling these requirements, but this would not
be due to the absence of prescriptions for us, actual agents, but their infeasibility
(which will concern us in the next section). Alternatively, a theory which idealizes
could provide an account of how actual societies are to be reformed so that they
may become more just and thus more closely resembling the ideally just society.
The mere fact that a theory appeals to an idealized state of affairs to arrive at
normative standards does not mean that it cannot use those very standards to
arrive at action-guiding prescriptions for actual societies. Of course, a theory
which fails to generate action-guiding prescriptions at all would indeed be at
fault, but nothing about it relying on idealization necessitates this result. More
generally, we can safely say that a theory which idealizes is only subject to the
action-guidingness worry if it lacks additional features that (can) supply the
action-guiding prescriptions needed. Thus, the mere fact that a theory idealizes is
not sufficient to generate this worry.
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Neither is idealization sufficient for this objection to materialize. Consider
an intuitionist moral theory, such as the one advanced by W.D. Ross. 31 Such a
theory arrives at moral principles and duties for each individual by appeal to the
faculty of intuition. Ross argues that these intuitions are self-evident, and as such,
“cannot be proved, but … just as certainly need no proof."32 His theory generates
several presumptive duties, including duties of reparation, fidelity, beneficence
and non-maleficence. Despite this, we are still left wondering how each of these
duties are to apply to us in specific contexts. For instance, precisely what does a
duty of reparation require of me when I have accidentally crashed into someone’s
car? And how would the reparations I would need to pay here differ from a case
where I wronged them in some other way? Similarly, how should we resolve
conflicts between equally important duties, such as the duty of fidelity and the
duty of reparation? Ross contends that his theory of moral right merely offers us
the basis for determining what kinds of reasons count in favor of and against
some action, but is this enough to determine how we ought to act? Rossian
intuitionism might ultimately fail to deliver action-guidance, or at least to the
degree that we seek. However, such a theory does not appeal to idealization to
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Ross, The Right and the Good.

Ross, 30. To be sure, he does also state that “the moral convictions of thoughtful and welleducated people are the data of ethics, just as sense-perceptions are the data of natural science”,
but importantly, these are merely actual rather than idealized individuals.
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generate moral duties and principles. This shows that idealization is not
necessary for generating the action-guidingness objection.
An interesting question that falls out of the previous paragraph is whether
action-guidingness is something that any theory can yield. This is a question that
we will explore in the next chapter. For now, it is worth asking whether it is simply
a deep feature of moral and political theorizing that generating action-guidance
for very specific moral contexts is beyond their reach. It is generally agreed
among moral theorists that the main moral theories only yield somewhat general
prescriptions. Even consequentialism, which at least in principle gives us a
determinate basis for action, still leaves us unsatisfied. For consequentialism
requires, at least on the standard interpretation of it, that we maximize the good.
For instance, act utilitarian theories require that we maximize aggregate
happiness. But in order to do this, we would need information on variety of
things, including the predictable effects of the actions we are considering, the
degree of happiness each candidate action would generate, a general unit for
measuring happiness (for instance, does taking chocolate cake generate 5 units
of happiness or 10?), and finally a way of determining how far into the future we
must look when evaluating the likely effects of the candidate actions. Given the
complexity of the world and the difficulty of predicting future outcomes, act
utilitarianism is unlikely to tell us which specific action we should perform,
except perhaps in very specific cases, such as the hypothetical ones in philosophy
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essays and books. This simply casts wider skepticism over the possibility of
action-guidance as an achievable standard for any moral or political theory.
Nonetheless, for our purposes, we need only observe that idealization is not the
source of the problem here.

4.2.

Idealization neither necessary nor sufficient for infeasibility

Infeasibility, once again, is a problem for critics because infeasible
standards do not seem meaningfully prescriptive for us. As mentioned already,
this failure could either be the result of their motivational incapacities or the
epistemic inability. Either way, because of it, such normative accounts fail to be
action-guiding and thus, normatively relevant. Idealization seems to be the
culprit because the normative standards are arrived at by idealizing various
attributes of actual persons.
There are, however, ways to idealize without producing this problem. For
instance, one might choose to moderately idealize by imagining a set of
imperfectly benevolent and moderately rational agents who determine the
principles of justice in a society. Assuming that these agents select principles on
the grounds that their conformity requires no more benevolence and rational
agency than what they possess, it is unclear that the final principles picked would
be infeasible for us since they require only a moderate change in our individual
and social conduct.
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For an example of this sort, consider the idealization used by Jerry Gaus in
his public reason account. When theorizing about his own preferred political
principles, Gaus considers which rules a hypothetical Member of the Public
would endorse. He notes that when deliberating, she considers only the reasons
and concerns of her actual counterpart that are relevant to the formation of
publicly justified social rules.33 A world with agents that considers only relevant
reasons is clearly not as remote as one with agents that are fully rational, mutually
disinterested, or risk indifferent. But for Gaus, the social rules yielded by the
deliberation of such agents are not infeasible, unlike the principles yielded by
Rawls’s idealized agents. Thus, by his own lights, he cannot claim that all
instances of idealization would lead to the problem he pins on Rawls’s theory.
This is a general point that applies to both the ways in which a normative
standard could be infeasible. An alternative ideal theory to Rawls would not
succumb to the knowledge problem Gaus raises if it identifies an ideal whose
achievement we can chart the course toward from our present state of affairs. The
important thing to note is just that such an account is not closed off from the mere
fact of idealization in the process of normative theorizing.
Neither is idealization necessary for the problem of infeasibility. The most
frequent target of infeasibility is in fact not Rawls’s theory of justice, or for that
matter, any of the major theories that idealize away facts about actual persons or
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Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, 26.
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societies. Rather, it is consequentialism. Act consequentialist theories of right
action are ideally positioned to yield standards that are beyond the reach of us
actual agents. They also produce worries of infeasibility in both the senses
described. The agent who generally succeeds in maximizing the good is both one
that has the ability to fight off various hindering motivations, such as her
inclination to privilege kin over strangers, and also in possession of the requisite
knowledge of how to realize the right action.34 Since most of us are unlikely to
ever be capable of these, such a normative standard is infeasible on us. What actconsequentialism provides us is an example of a type of normative theory that
yields such standards without idealizing. Consequentialists do not generally rely
on any assumptions or stipulations about idealized agents. Rather, their
normative accounts flow from what they take to be the right way to respond to
objects of intrinsic value. In order words, because consequentialist theories are
not response-dependence theories, idealization, where it is present in such
theories, does not play the kind of determining role in the generation of the
output principles or the account of right action that it does in many nonconsequentialist theories that employ it. Thus, we have a counter-example to the
view that idealization is necessary for the infeasibility objection.
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4.3.

Idealization neither necessary nor sufficient for alienation

We noted that the problem of alienation arises due to the great difference
between the actual and ideal counterpart. As a result of the distinct cognitive and
conative features of the ideal counterpart, our actual agent is unable to feel like
her counterpart’s evaluations of what is good are ones that she herself would
make. As such, she does not take her counterpart’s assessment of the good to be
binding on her. If idealization is sufficient to yield this result, then any attempt to
idealize in this manner would engender this problem. However, consider an ideal
advisor view that idealizes moderately by granting the ideal counterpart not full
but increased information and cognitive powers of attention and reasoning.
Perhaps this cognitive boost is one that the actual agent herself would acquire in
the foreseeable future if she maintains the general life path that she has been on.
We could even view the advice from such an ideal counterpart as being analogous
to instances where we defer to the judgments of older or more experienced peers
or relatives who are simply further along on a general life path that we too occupy.
In such cases, we defer to their judgments because we can recognize that we are
likely to end up in their shoes one day. Of course, we might be mistaken in
thinking so, but for present purposes, assume that our actual agent has at least
justified belief in the veracity of her peer’s evaluations of what is good for her.
Now, if we arrive at this same evaluation by choosing instead to idealize from her
actual cognitive features, it looks like the problem of appreciation Rosati outlines
47

no longer troubles us. The reason is that appreciation only becomes a challenge
when the actual agent is unable to see any meaningful resemblance between
herself and her ideal counterpart. If her ideal counterpart is instead someone she
can imagine herself becoming in the near future, then she should be able to take
her normative assessments as being action-guiding for her.
To insist on the appreciation problem even here would be to risk making
the problem so insurmountable as to beg the question against the ideal advisor
theorist. That is to say, we cannot claim that appreciation only obtains when the
actual agent sees herself as being identical to or virtually identical to her ideal
counterpart for that would be to rig the game against any such ideal advisor
account. What more, this would undermine the very rationale for seeking the
advice of the ideal advisor in the first place, which was to gain access to what is in
fact subjectively good for the agent.
Of course, this last point raises the question of how much similarity
between the actual and ideal agent is needed for the actual agent to overcome the
appreciation challenge. Rosati herself does not suggest a threshold in similarity
that would answer this question. Her focus is only on the fact that an agent with
full information of the good would clearly cross this threshold of similarity and
thus engender the problem of alienation. For now, we can at least acknowledge
here that idealizing only moderately to yield an imperfect but informed and
cognitively boosted counterpart to our actual agent whom she can nonetheless
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see herself as becoming is one way in which idealization does not obviously
generate Rosati’s challenge.
Here is a case involving the sort of ideal advisor I have in mind that serves
as a counterexample to the sufficiency of idealization for the alienation worry:

Uncertain Mary: Mary wishes to know whether she should pursue a career
as a violinist or as a lawyer. She has a strong love for music, as well as a
desire to pursue various human rights causes through legal means. She
also has other desires that motivated her in one or the other direction, such
as her desire to have a financially stable career. She is disinclined to simply
make her decision based on which turns out to be the stronger desire since
she might have inadequate information or cognitive powers to attend to
the right considerations. Instead, she wishes to know what would the good
life consist in, for her. To help her determine this, we conceive of an ideal
advisor who incorporates the perspectives of her counterfactual pianist
self and the other one who pursues a career in law. This ideal agent focuses
on the relevant first and second-order desires of the present, actual Mary
that would be satisfied by either counterfactual version. The ideal agent’s
final assessment is that her good consists in her pursuing law since she
would pursue more of the total set of current desires.35
The question to ask here is whether Mary would find this judgment alienating.
Now, the dilemma Mary faces is clearly not unlike one that many of us engage in.
Additionally, in our efforts to resolve it, we might also attempt to deliberate in the
exact same way that her ideal advisor does. We might gather the relevant
information about what the life or career paths we are considering might lead to
and then assess whether the predictable outcomes comport with the cluster of
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Assume here that she does not have any obviously aberrant desires that the ideal agent might
choose to ignore. For example, we can assume that she does not desire to live only till the end of
her 20s.
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present desires we have. If this is right, then having an ideal agent perform the
deliberation on our behalf should not strike us as a reason to reject her final
evaluation. The case of Mary, I hope, illustrates how idealization might
nonetheless produce appreciation of the ideal agent’s assessment of the
subjective good for the agent.
Let us now shift our attention to whether idealization is necessary for
alienation to occur. We can ask this question in two senses. First, we might ask:
is the practice of idealizing in order to arrive at a normative conclusion necessary
for engendering the alienation worry. Alternatively, we might consider simply
whether any ideal advisor account that seeks to determine the nommoral good
for a person is necessary for the worry to arise. I will attempt to demonstrate why
idealization fails to be necessary in either case.
If we ask the question in the first, and broader sense, then we must
consider not simply the types of ideal advisor views that Rosati focuses on but
include any normative theory that idealizes. What is worth pointing out here is
that Rosati’s criticism of idealization can in fact be extended to the theories of
one’s nonmoral good as well. For instance, we might question why Rawls’s two
principles of justice are binding on us, not because realizing them is overly
burdensome on us, but because we are unable to identify with the rational,
mutually disinterested hypothetical persons behind the veil of ignorance who are
supposed to represent us. These persons are even more removed from us than
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the types of ideal advisors of concern to Rosati, and so, the appreciation problem
is only greater here. As a result, it is fair to wonder why we should take such
persons’ decisions as being normative for us. This point generalizes. Any theory
that employs idealized agents’ judgments to arrive at its normative output would
seem to succumb to the charge of alienation. Of course, such theories would not
provide us the counterexample we need here. The counterexample we need can
be obtained from reviewing what inspired the case involving Mary above.
Recall that what motivated the case involving Mary was the idea that she
can indeed identify with her ideal counterpart if she is merely an instantiation of
a future self she justifiably believes she might well become. This possible future
self would also be one that Mary thinks is very similar to some present peer of
hers who is well-placed to advise her on where her subjective good might lie.
Now, to arrive at a counterexample to the necessity of idealization for alienation,
all we would have to do is modify this scenario to something like the following:
what is objectively good (or right or just or fair, etc.) for Mary is whatever an
actual and informed sage judges to be the case. Let us assume here that, for
whatever reason, Mary cannot identify the correct moral principles except by
seeking the advice of the sage.36 This sage, due to his superior powers of
judgment, is greatly dissimilar to Mary. And yet, it would be true that she ought
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average human.
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to act on the principles he judges to be correct. It is clear that she might feel the
kind of alienation Rosati complaints about, because she is unable to see how she
herself might arrive at the normative results the sage does. The sage’s deliberative
processes are opaque to her. If we construct such normative theory, we can
generate normative outputs without any idealization. Of course, this would be a
bizarre theory, since it reduces the normative to the judgments of some actual
agents who seem no better equipped to grasp moral truth and thus, one that is
difficult to justify. Nonetheless, this problem is independent of the fact that it does
not idealize in order to generate its normative results unlike the ideal advisor
views Rosati discusses. What it does instead, is advance a potentially false account
of what the relevant normative thing reduces to.
This analysis paves the way for us to determine the necessity of idealization
if we confine the question just to nonmoral accounts of the good. Consider again
Mary’s peer who is able to give her sound advice on which career path to choose.
However, this time, imagine instead that the advisor is a senior counselor at her
university’s career services branch. She has gathered the relevant information
and is also able to deliberately soundly on how either career path might affect
someone like Mary. When asked, she evaluates these options for Mary and
concludes, with good reason, that she is best served pursuing a career playing the
violin, much to Mary’s surprise. Mary is unconvinced by the councilor because
she is unable to understand the rationale provided for her judgment. She is
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alienated from the councilor’s deliberative process and so cannot accept her
judgment as binding. Here we have a case of alienation concerning one’s
nonmoral good that does not involve idealization.

4.4.

Idealization neither necessary nor sufficient for failed
reduction

We come to the last objection against idealization. We considered two
different types of problems here that Enoch might be advancing. They are
compatible and, in his view, the latter, meta-ethical concern compounds the
former about the ad-hocness of idealization. His target is any responsedependence theory that idealizes. Let us consider the ad-hocness objection first.
This is the more general reading of Enoch’s argument, and the one he seems to
think is the essential problem with idealization. Idealization lacks justification,
according to Enoch, whenever the idealizer decides to deviate from the response
of some actual agent in order to avoid an implausible result and corrects it by
appealing instead to the appropriate ideal agent’s response. Is the appeal to any
such ideal agent sufficient for this problem to occur? Clearly, since the ideal agent
must be the sort whose judgment would give the idealizing theorist the normative
output he seeks, appeal to just any ideal agent is insufficient.37 But perhaps,
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whenever we do appeal to the appropriate ideal agent, then the problem of adhocness is generated. Or so we might think. However, as Enoch himself
recognizes, another crucial piece is needed to complete the story the responsedependence theorist wants to tell, namely, a meta-ethical account of how the
relevant normative property reduces to the response of the relevant ideal agent.
As such, the idealization cannot yet be ad hoc if this meta-ethical justification is
absent, for then, the idealized agent’s response cannot constitute the right
normative property desired by the idealizing theorist. The ideal responsedependence theory would be incomplete without this justification.
But this is perhaps a minor consideration, since it is clear that any such
theorist would at least attempt to offer a meta-ethical justification. If we subsume
this into the idealization itself, perhaps we can maintain that the idealization, as
employed by response-dependence views, is sufficient to generate ad-hocness.
However, once again, we do not have an in-principle objection. The reason is that
the problem of ad-hocness is tied to the specific motivation for the idealization
that Enoch targets. The idealization is only ad hoc when the theorist idealizes in
order to avoid the implausible result that would otherwise obtain. But this leaves
open the possibility for an alternative justification for the idealization. Enoch of
course countenances and rejects two justifications, though not on basis of their
ad-hocness. He also acknowledges that this does not rule out other possible
justifications. Being required to rule out all others, he says, would be overly
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demanding. We can take this to be acknowledgement of the claim that the
construction of an ideal response-dependence theory is insufficient for adhocness. That said, let me briefly consider an alternative justification for such a
theory in the hope of providing a little more motivation for the insufficiency
claim.
A standard rationale for the type of contractarian account of justice that
Rawls defends is what is called pure procedural justice. Rawls expresses the idea
in the following way:
the aim is to characterize this [hypothetical contract] situation so that the
principles that would be chosen, whatever they turn out to be, are
acceptable from a moral point of view. The original position is defined in
such a way that it is a status quo in which any agreements reached are
fair…thus justice as fairness is able to use the idea of pure procedural
justice from the beginning.38
The rationale for the idealization in the original position, for Rawls, is to design a
deliberative procedure that is fair, such that, when applied properly, it guarantees
a fair outcome. The ideal agents’ response is not appealed to for the sake of
arriving at a desired normative result. Of course, Rawls also views his two
principles of justice as having intuitive appeal independent of this original
position argument, and argues that we might, as part of the process of reflective
equilibrium, modify the resulting principles if they do not comport with our
considered judgments. Nonetheless, he argues that this original position
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justification for the two principles need not make any appeal to the aim of
avoiding counterintuitive results. If Rawls is correct, we have an alternative
justification that the ideal response dependence theory can appeal to without
running into Enoch’s ad-hocness worry. Interestingly, notice also that this would
be a theory in which the locus of the normativity is not merely the response of the
ideal agent herself. Rather, the normative property would be reducible to all the
conditions that characterize the decision procedure as well as the agents that are
part of it. It is the deliberative procedure itself, rather than the agent’s judgments
themselves that constitute the normative property.39 I do not have the space here
to provide a thorough defense of this response-dependence theory against
Enoch’s objection. Suffice to say, it appears to be a live option and thus one that
Enoch would have to reject to maintain his claim of having considered and
rejected all the major justifications for ideal response-dependence views.
Shifting now to focus instead on the necessity of such accounts for the
problem of ad-hocness, we should once again attend to what specifically
generates the problem. The problem of ad hocness arises whenever the theorist
deviates from the response of the actual agent to that of some other in order to
avoid the unpalatable result in question. In the Williams example involving gin
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and petrol, the concern is to appeal to an ideal agent who is able to recognize that
the glass contains petrol and not gin, and appeal to her judgment as yielding a
reason for the actual agent in the pub not to drink the glass. However, notice that
appeal to the ideal agent here is redundant if we can appeal to some other actual
agent whose knowledge of the relevant consideration can undermine the original
agent’s reason to act. For instance, imagine that the petrol was poured into the
class by a malicious bartender intent on playing a dangerous prank on the agent
in question. The bartender’s knowledge of what is contained in the drink can
serve as the basis for undercutting his unsuspecting friend’s reason to drink. It
can do this by offering us the opportunity to conceive of an alternative basis of
reasons that is not couched in terms of the idealized agent. The Williams’s model
took reasons to be couched in terms of what one would do if one had no relevantly
false beliefs about the action in question fulfilling at least one of one’s present
desires. 40 We might replace this criterion with one that states instead that one has
a reason to φ only if there is at least one actual agent who correctly believes that
φing would fulfill at least one desire within her present motivational set. On this
alternative account of reasons, our unsuspecting patron’s belief that the glass
contains gin would not yield a reason since it is false. By contrast, he would have
a reason to not drink the glass since his bartender has a true belief that not
drinking the glass would enable him to fulfill his desire to stay alive. If we adopt
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this patently absurd account of reasons, we might well generate other
counterexamples, but nonetheless, we avoid appealing to the idealized agent.
Now, of course, the scenario I have described does indeed involve a
fabrication. The point nonetheless, is that, in order to undermine the claim that
appeal to the ideal agent’s response is necessary for the generation of ad-hocness,
we need only find one counterexample where the relevant implausible output can
be avoided by appeal to some other actual agent’s judgment. The scenario
sketched here should gesture at how that counterexample might look like. The
counterexample might involve something as mundane as my roommate’s
knowledge that the liquid I am about to pour on the shirt I wish to hand-wash is
bleach rather than detergent. And it should be clear that we can generate more
than one such counterexample. This gives us the resources to resist the necessity
claim about idealization generating ad-hocness.
Thus far, we have looked at how we might respond to Enoch’s argument,
viewed as challenging the ad-hocness of idealization. If we instead focus on the
meta-ethical variant of his argument, then the complaint would instead be that
we do not have a good justification for attempting to reduce the normative
property being theorized about to the response of the idealized agent. Even so, we
can still undermine the idea that idealization is necessary and sufficient for the
occurrence of this problem. Let’s attend to the sufficiency claim first.
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The open-question argument does not even rear its head if there is no
reduction of the normative to the natural. The question for us is simply whether
there could be a response-dependence account that idealizes without performing
such a reduction. As it turns out, Julia Markovits provides us with one such
account. According to her view, one has a subjective reason to φ if and only if one
would be motivated to φ if one were procedurally rational.41 Reasons are couched
in terms of the response of a hypothetical agent. Additionally, Markovits takes
reasons to be irreducibly normative facts, and thus, her ideal responsedependence account is not subject to the open-question argument. This proves
that idealization is insufficient to generate the open-question style worry that
Enoch discusses.
To see why it is not necessary either, we need only refer back to two
examples discussed in the previous section on the necessity of idealization for the
alienation problem. The sage and the career counselor can determine what is
good for Mary even though they are not hypothetical agents. As such, a responsedependence account that reduces the relevant normative property, namely what
is good, to the evaluations of such actual agents, would escape the reduction
problem. Even if we think that the relevant normative property does not reduce
to their judgments, we only need to construct one plausible counterexample of a
reduction to an actual agent’s response. One such candidate might come from
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Mill’s test for higher pleasures involving competent judges. Competent judges are
those who have experienced a full range of pleasures and are capable of
comparing and determining their relative quality. We might think that the right
account of what is good for us reduces to such persons’ judgments.

5.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Let us now take stock and then understand what would follow if the

arguments made in this chapter are successful. Once again, I considered whether
each of the three objections shows that idealization is problematic in-principle,
arguing that they are not. Arguing thus required showing that idealization as
employed in the various normative theories, is not sufficient for the generation
of each of these problems. However, I also attempted to show that idealization is
not necessary for them. The upshot of this latter claim was that the use of
idealization is merely incidental to the occurrence of each objection. If all of this
is correct, what does it tell us about idealization? One thing it surely tells us is that
we can permissibly idealize in ways that would not engender these problems.
However, it is unclear how much scope it leaves for any worthwhile attempts to
idealize. Let me explain why. In many of my responses to these three objections,
I explored how we might alter various features of the idealizing normative
accounts to dodge these threats. For instance, to challenge the necessity claim,
we might alter our account of reasons to yield a non-idealized account of
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rationality that nonetheless delivers the correct result in cases such as the one
involving the drink containing petrol. Likewise, it appears that we would need to
moderate the degree to which we idealize in order to avoid idealization being
sufficient for at least the infeasibility and alienation worries. Given the seeming
need to make such modifications to avoid these objections, we might well wonder
whether the success of my arguments give us little more than a pyrrhic victory.
For what is the use of providing such defenses if they do not allow theorists to
continue to idealize as they have normally done till now? Thus, the arguments in
this chapter seem to require a major change in the status quo vis-à-vis the practice
of idealizing in moral and political philosophy.
I take this to be the main problem of this chapter. What the succeeding
chapters will aim to do is address this problem. This chapter has not directly
challenged or responded to each of the three major criticisms of idealization.
Rather, it has attempted to show that idealization can survive in spite of them.
And showing this was significant because it undermines the impression that
idealization is inherently at fault. In the rest of the dissertation, I aim to directly
address each criticism. If those chapters also succeed, then the dissertation as a
whole would have served to vindicate the status quo as far as the practice of
idealization is concerned.
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CHAPTER 2: NONIDEAL THEORY, INCOMPOSSIBILITY,
AND THE MORAL PRIORITY OF BASIC STRUCTURE
REFORM

1.

INTRODUCTION
A natural way to respond to the deep and persistent injustices we see in our

world is to focus directly on targeted solutions. For instance, we often arrive at
conclusions about how to make schools, housing, and the workplace more just by
focusing on each problem in isolation, and considering what measures would
remedy the injustice at hand. We apply our preferred standards of justice directly
to such problems. Call this approach to addressing injustices in society the

piecemeal approach. Another way to approach the redress of injustice is to focus
on top-down reform. This is the approach that political philosophers have
traditionally favored. According to this approach, we first ascertain the makeup
of our most basic institutions, that is, the basic structure of society, which then
determine how to organize the various aforementioned local institutions. Call this
alternative the holistic approach.42

42

I take many of the canonical figures of political philosophy to adopt this top-down approach,
from the ancients such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics (in particular, Zeno and Chrysippus), the
contractarian thinkers of the modern era such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, to the main
twentieth-century political philosophers such as Rawls, Nozick, Scanlon, Dworkin, Raz, and G.A.
Cohen. Each of these theorists focuses on basic structure reform, and how more local changes can
be determined once such reform has taken place.
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The contrast between the piecemeal and holistic approaches captures one
important source of debate between ideal and nonideal theorists. Ideal theory
describes what society would look like if our basic structure was perfectly just and
generally complied with.43 Nonideal theorists contend that ideal theory fails to be
action-guiding. While this objection comes in various forms, an interesting and
underexplored one concerns ideal theory’s ability to tell us how to reform our
society.44 A description of the perfect basic structure does not appear to answer
this question, and even when it does, it seems to focus on realizing the perfectly
just basic structure rather than on remedying present injustices in a targeted
manner. Accordingly, some have argued that focusing on what the just basic
structure looks like might even lead us astray in our attempts to realize.45 They

43

In providing such an account, ideal theory idealizes, since it stipulates, contrary to reality, that
everyone will generally comply with the demands of justice. For an influential discussion and
defense of this idealization (“the full compliance assumption”), see Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal
Theory.”
44
A more widely discussed version of the action-guidingness objection is that ideal theory is
infeasible, either because actual, imperfect agents like us will be incapable of realizing ideal
justice, or because we lack knowledge about how to implement the ideal institutional
arrangements. For prominent versions of these two objections, see Schmidtz, “Nonideal Theory”;
Schmidtz, “A Realistic Political Ideal”; Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal; Wiens, “Political Ideals and
the Feasibility Frontier”; Wiens, “Against Ideal Guidance." Similarly, others argue that ideal
theory is infeasible because of the false assumptions (“idealizations”) it employs, such as that all
agents will comply with the requirement of justice. For instance, Charles Mills argues that by
“abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice
in human interactions and social institutions, [we are] thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-asidealized-model will never be achieved.” Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” 170. Also, see O’Neill,
“Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics”; Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory."
45
For instance, Elizabeth Anderson argues that “if...the ideal society would be a color-blind one
in which everyone adhered to principles of individual responsibility, a work ethic, and traditional
family values, the solution would appear to be to end race-conscious policies, preach the right
values to individuals, and back them up with punitive measures against those who fail to measure
up.” Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, 4.
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argue that we can do away with ideal theory, and adopt alternative approaches
such as applying our preferred moral standards to diagnose and identify solutions
for problems of justice where they occur. The piecemeal and holistic approaches,
express one important way in which ideal and nonideal theorists diverge with
respect to the question: how should we approach reform in order to make our

society more just? Since this question concerns how our theories of justice should
guide action, we might term this the Action Guidingness Question.
In this chapter, I investigate the action-guidingness question by raising a
deeply troubling yet underexplored problem facing our attempts at reform. To
avoid the confusion that often ensues with talk of “ideal” and “nonideal theory”, I
will examine this question by evaluating the piecemeal and holistic approaches
to reform. Doing so, as I demonstrate, will eventually reveal why ideal theory, in
contrast to nonideal theory, offers us a more morally and, to a lesser extent,
practically satisfying way to approach the question of action-guidingness.46
I pursue two aims in this chapter. First, I show that our attempts at reform
are complicated by a troubling feature of social institutions. Many of our
institutional arrangements are interconnected in such a way that reforming one

46

“Ideal” and “nonideal theory” have been conceived in overlapping but distinct ways. I take ideal
theory to concern what a perfectly just society (under conditions of general compliance) looks
like, whereas nonideal theory, as its alternative, concerns what justice requires under conditions
of partial compliance with the principles of justice. That said, I will only defend the part of ideal
theory that focuses on realizing the ideally just basic structure. For a useful discussion of different
conceptions of “ideal” and “nonideal theory,” see Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory”; Hamlin
and Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals."
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set can undermine our ability to reform others. I call the problem created by the
interconnectedness of institutions the problem of incompossibility. The problem
of incompossibility highlights the need to take seriously the compatibility of our
preferred solutions in different institutional contexts, and what this implies for
the types of principles and rules we need in order to arrive at action-guiding
prescriptions.
My second aim is to show that, by embracing reform in the top-down
manner suggested by the holistic approach, we can arrive at a more morally
satisfying way to negotiate the incompossibility problem. Incompossibility
threatens both the piecemeal and holistic approaches, and this highlights the
difficulty of arriving at action-guiding solutions. That said, I argue that the holistic
approach’s attention to the morally significant role of the basic structure in
shaping people’s lives gives us a strong moral reason for favoring it over its
counterpart. In addition, I provide a sketch of how a carefully crafted set of basic
structure-level institutions might yield a feasible way to constrain and resolve
more local-level institutional conflicts. In the final section of the chapter, I
explain how my defense of this approach can pave the way for ideal theorists to
focus on the perfectly just basic structure. While this does not serve as a full
defense of ideal theory, it nonetheless provides an important reason to favor ideal
theory over nonideal theory.
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In what follows, I first expand, in Part 1 on the motivation for the
piecemeal approach and how it would work in Part 2. Then, in Part 3, I raise the
problem of incompossibility, describing what it consists in, and why the
piecemeal theorist cannot get out of it easily. In Part 4, I clarify and defend the
holistic approach, before laying out the implications of my argument for the
action-guidingness of ideal theory in Part 5.
Before we go on, let me make an important clarification. The debate in this
chapter is methodological in nature. My focus is on the appropriate ways to
theorize and identify proposals for remedying conditions of injustice in our
society.47 The incompossibility problem highlights the need to alter how we
approach these matters. My focus is not on the metaphysical nature of moral
properties themselves. Instead, the requirements I extract for how we should
think about the justice of institutions are drawn from the moral commitments of
piecemeal theorists. Given what they think makes this or that institutional
proposal morally significant, my argument shows why they are forced to think
non-locally about matters of institutional justice. Key here is the assumption that
our moral commitments are subject to a basic consistency requirement.48

47

For simplicity’s sake, throughout this essay, I shall take justice and injustice to be binary
opposites. Thus, a world without injustice would thereby be a just world.
48
Relatedly, my focus is not on interpersonal disagreements between piecemeal theorists about
whose ideas for reform should win out in cases of conflict. Rather, my claim is that for any one
piecemeal theorist, given her theoretical commitments (which I will outline shortly) and her
preferred reform strategies, she is subject to the problem of incompossibility.
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2.

THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH
Despite not being the traditional way that political philosophers have gone

about their work, the piecemeal approach has received much support in recent
years. As mentioned, its growing influence is motivated in large part by what
many have argued is the practical inefficacy of the dominant approach to thinking
about questions of justice. I will highlight two important features that are relevant
for my subsequent argument. Then, I will say something about how piecemeal
theorizing might work. This will set us up for our investigation into the problem
of incompossibility in Part 3.

2.1.

The practicability and moral adequacy conditions

We saw that criticism of ideal theory motivates the piecemeal approach.
The way it does this is by highlighting the need for arriving at practical, actionguiding solutions to problems of injustice. To the extent that ideal theory fails to
tell us how to go about changing the world, where this involves identifying
recommendations for reform that are feasible, it represents a departure from the
piecemeal approach. Call this the practicability condition of the piecemeal
approach.
Amartya Sen’s famous objections to ideal theory motivate the importance
of the practicability condition and by extension, the appeal of the piecemeal
approach. Sen argues that ideal theory fails to be practically relevant since it is
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neither necessary nor sufficient for determining what measures we should take
to alleviate injustices. If we care about remedying “manifest injustices” such as
“iniquities of hunger, illiteracy, torture, arbitrary incarceration, or medical
exclusion”, then we ought to focus directly on what is needed to remedy them
rather than on “looking only for the simultaneous fulfilment of the entire cluster
of perfectly just societal arrangements demanded by a particular transcendental
theory."49 In his view, if we discover that some society S1 is less just than society
S2 because S1 contains injustices A, B and C not present in S2, then we might want
to make S1 more just by focusing on what is needed to remedy A, B and C rather
than focusing on making S1 more like the fully just society SJ. Notice though, the
following concomitant of his view here: since these injustices are severe enough
to motivate our concern, our priority should be addressing them rather than on
fixes to the basic structure of S1 (assuming that these two reform projects do not
overlap).
The important point here is that Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s focus on aiming
reform at moving us closer to the ideally just basic structure can also naturally be
read as a criticism of the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure over other areas
in society, for what should guide our reform agenda is the very natural thought
that there exist serious injustices that need remedying. Thus, while Sen himself
goes on to employ a social choice theoretic approach to comparing the relative
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Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?."
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justness of social institutions, the spirit of his critique motivates thinking about
reform in a piecemeal manner.
A second core feature of the piecemeal approach is moral adequacy. That
our theories issue practicable solutions matters little if the solutions do not
address the injustice at hand. Instead, the solutions must realize justice.
Piecemeal theorists thus seek to identify just solutions to problems. This point
might seem trivial, but its importance will become clearer later in the chapter.
For now, it suffices to note that the piecemeal approach, in focusing on
practicable solutions, does not eschew its commitment to justice, or whatever
other normative value it pursues. In this regard, it is like the holistic approach.
Both approaches seek to ascertain what justice, fairness, equality, or some other
such moral value requires.
Of course, there are other normative values to which our action-guiding
solutions might also aim. Efficiency, stability, and publicity to mention a few. But
given that the piecemeal approach is supposed to be a way of confronting
injustice, the variant of it that interests us here is one that focuses on morally
adequate solutions to such problems. Thus, the focus is on moral rather than
normative adequacy more generally. We shall set aside piecemeal approaches
that merely aim at non-morally adequate solutions.50

50

Hobbesian solutions to institutional problems are perhaps the paradigmatic examples of such
an approach. A Hobbesian might aim at realizing practical solutions that serve the self-interest of
individuals. This is compatible with individuals being morally motivated. In cases in which the
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2.2.

The piecemeal approach in action

While numerous political philosophers have highlighted the importance
of moving away from ideal theorizing towards the piecemeal approach, the work
of David Wiens and Elizabeth Anderson will be particularly instructive in helping
us see how piecemeal theorizing might proceed.51 Wiens’s piecemeal approach
centers around what he calls “institutional failure analysis.” This three-step
process involves: (1) identifying first those institutions that fail to realize moral
values widely held in society (failure identification); (2) engaging in a causal
analysis of the salient institutional features that give rise to the failure (causal
analysis); and (3) prescribing institutional solutions that would feasibly avoid the
failures (failure avoidance).52
Similarly, Anderson argues that we should ascertain “how institutions
work to attribute desired or undesired consequences to the [institutional
solutions] we are trying to realize, or to contingent features of the practice or its
background conditions that we might be able to change.”53 Like Wiens, she takes

body of individuals for whom a piecemeal solution is satisfactory are primarily morally motivated,
moral considerations are going to figure heavily into the overall normative adequacy of the
solutions. For examples of such an approach, see Hobbes, Leviathan; Gauthier, Morals by
Agreement; Galston, “Realism in Political Theory”; Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics. Some of
Jerry Gaus’s recent work also moves in this direction. See Gaus, “Self-Organizing Moral Systems:
Beyond Social Contract Theory”; Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal.
51
For other instances of the piecemeal approach, see Morrow and Svoboda, “Geoengineering and
Non-Ideal Theory."
52
Wiens, “Prescribing Institutions Without Ideal Theory*."
53

Anderson, “Reply to Critics of The Imperative of Integration,” 377.
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our proposed solutions to be subject to constant refinement as we improve our
causal analysis. Unlike Wiens, however, Anderson engages in failure analysis by
appealing to a particular account of justice, namely, relational equality. On this
view, justice is realized by supplanting power structures — whether these are
formal institutions or social practices — that prevent individuals from living
together as social equals. Anderson suggests a plethora of institutional schemes
for realizing social equality, both at the level of the basic structure, and more local
rules and practices.54
The difference in the failure analysis standards between Wiens and
Anderson might make us wonder how a piecemeal theorist ought to arrive at
solutions that realize moral adequacy. For instance, is she to use one general
principle of justice, or might she use a variety of principles? If the latter, could
she appeal to different moral values — for instance, justice, desert, autonomy and
welfare-maximization — or must all the principles utilized fall under the same
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For instance, she argues in favor of integration of blacks and whites through both formal and
informal measures that would ensure the sharing of social spaces, generate intergroup dialogue
in democratic decision-making and coordination over shared goals in the workplace, schools,
sports teams, military, etc. Anderson, The Imperative of Integration. Similarly, she contends that
securing accountability and non-domination for employees requires implementing a robust set of
constitutional rights (such as a strong right to exit) and greater voice for workers in firm decisionmaking. Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk
about It). More generally, Anderson argues that relational equality demands that each have equal
access to the social conditions necessary for realizing their “desired functionings” (their action
plans in life). This constitutes her capabilities view. This view requires that, for instance, we
reform both laws and social norms to address oppressive practices such as female genital
mutilation and gender discrimination. Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?." For a more
detailed exposition of her “non ideal theoretic” position, see Anderson, “Reply to Critics of The
Imperative of Integration”; Reply to Critics of The Imperative of Integration.
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general value (e.g., justice)? And are each of these principles to be applied to all
moral problems or only to specific ones (e.g., the principle of welfaremaximisation applies only to questions surrounding the distribution of economic
goods)? For the purposes of this chapter, I will consider only monist piecemeal
theories, that is, ones which aim at realizing a single value, and which subsume
more local principles (such as those for education policy in a certain county) to
this one general value (e.g., justice). The problem I raise for piecemeal theory
applies equally well, if not more seriously, for value pluralist versions of
piecemeal theory. I choose to focus on the monist variant so as to address the
suspicion that the problem of incompossibility I raise for piecemeal theorizing
only affects the pluralist variant.55

3.

THE INCOMPOSSIBILITY PROBLEM
In this part, I articulate the problem of incompossibility and then show

how it applies to the piecemeal approach. While the problem also affects the
holistic approach I defend later, my interest here is to illustrate the problem by
using the piecemeal approach as my example. In Part 4, I clarify the specific ways
in which the holistic approach faces this problem before going on to defend it.

55

Similarly, a piecemeal theorist might appeal to just one value (e.g., justice) but appeal to
numerous different principles, each for a different context or problem, such as a principle for just
migration, and one for just access to healthcare without these being subsumed or grounded in
some more general principle of justice. I also set these aside for the same reason.
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The piecemeal theorist tells us that when theorizing about injustice, we
should focus directly on each injustice, asking what caused it and what might be
needed to remedy it, and likewise for the next injustice, and so on. Adopting this
approach would give us a list of solutions for tackling all the injustices that we
face. If we succeed in implementing these solutions, our world would be more
just.56 But can all these solutions be realized in the same world? In this part, I
argue that theorizing about injustice in a piecemeal manner commits us to a
potentially incompossible set of solutions.57

3.1.

Understanding the problem

Let’s call any two or more sets of institutional arrangements compossible
if, given both hard constraints (logical, nomological, and biological limits) and
soft constraints (economic, cultural, and institutional limits), they are realizable
in the same world.58 Incompossibility obtains when they fail to be compossible.59
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Remember that we are staying silent on the veracity of our beliefs about justice. Thus, what we
succeed in here is realizing greater justice as we see it.
57
Philippe Van Parijs gestures at something like an incompossibility argument in his objection to
efficiency-based arguments for basic income. He notes that defenses of universal basic income
that are based on the need to achieve specific goals, such as fighting poverty or reducing longterm unemployment, might undermine the pursuit of other important institutional reform goals.
See Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform , 24–25.
58
I follow others in the literature on political feasibility here by differentiating feasibility
constraints this way. For a helpful discussion on this, see Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, “Political
Feasibility."
59
The term “compossibility”, of course, originates from Leibniz, who appeared to use the term to
refer both to individuals and substances in the possible worlds God could create. His use of the
term is closely tied to what we think of as “metaphysical possibility.” See Leibniz, Philosophical
Writings. Steiner uses the term “compossibility” to refer to the possibility of exercising rights. See
Steiner, “The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights."
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Institutional arrangements consist of laws and policies (formal rules). 60 That
institutions must respect the limits of logical, nomological, and biological
possibility is clear enough.61 But why include soft constraints? The reason is
piecemeal theory’s commitment to practicability.62 Soft constraints such as
economic and cultural factors can undermine present or near-future reforms
even if they are surmountable in the long-term.63 Unless we view reform as a longterm project that involves gradually altering presently entrenched economic and
cultural limitations — which the piecemeal theorist does not — our aim should be
to identify solutions that work within these constraints.
The same point holds for “institutional constraints.” The operation of
central (e.g., federal) and local (e.g., state or county) institutions involves both
complexities surrounding the effectiveness of legislation and enforcement of
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Here I exclude social norms and practices (informal rules) since the occurrence of
incompossibility, formal rules are sufficient. This is not to say that conflicting informal rules
cannot generate incompossibility, or that such rules are not important. Both sets of rules are
important for the effective realization of justice. For instance, market solutions to moral problems
require both legislation and norms involving mutual trust and cooperation. Similarly, racial
integration cannot happen through new laws alone. Institutional theory studies the development,
necessary constituents and interaction of such institutions. For a useful introduction to this area,
see North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of
Institutions and Decisions).
61
After all, if a solution for how to fix a present institution demands something logically
impossible, then there’s no sense in which it is practicable.
62
For instance, Anderson states that the focus of her theoretical approach is “on what we can and
should do, given the constraints under which we currently live.” Anderson, “Reply to Critics of
The Imperative of Integration,” 4.
63
As Tyler Cowen notes, “Modal logic usually operates within a broader notion of the feasible than
would resolve extant debates over the feasible set in policy or political philosophy.” Cowen, “The
Importance of Defining the Feasible Set,” 6.
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laws, as well as their interaction with the behavior and expectations of private
citizens. As we will see, the problem of incompossible institutional solutions often
arises because private citizens respond to the various incentives of new reforms
by adjusting their behavior in ways that end up undermining the effective
realization of a different set of institutional reforms. What’s worth noting here is
that institutional constraints, in effect, reduce to social psychological facts about
how agents respond to their social and legal environment in the present and near
future.
How might incompossibility obtain? Consider solutions to injustices in
four distinct domains: education, housing, healthcare, and employment. It is not
difficult to see how institutional alterations to the workings of one of these
domains can impact institutions in another. For instance, changes in the property
tax rates in a residential area can lead to long-term residents being forced to move
out of the city to lower-income areas, which in turn puts a strain on the ability of
local schools and community services to provide adequate support for those in
need. Inadequate access to education and social services can hamper one’s
employment prospects. This, in turn, is likely to undermine public health, both
due to the increased stress of low-wage work (or unemployment), and inadequate
access to healthcare.
What this example shows is that institutional arrangements are entangled,
in that, the workings of one has bearing on operation of others. Of course, in some
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cases the connection between entangled institutional sets is easy to observe, as in
the example above. In others, the connections will be mediated by other rules and
practices such as the state’s fiscal policy and public education campaigns, making
their cumulative effects less transparent. Nonetheless, this familiar example is
sufficient to make us realize that many institutions do have such cumulative
effects, which are discernible only once we understand how they depend on and
affect each other.
Are there examples of institutional arrangements generating morally
suboptimal results that are less obvious? Jon Elster’s influential work on the
operation of local institutions is particularly useful here. Elster discusses three
ways in which policies aimed at realizing local justice can have unintended
effects.64 First, policies can negatively affect a subset of the population they are
intended to help (secondary effects). For instance, African Americans are less
likely to receive kidney transplants even in the absence of any explicit
discrimination. The reason for this is the cumulative effect of three disparate
facts: African Americans are more likely to need kidney transplants due to their
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Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens, 1992.
Elster defines local justice as the “decentralized allocation of scarce goods and necessary
burdens.” This is to be contrasted with what he calls “global justice”, which involves a central
government or national-level institutions attempting to realize distributive justice. Paradigmatic
examples of local justice issues in Elster’s work include the allocation of organs for transplant,
admission to selective higher education institutions, selection of young men for military service,
and choice of tenants for public housing. See Elster, “Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate
Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens,” April 1, 1991.
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higher rates of end-stage renal disease; less likely to become kidney donors; and
less likely to find donors with matching antigens.65
Second, attempts at local justice can generate negative incentive effects,
motivating people to engage in costly behavior in order to secure scarce goods.
An example of this when people voluntarily relocated to slums in order to obtain
public housing in Israel.66 Third, the compound effect of different local
institutions attempting to realize justice might be wider injustice (compound
effects). For example, imagine an individual who becomes a casualty of some fair
employee retention policy, is then picked randomly in a draft for military service,
and is then turned down for medical school because of an affirmative policy.
While each of these policies might be designed to realize justice, they could end
up combining to place an unduly large burden on that individual.67
Even though Elster’s examples are local in nature, they are highly relevant
for piecemeal theorizing. There are two reasons for this. First, the types of effects
Elster discusses here might also occur at less local levels. After all, there is
nothing about the nature of secondary effects, negative incentives, and
compound effects that suggests that they are peculiar to problems of local justice.
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Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens , 1992, 116.

To be sure, Elster also discusses how local institutions can generate positive incentives for
conduct. For instance, people going to college to obtain deferment from military service has
positive spin-off benefits for society. Similarly, the practice of awarding custody to the primary
caretaker might induce parents to spend more time with children. See Elster, 130–131.
67
This is Elster’s own example, though we can substitute it for any other that involves a similar
result. While each policy realizes justice, its combined effect can be injustice towards some
individuals.
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The second reason is more telling. Piecemeal theorizing, as we have noted, adopts
a targeted approach, homing in on the source of injustice in both its analysis and
subsequent recommendations for reform. As such, both local and general reform
measures are recommendable. This, however, raises the possibility that many
local solutions for reform recommended by the piecemeal approach will interact
with other, less local ones that operate within the same domain. For instance,
reforms to local housing policy can impact larger national-level housing remedies
and vice versa. This adds another level of complexity to the entanglement
between institutions. If interaction can happen both between local institutions as
well as between general institutions, then the threat of some remedies stymying
attempts to realize justice elsewhere is only greater.68
To sum up, the problem of incompossibility is the following: institutional
arrangements, across the various domains (e.g., education) and levels (i.e., local
or general) of society are interconnected in ways that makes it difficult for us to
confidently say we can successfully realize all our desired reforms. Even if the
piecemeal theorist was able to identify some of these interconnections, the task
of determining how adjustments in her theory, with regard to those set of
interconnected institutions, would interact with other sets, and how those would
interact with still other sets, and how, at the same time, the sum of these sets
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For an analysis of unintended effects, see Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of
Purposive Social Action."
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would interact with still other sets, would make the overall task of weeding out
incompossibility worries insurmountable. The consequence of the entire set of
institutional proposals being incompossible is the following: they cannot all be
ways to make our society more just, at least given the feasibility standard the
piecemeal theorist imposes on all potential institutional solutions.69
It is worth noting that the problem of incompossibility can also apply at the
international level. Indeed, Simon Caney’s discussion of whether we should treat
responsibilities pertaining to climate change in isolation of “considerations about
global and intergenerational justice in general (including issues such as trade,
development, poverty, and health)” (which he terms the Isolationalist Approach)
rather than in conjunction with such considerations (the Integrationist
Approach), closely mirrors my distinction between the piecemeal and holistic
approaches to reform.70 Caney argues that the isolationist approach faces
potential incompossibility worries. For instance, if it proposes that we provide
certain resources to present generations in a way that would foreclose such
provisions to future generations, then its prescriptions “undercut its ability to
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The incompossibility objection to the piecemeal approach should not be understood as targeting
the absence of principles undergirding it. As mentioned, the piecemeal approach to addressing
local injustices can also appeal to principles. Thus, we should not confuse this debate about the
plausibility of local nonideal theory with the more familiar one between generalists and
particularists about moral principles. Particularism, as defended by Dancy and others, is a view
about whether normative principles play any role in practical matters. For Dancy’s seminal
version of particularism, see Dancy, Ethics Without Principles.
70
Caney, “Just Emissions."
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realize its own principles."71 More interestingly, Caney also offers pragmatic
reasons to take incompossibility worries seriously. He argues the isolationist
approach "does not necessarily facilitate agreement and will, in fact, prevent an
international climate agreement that reduces emissions because at least one
major player (China and perhaps also India) will not reduce emissions unless its
developmental imperatives are borne in mind."72 I take Caney’s objections to
piecemeal reform to capture much of the same concerns I am raising here. That
said, the incompossibility argument I am making concerns not people’s
willingness to accept different piecemeal institutional solutions but rather the
ability of such solutions to work as they are supposed to (even granting that the
agents responsible for running and supporting such institutions perform their
duties). Thus, my argument focuses more narrowly on non-pragmatic reasons to
worry about incompossibility in contrast to Caney’s.

3.2.

Is the incompossibility problem overstated?

We might wonder whether we have overstated how big of a concern the
incompossibility problem is for piecemeal theorists. After all, Wiens and
Anderson explicitly mention the need to understand the causal underpinnings of
the faulty policies and practices. It therefore seems that, short of denying the
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Caney, 295.
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Caney, 280.
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worry I have raised here, they would simply re-emphasize the importance of the
“causal analysis” stage of the piecemeal theoretic process. A good piecemeal
theorist, they would claim, is one who locates potential sources of conflict
between different institutions, at all levels.
While this response is merited, it also underestimates the way in which the
problem matters for the piecemeal approach. Remember what the piecemeal
approach states. It tells us how we ought to approach each injustice present in our
political and social institutions. If it represents the correct way to do so, then the
solutions we would arrive at by implementing it would be the right ones. In
principle, we could arrive at a full set of institutional recommendations, of
varying degrees of generality, for realizing justice in all the domains of social life.
But do we have any good reason to think that all these solutions would be
compossible? My contention is simply that we would not.73 And the fact that we
do not have good reason to think so is deeply troubling for the piecemeal
approach, since, in setting out to arrive at morally adequate solutions that are
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Thus, I am not claiming that the entire set of piecemeal solutions would indeed be
incompossible. While the actual compossibility of a theory’s prescriptions matter hugely, the fact
that a theory might well generate impracticable action-prescriptions is also significant.
Remember again that the main criticisms of ideal theory focused on the fact that they seem
incapable of being action-guiding. Incompossibility threatens piecemeal theory with a potentially
worse form of impracticability, since internal (practical) inconsistency seems worse than
principles merely being difficult to realize.
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feasible, it ends up giving us directives that we cannot confidently say would make
our world more just. In other words, it fails on its own terms.74
An important upshot of my reply here is that merely addressing the
problem of incompossible solutions when they arise is not a promising avenue.
This is because any attempt at addressing such institutional conflicts whenever
they occur might only give rise to incompossible results elsewhere. And resolving
that second incompossibility might give rise to a third elsewhere, and so on.
Again, this might well not happen, but given that we are thinking in a piecemeal
manner, there is no good reason to think that it would not happen, and that is
what matters for piecemeal theorizing.

3.3.

Why the piecemeal theorist should care?

At this point, the piecemeal theorist might respond with a shrug and a look
of slight bemusement, as if to say, “what more can we do, short of giving up
altogether?” In a moment, I will say why we are not devoid of alternatives,
contrary to the piecemeal theorist’s suggestion here. But for now, notice that this
response betrays another unsettling fact about piecemeal theory. If the piecemeal
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Our focus on what actions and remedies are feasible should not be taken to reduce the debate
between the piecemeal approach and its alternatives to a debate about the appropriate way to
understand the dictum “ought” implies “can.” What is feasible need not simply reduce to what we
can do. Instead, feasibility might concern a more stringent standard than mere ability. Thus, even
if incompossible institutional sets can be realizable, the fact that their realization is not feasible
matters independently. Piecemeal theorists care about feasibility independent of our ability to
realize actions. For an insightful overview on this matter, see Southwood, “The Feasibility Issue."
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theorist contends that the correct response to the problem of incompossibility is
to soldier on in our attempts to remedy injustice, then her inattention to the
problem suggests a lack of genuine commitment to justice. After all, if you really
did care about justice and making our institutions better, would you not take care
to ensure that your attempts at making them better do not end up undermining
justice in other ways? It would be one thing if the piecemeal theorist was simply
focused on a subset of problems and took her methodological approach to be
appropriate for just those ones. But we are considering the view, endorsed by
critics of ideal theory, that piecemeal theorizing is the way to think about all
matters of justice. And taking them to hold this view is not uncharitable, since it
follows naturally from numerous criticisms of ideal theory. Thus, piecemeal
theorists, given their commitment to feasible means of realizing justice, cannot
disregard the worry that the sum of all the piecemeal solutions they would favor
might be incompossible.

3.4.

Prioritizing the most severe injustices in the face of
incompossibility

One might get the sense that I have ignored an important and very natural
way in which piecemeal theorists can get around the problem of incompossibility.
When faced with the prospect that their proposed reforms are incompossible, the
piecemeal theorist could choose to prioritize the gravest wrongs present in our
83

society. And doing so seems perfectly reasonable since the presence of such
wrongs is what motivates us to reform our society in the first place. Thus, it
appears that the piecemeal approach to remedying injustice is able to negotiate
the problem of incompossibility in a way perfectly in line with our moral
sensibilities.
In response, I want to first clarify the problem I have raised for the
piecemeal approach should not be viewed as denying that the piecemeal theorist
has no resources to address it. Indeed, there will be cases in which the moral
importance of certain reforms far outweighs those of other incompatible ones
such that we clearly ought to prioritize the former. For instance, ending
systematic religious or racial persecution seems more pressing than many other
injustices in domains like education and housing. In such cases, incompossibility
does not mire the piecemeal approach in deep uncertainty about the best course
of action to take.
That said, I think we should be careful not to overstate the significance of
this point for the piecemeal approach. There are two reasons for this. First,
prioritizing the most severe injustice might not always provide the best course of
action. The most severe injustices are sometimes also the most difficult to remedy
due to political, developmental or temporal hurdles. And their remedy might
require more fundamental and wide-ranging reforms that in turn will take greater
political ingenuity and time to achieve. For instance, reform efforts pertaining to
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a variety of basic needs in healthcare, education, and employment opportunities
might all be stymied due to systemic corruption, which itself might require a
multi-pronged reform approach. In such cases, we might have to recalibrate our
efforts and determine which course of action would be most optimal in the face
of incompossibility. This is not to say that we should not pursue the most pressing
injustice at hand. Rather, the point is simply that the mere fact that a particular
set of reforms concerns the more pressing injustices does not automatically mean
that we should prioritize it. Determining what the next best course of action
consists in requires more careful consideration. This shows that the severity of an
injustice does not provide a readymade solution to the problem of
incompossibility for the piecemeal theorist.75
The second reason concerns the wider aim of the piecemeal approach.
Since the piecemeal approach, as we have been considering it, is meant to provide
a general solution to the problem of injustice, we would still be left to wonder
what we ought to do when the set of incompossible reform proposals does not
concern some grave injustice. In other words, even if the correct way to get
around incompossibility is by focusing on what Sen calls “manifest injustices”, we
would still need to determine what we should do when our incompatible reforms
do not concern such matters. In such cases, the piecemeal approach would still
lack a clear way to get around the problem. Of course, the piecemeal theorist
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Note that this problem also plagues that holistic approach which I discuss in section 4.
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might seek to apply a similar strategy to the one employed above by prioritizing
the more severe injustice in such cases. But the first reason I provided also casts
doubt on such an attempt. In fact, this reason makes the proposed strategy here
even less promising than in the case of manifest injustices since the smaller
difference in unjustness between the areas of reform considered would only
make the weighing of the overall merits of pursuing one over another less
obvious. Again, this is not to say that the piecemeal theorist is doomed to
uncertainty. Rather, the point is simply that the piecemeal approach cannot
brush aside the problem of incompossibility as a minor hurdle.

4.

THE HOLISTIC APPROACH
The piecemeal approach was motivated in large part by a desire to see the

world change for the better. And yet, we saw that this way of thinking about
reform has difficulties dealing with the complexities of our institutional
arrangements. In other words, the world might get in the way of piecemeal
reform. How could an alternative do better? In this part, I defend a holistic
approach to thinking about reform. I will argue for a particular kind of holistic
approach, one which involves thinking about reform in a top-down or levelled
manner.
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4.1.

The holistic approach clarified

The type of holistic approach on which I am focused concerns itself first
with the makeup of the fundamental political, economic, and social institutions;
that is, their basic structure, before then proceeding downward to investigate the
shape of less fundamental institutional arrangements. These might include the
political constitution or the design of the economic system (e.g., whether it is a
market economy), both of which specify the various fundamental rights and
responsibilities to be accorded to all members; as well as laws dictating how, if at
all, the variety of socio-economic goods of importance are to be distributed. How
all other institutional arrangements are to be ordered is to be constrained by the
makeup of these institutions. In some cases, such as when we first establish a set
of basic rights and freedoms, the fundamental institutions would simply delimit
what types of laws and practices are permissible in society. In other cases, such
as when considering rules governing socio-economic redistribution, the
fundamental rules might more narrowly determine how non-fundamental
institutions look. Call this variant of the holistic view the basic structure-first

approach.76
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While the problem of incompossibility is not exclusive to questions of domestic justice as I note
at the end of section 3.1, for simplicity’s sake, I restrict my discussion of the holistic approach to
the problems of domestic rather than international or global justice. It might be the case that when
we are considering the latter set of problems, then the principles of global distributive justice take
primacy over those of domestic justice. If so, then the global basic structure would be even more
fundamental than the domestic basic structure. I set aside this issue in this chapter.
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To be sure, in specifying the list of fundamental institutions here, I do not
seek to defend this particular conception of the basic structure. The reason for
this is my neutrality with respect to what values and principles undergird one’s
theory of justice. For instance, a theorist concerned with fighting injustice might
appeal to a conception of justice according to which the most fundamental
institutions are those relating to one’s cultural group or national identity. That her
principles admit of such communitarian or nationalist underpinnings is
orthogonal to what is of interest to us here. Thus, we should take the specification
here to be one way of thinking about the fundamental institutional arrangements.
That said, it is likely that these arrangements will make up most theorists’
conceptions of the basic structure, since the rights, responsibilities, and access to
opportunities and material goods are going to matter to all citizens, regardless of
what they concern.77
An important point of similarity between the piecemeal approach and the
basic structure-first approach should be noted. Holistic reform is not
incompatible with piecemeal reform. Rather, it is distinct from its piecemeal
variant merely in the priority it gives to some sets of institutions over others. To
see this more clearly, imagine that we have succeeded in realizing our desired set
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Similarly, I remain neutral about how we might come to discover what the basic structure
should look like on our view. For instance, we might determine our preferred account of the basic
structure by engaging in various kinds of piecemeal reform and then reflect on the results.
Alternatively, we might simply engage in armchair speculation. What matters is the view we end
up with, and how we use it to direct political reform.
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of basic structure reforms, along, say, relational egalitarian lines. A relational
egalitarian basic structure would still underdetermine the makeup of more local
institutions. For instance, the fact that everyone is entitled to participate equally
in civil society does not fully explain how we should organize private and public
spaces such as schools, parks, shops, libraries, and hospitals in light of this
requirement. Moreover, we do not know how this entitlement should be squared
with one’s right to freedom of association.78 In such cases, we would again have
to consider the likely effects of realizing egalitarian measures in one domain on
other domains.
Of course, how much indeterminacy is generated by the rules of the basic
structure depends on the content of those rules. Imagine a society that realizes
the Nozickian basic structure, by implementing a variety of property rights
restrictions and permissions along with a limited set of civil liberties. Since
Nozick’s minimal state performs only a few functions, the formal rules that exist
might simply be the product of private exercises of one’s natural Lockean rights.
But notice that even in such a state, all conflicts do not merely reduce to conflicts
between the rights of members. This is because the Nozickian state also applies
the principle of rectification for all transgressions of natural rights. Given this, it
would still be possible for some rectificatory measures to conflict with other
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Anderson remarks that freedom of association can generate subordination and so is insufficient
for equality, contra libertarians.
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rectificatory measures, such as when compensating for loss of property to some
comes at the expense of rectificatory healthcare provisions to others (if the latter
was wrongfully deprived of access to private healthcare she purchased).79 Thus,
the general point still stands: the holist might still have to engage in some
piecemeal theorizing about reform, even if what counts as an appropriate reform
is constrained by the basic structure-level institutions.80

4.2.

Holism and the incompossibility problem

Since holistic reform does not exclude piecemeal reform, to the extent that
it does, would it not be saddled with the problem of incompossibility as well? After
all, holists must still consider the effects of top-down reform on more local
institutional arrangements (since they are likely to underdetermine them), and
so, it seems, the same interactional problems between different institutional
arrangements might surface. Why should we be more confident of surmounting
these difficulties by employing the basic structure-first approach?
Indeed, it seems that the holistic approaches, like the basic structure-first
approach, are doubly troubled by the problem of incompossibility. This is
because, aside from (1) having to ensure that all their piecemeal reform efforts
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For Nozick’s brief discussion of the principle of rectification, see Nozick, Anarchy, State, and

Utopia.
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An interesting upshot of the constraining role played by the basic structure is that the holist
reformer could, in principle, choose not to reform the basic structure first before reform less
general institutional arrangements. She need only take the more local reforms to be constrained
by the basic structure were it to be instantiated.
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are compatible, the holist must also (2) ensure that whatever institutional
solutions are compatible with each other are also compatible with what the basic
structure demands. And so, it might turn out that we could fulfill the first task but
still fail at the second. Similarly, it might turn out that some or all of the local
institutional fixes that are compatible with what the basic structure level
institutions demand are themselves incompatible with each other. Since the
holist also demands compatibility with the basic structure, it seems the possibility
of surmounting the problem of incompossibility is only more daunting for her.
Plausible as this thought is, I think there are two reasons for thinking that
this is not as serious a problem for the holistic approach as it appears. First,
remember that for the holist theorist, reform at the non-basic structure level does
not appeal directly to general principles of justice. While the piecemeal theorist
determines what is the morally adequate solution to some problem in context A
by asking what these principles would require us to do with respect to A, the holist
avoids resorting to these principles. Instead, she asks what reforms to A would be
mandated or be consistent with what the core set of institutional arrangements
ought to look like. Thus, even if her preferred principle of justice demands that
we implement, say, an egalitarian redistributive solution, she might reject this in
favor of certain rights-based reforms if they are mandated by the basic
constitutional requirements of the society. This means that unlike the piecemeal
theorist, what local institutional fixes the holist theorist would consider will
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already be those that are compatible with her preferred basic structure. This is
because she attempts to isolate only those reform proposals that are compatible
with the basic structure before considering which of these proposals are
compossible.81 Thus, the holist theorist does not perform task (1) described above
independently of task (2).
The second reason concerns a worry that might linger in spite of the first
reason. It seems extremely difficult to enumerate the entire set of non-basicstructure-level reforms that would be compatible with the rights, responsibilities
and privileges enumerated in the basic structure. Since this is what I have
suggested the holist theorist would do prior to addressing the problem of
incompossibility, the holist’s task seems to be cognitively out of our reach.
However, there is a weaker version of the same task that the holist might be able
to perform feasibly. Constitutional decrees can specify general guidelines for how
all non-constitutional laws are to be shaped according to, and while serve as
useful heuristics rather than strict logical determinants for designing compatible
laws at more local levels, they can at least provide an initial framework for
designing reforms. To be sure, how we should interpret constitutional
requirements is obviously a highly controversial matter that would yield a
potential wide variety of guidelines for making laws downstream. But we need
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Of course, the holist theorist must also include likelihood of success as another desideratum in
her deliberations, for if two sets of reforms are both compatible with the basic structure, then,
ceteris paribus, she ought to pursue the set more likely to be implemented.
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not take a stand on the question of constitutional interpretation in order to
address the objection raised here. What matters is that, in principle, we can come
up with such guidelines for what all reforms further downstream are to look like.
And while the guidelines might miss out on certain crucial details from time to
time, they can nonetheless offer us a way to enact reform in a generally consistent
manner. Thus, while the holist theorist faces this worry, she is not as encumbered
by it as the criticism suggests.
Let us return to the question about whether the holistic approach is in a
better position to deal with the problem of incompossibility. The ultimate claim I
want to make here is that we should concede that the problem of incompossibility
is inescapable. The broad lesson to draw from our exploration of the problem in
Part 3 concerns its impact on the question of action-guidingness. Any theory that
aims to be action-guiding must face up to this problem. And the problem cannot
be completely extinguished. Instead, a certain degree of trial and error in our
reform process is inevitable as we seek to anticipate and correct any instances of
incompossibility. Thus, the difficulties posed by the problem for the piecemeal
theorist, including the question of what one ought to do to get around the
problem, also affect the holistic approach. That said, we need not think that all
attempts at facing it are equally bad. What I want to argue in the next section is
that, taken in its best form, the basic structure-first approach has the resources to
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offer a more morally (and to a lesser degree, practically) satisfying way to combat
the incompossibility problem than its counterpart.

4.3.

The moral appeal of the basic structure-first approach

The problem of incompossibility undermines our ability to satisfy the
practicability condition when proposing reform. In other words, it undermines
our ability to recommend a feasible set of institutional prescriptions. If this is
right, then, as I have just suggested, the action-guidingness of the piecemeal and
holistic approaches is undermined, at least in the sense that many critics of ideal
theory cared about. But if it is also true that we should simply accept the
incompossibility problem for what it is, and attempt to deal with it as and when it
rears its head, then we might still wonder whether one approach to reform does
better than another. And if my arguments in the preceding section are correct,
then the piecemeal and holistic approaches are on a par with respect to their
ability to satisfy the practicability condition. Now, I will show why the basic
structure does better at satisfying the other major condition discussed in Part 2:
the moral adequacy condition.
Both the piecemeal and basic structure-first approaches appeal to moral
considerations to ground their reform proposals. The latter, however, gives pride
of place to the basic structure. Why might this be morally appealing? Consider the
relational egalitarian piecemeal theorist. She asks how we might realize this value
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in a variety of contexts. But presumably, everyone is entitled to certain kinds of
treatment and goods as a matter of relational equality. That is, qua citizen of a just
state, they might be entitled to certain basic rights and opportunities that,
regardless of context, are important for securing relational equality. 82 Whatever
these are, we might think that the piecemeal theorist would be well served by
giving precedence to their realization over other things needed for justice.
A different way to make this same point is to look at matters from the point
of view of the citizen. Given all the different things needed to ensure that the state
and society at large secures relational equality for her, is there something that she
can demand as most fundamental? Presumably, this would be something like
recognition of the fact that she is an equal member of society, worthy of equal
respect and concern, and to whom others are accountable for certain kinds of
treatment (such as conduct which affects her ability to realize her most
fundamental pursuits in life). If given the piecemeal theorist’s preferred account
of justice, she is committed to taking the citizen’s demands with regard to these
matters as more important than all others, then it seems that she is committed to
securing institutions that realize justice at this level before everything else.
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In her seminal piece “What is the Point of Equality,” Anderson endorses a capabilities approach,
according to which one is entitled to opportunities to live and participate as a democratic citizen
of equal standing with others. As she explains, “one's capabilities are a function not just of one's
fixed personal traits and divisible resources, but of one's mutable traits, social relations and
norms, and the structure of opportunities, public goods, and public spaces.” Anderson, “What Is
the Point of Equality?,” 319.
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We can buttress these considerations with the arguments Rawls famously
offered for why the basic structure is the “primary subject of justice.”83 Rawls
argues that the basic structure has a profound influence on our lives, shaping our
characters, preferences, goals, and future life prospects. How the political system
is shaped, and what rights and freedoms it confers upon you, as well as the form
of the economic system (e.g., a market as opposed to a command economy) and
the kinds of economic rights (e.g., to private property) and the related norms
surrounding them determine significantly how our lives will go and how we view
them.84 A second, related reason he offers concerns the need for rules of social
cooperation. Rawls and other contractarians view the function of principles of
justice to be the articulation of rules that would foster mutually beneficial terms
of social cooperation. But what are these terms? Those which define the most
basic ways in which we might interact with one another in society, or in other
words, the rules that make up the basic structure. For instance, trade, division of
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Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 6. The relevant interpretation of what Rawls meant by “primary
subject” of justice is that the basic structure has a kind of methodological priority; we first
ascertain the makeup of the basic structure first before asking what justice demands at less
general levels. For a discussion of other interpretations, see Freeman, Liberalism and Distributive
Justice, chap. 7.
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G.A. Cohen argues that Rawls’s argument about the profound influence of the basic structure
commits him to including other institutions like the church (and religious institutions more
generally) in the basic structure. While we need not take a stand on this matter in this chapter, we
can look to Samuel Freeman’s contention that the “Rawls’s basic social institutions are necessary
for cooperation in almost any society” for a response. Freeman points out that despite its influence
on many people’s lives, religion is not generally a precondition for peace and productive social
cooperation. Since we are interested in something like a context-neutral set of institutions to
include within the basic structure, religion can be left out. Freeman, “The Basic Structure of
Society as the Primary Subject of Justice”; Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, chap. 3.
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labor, and innovation cannot happen without a complex structure of rules that
demarcate who has control and access to scarce goods and how far this control
extends. Similarly, for any claims of redress or compensation for non-material
injustice to be respected, we would first need a basic set of rules establishing what
each is entitled to and the strength and scope of these entitlements. The basic
structure provides this framework.85
Despite Rawls’s arguments, we might nonetheless wonder why the basic
structure has greater importance than any other institution or individual action.
For instance, why not instead think that our reforms should aim at whatever
would maximize justice or some other value like individual utility?86 Samuel
Freeman’s clarification of Rawls’s arguments is instructive here. He highlights
Rawls’s non-consequentialism, noting that for him, what matters is that society

respects rather than maximizes certain values. Further, the idea that we are all
free and equal moral persons is central to his justification of the basic structure.
Thus, as Freeman argues: “the moral conceptions of free and equal persons and
a well-ordered society are not states of affairs to be instrumentally promoted or
maximized; rather they are ideals to be realized by society’s members cooperating
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In providing this argument, my defense of the basic structure-first approach is rendered
controversial at least among consequentialists, for whom the basic structure is no more important
than any other set of rules that can potentially promote the good. While consequentialist theories
of justice (e.g., Harsanyi’s) are also objected to on the grounds that they are insufficiently actionguiding, they cannot avail themselves of the argument I have provided here. Nonetheless, this
defense applies to a wide variety of deontological (and possibly some rule-consequentialist)
theories of justice.
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See Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice."
97

according to the rules for institutions and individuals that exemplify the
principles of justice constructed from these ideals."87 The basic structure provides
the background set of social rules needed to realize these ideals. To be sure, we
need not even go as far as Freeman does here to maintain the primacy of the basic
structure. Insofar as we take our project to concern only institutional solutions to
remedying injustice, the preceding arguments explain why the basic structure
holds greater moral significance than other social institutions.
The moral appeal of focusing on the basic structure-first approach also
explains why it is superior to other holistic approaches. Remember that being a
holist about reform consists not in focusing directly on the injustice at hand but
looking at the “bigger picture.” This says nothing about what level or domain we
ought to give priority. There are alternatives to the basic structure-first approach
I have defended, such as focusing first on a particular domain or injustice like
workplace oppression before using those institutional fixes constrain all other
reform efforts. However, focusing on the basic structure is more morally
appealing since it focuses on what is of fundamental moral importance for a
member of society to whom considerations of justice, across a whole range of
issues, apply.
At this point, the piecemeal theorist might object that despite the moral
arguments we have offered in favor of the basic structure, we are ignoring how
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Freeman, “The Basic Structure of Society as the Primary Subject of Justice,” 9.
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much easier it is to enact local reforms. Determining the makeup of the basic
structure and reforming is likely to take more work than fixing local reforms,
given their more manageable scope. Consider, for instance, the difficulty that the
United States has had in ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment, which, if passed,
would constitutionally prohibit differential legal rights on the basis of sex. Given
the number of obstacles to constitutional amendments and the lack of political
will, the prospect of enacting such reform seems unlikely, at least in the near
future. Thus, it seems that our efforts are better spent securing less fundamental
legal protections for women and other genders, even if such protections are more
fragile. Hence, why should we not focus our efforts on what we are more likely to
get revised in the near future?88
We must, I think, concede this point, at least in part. Reforming an existing
basic structure around which the prevailing norms and political cultures have
coalesced around is a difficult matter. Indeed, the central challenge here might
first be to change the relevant political attitudes before we can push forward with
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Notice that the problem here concerns not something pertaining to incompossibility but the
more general issue of motivational infeasibility. Given entrenched norms and practices, we are
loath to change our ways. In many cases, the only hurdle to society adopting more just practices
might be our willingness to change. If so, then a more just society will be within our reach were
we to try. However, there might also be other ways of organizing society that are motivationally
out of reach for us. Prominent examples of this include Plato’s communal rearing of children and
the Carens Market, under which everyone works to maximize their pretax income, which then
gets equally distributed. The difficulty of altering the makeup of the basic structure concerns just
whether such reform is motivationally out of reach for us. By contrast, incompossibility, concerns
whether it is possible to realize all our preferred institutional solutions together in the same
society given the deep entanglements between them. See Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and
the Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory.
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legislative or constitutional reform. And determining how this is to happen is not
an easy matter either.
However, notice that the same reasons we have to doubt the probability of
altering the basic structure might also give us reasons to doubt piecemeal reform.
Imagine that we seek to enact reforms to realize a Rawlsian basic structure. Faced
with resistance from the prevailing political culture, we shift our attention to
reforming more local level institutional arrangements in line with Rawls’s
principles of justice. However, if the political culture is indeed resistant to
Rawlsian reforms, then it would also be resistant to these local reforms. While
society might be more resistant to altering its basic structure, any reforms
enacted at more local levels might end up being overturned in the near-future due
to the prevailing political winds. Again, this is not to say that reforming the basic
structure is never more difficult than other reforms. The mere fact that basic
structure form requires the political will of national-level legislative bodies and
possibly also nationwide public support means that it is harder to come by.
Even so, there is a sense in which issues at the level of the basic structure
animate our moral concern more vividly and directly than complex local issues.
The question of what we are owed as citizens of a country is a matter that, due to
both its fundamental and general nature, can be taken up by anyone. 89 It is thus
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By generality, I mean something like applicability to a wide range of domains . Basic structure
level institutions are general in that the rights, freedoms, privileges and responsibilities they
articulate apply to any context in which they are relevant. For instance, a constitutional right to
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unsurprising that mass protests and revolutionary movements invariably center
around such questions. Basic structure reform, thus, while being harder to enact
given its dependence on a large collective effort, is in this sense easier to enact if
we can motivate public support in comparison to more local level reforms. Thus,
we should not conclude that the reforms prioritized by the holistic approach are
not worth pursuing.
Following this last point, the worries about the feasibility of enacting basic
also obscure another reason to focus on basic-structure level reform: the positive
ripple effects it generates for more local reforms. Consider the following. If we
succeed in implementing our desired basic structure, and it receives wide
endorsement among members of society, it can help validate reforms at more
local levels that capture the ideals enshrined in those basic structure level-rules
and norms. For instance, a political constitution emphasizing the importance of
checks and balances can generate support for state and other more local reforms
aimed at ensuring separation of powers and anti-corruption measures. The
reason, once again, is the fundamentality of the basic structure. When one comes
to recognize that one has, say, a fundamental right to fair and equal treatment in
the eyes of the law, or that one’s lawmakers are duty-bound to not meddle in the
affairs of the executive and judiciary, one is likely to see the underlying rationale

due process would have implications for laws in education, employment, housing, healthcare,
and so on. Local or non-basic structure level reforms are not general in this way.
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for such measures. And recognizing the underlying rationale has a kind of
galvanizing effect on one’s willingness to both support and demand more local
reforms that realize those same values. By contrast, merely local reforms that aim
at realizing some value will likely be mediated by contingent factual
considerations that apply narrowly to the legislation or norm-creation at hand.
This prevents such norms from having this same effect. Thus, short of
undermining the prospect of reforms at a more local level, realizing basic
structure might generate good outcomes in ways that merely local reform would
not.
Notice that the potentially galvanizing effect of the basic structure-first
approach provides a non-moral reason to prefer it over its counterpart. Of course,
whether basic structure reform has such an effect will depend on a variety of
factors, including the clarity of the vision undergirding the formal rules that
constitute it, the degree of uptake of the norms that support it, and the degree of
ambiguity in the way the rules are written (and what they might imply for less
general institutions). If we imagine a basic structure that does an excellent job
with respect to each of these factors, then the aforementioned benefits might
obtain. Thus, we might say that, at its best, the basic structure-first approach
promises greater practical and moral rewards than its competitor. But even in
suboptimal conditions, the moral argument is sufficient to show that we ought to
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at least focus on determining the content of the basic structure before proceeding
our reform efforts.
Let me sum up the discussion in this section. We began by conceding that
the problem of incompossibility will loom large over any meaningful attempts at
reform. Even so, we noted that we have compelling moral reasons to privilege the
basic structure-first approach. And since moral adequacy is an important
consideration on both the reform approaches we have been considering, this
gives us a reason to take the basic structure-first approach to be superior overall
to its counterpart. In addition, the potentially galvanizing effect of successful
basic structure-level reform means that it might also smoothen local reform
efforts. Thus, we also have a practical reason for prioritizing reform of the basic
structure. This vindicates political philosophers’ predominant focus on the basic
structure. Importantly though, the kind of priority I have defended is a kind of

methodological priority. What we ought to do is ascertain what basic structurelevel institutions justice demands. It is a further question whether we should then
prioritize reforming those institutions in our society before more local ones. That
said, I have also provided reasons why such priority in reform might also be
warranted given the positive ripple-effects that basic-structure level reform can
generate.
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5.

IDEAL THEORY AND ACTION-GUIDINGNESS
The question of whether ideal theory is action guiding was what prompted

us to evaluate the relative merits of the piecemeal and basic structure-first
approaches to reform. Given that ideal and nonideal theorists have to grapple
with the problem of incompossibility when attempting to tell us how to make our
society more just, how do my arguments in Part 4 show that we should realize the

ideal basic structure? This, after all, is what ideal theory demands of us, at least to
the extent that it provides prescriptions for action.90 I will now sketch an answer
to this question.

5.1.

In pursuit of the ideally basic structure

If the basic structure has such profound effects on people’s lives, and
serves to provide the background conditions for mutually beneficial social
cooperation, then does this mean that we should aim to realize the ideal version
of it? The only sensible answer I think we can give is, yes. What motivates our
reform efforts is to see the world made more just. Of course, very often, we know
that we cannot fix all the injustices, and so we focus on some. However, given the
fundamental importance of the basic structure to each citizen, it seems that we
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Of course, a different, and popular reading of the function of the principles of justice in ideal
theory is that they serve merely as standards for evaluating the justness of all societies. Some have
appealed to this evaluative function as a way to respond to the claim that ideal theory fails to be
prescriptive (due to its seeming infeasibility). For a discussion of this response, see Wiens, “‘Going
Evaluative’ to Save Justice From Feasibility -- A Pyrrhic Victory."
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ought to attempt to realize it or at least ascertain what justice requires at this level.
The arguments I have drawn from Rawls motivate not merely the importance of
instantiating a partially just basic structure, but one that realizes justice across
each of the fundamental areas of social life. Doing anything less seems to fail to
respect the centrality of the basic structure itself in people’s lives.
Thus, in making this argument, I am claiming that pursuing the just basic
structure is no different from pursuing the ideally just basic structure. Ideal
justice with regard to the makeup of the basic structure consists in nothing more
than all the relevant basic institutions being in place and operating as they should.
At the very least, this is one very natural way to read what the “ideal” society
comprises for ideal theorists.
Thus, to say that we should realize the ideal basic structure is not to say
that we should realize a utopian basic structure. Ideal theory is often accused of
aiming at utopian principles and social arrangements. A common feature that
many point to in defense of this claim is its concern with full compliance. Rawls
famously took ideal theory to be “full compliance theory”, that is, a theory
concerned with the makeup of society within which the principles of justice are
generally complied with. But a major part of my argument for the holistic
approach was to show the moral importance of pursuing what we take to be the
just basic structure in its fullest conception. While contemporary liberal societies
might partially instantiate Rawls’s two principles, its basic structure would
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nonetheless fall short of articulating and securing the most fundamental rights
and provisions that one is owed as a free and equal member. If we accept that
securing things in this way is of paramount importance, then our focus should
not be on partial instantiations of the basic structure but its full realization. And
to acknowledge this point is not to commit oneself to utopian political reforms,
for it is a further question whether the just basic structure is ambitious or utopian
for us. If securing justice at the basic structure-level cannot be had without
reforms that we justifiable conclude are unattainable, then perhaps we should
revise what we take to be our reform goals. My contention here is only that the
argument for the holistic approach offered here shows why ideal theory, in its
focus on the ideal basic structure, is valuable and morally appealing. It is in this

sense that this chapter provides only a partial defense of ideal theory.
In response to my arguments here, the piecemeal theorist might retort that
by employing the basic structure-first approach, we actually fail to arrive at an
action-guiding set of solutions to the injustices of our world. This is because we
would need to first figure out how to implement the desired basic structure. Since
the holistic approach does not tell us how to do this, we still do not know how to
make our world better.
This objection ignores the fact that piecemeal theorizing can also focus on
basic structure reform. As mentioned, realizing a normative principle like
relational equality might require reform at a variety of levels. The piecemeal
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theorist must also grapple with the implementation challenge she poses to the
holist theorist here. This is not to say of course that implementation is not a
concern. As others have noted, the kind of feasibility we are often interested in is

accessibility, that is, whether we can get from where we are now to some desired
state of affairs.91 That we ought to implement, say, a just basic structure does not
yet tell us what steps we ought to take to do so. But our discussion has largely set
aside this question. We have been assuming throughout that both the piecemeal
and holist theorists are able to determine the ways to put in place their preferred
institutional fixes. The only type of accessibility question that is relevant concerns
whether two sets of institutions are accessible if we discover them to be
incompossible. And with respect to this question, the same point holds. Whether
we can surmount the incompossibility is a matter of trial and error. If I am right
about the galvanizing effect of a basic structure-level reform, then instituting the
ideal basic structure can render local reforms more accessible than they would
otherwise be.
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I borrow this term from G.A. Cohen, who took it to be one half of the idea of feasibility. The
other component for him is stability, which concerns the ability of a system to gain its own support
and withstand internal pressures (say, in the form of revolt or resistance from a subpart of the
citizenry). See Cohen, Why Not Socialism?. Rawls employs a similar idea of stability. See Rawls,
Justice as Fairness.
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5.2.

The Problem of Second Best

A commonly discussed problem for ideal theory concerns what we ought
to do if we are unable to feasibly realize the ideal state of affairs. 92 Intuitively, in
such a case, we ought to approximate the ideal as closely as possible. This is
precisely what the “theorem of second best” warns against. Since the ideal state
of affairs is one in which everyone generally complies with the laws, the next best
alternative for that world need not apply to ours. In our world, attempting to
realize the second-best option might prove disastrous.93 The problem raised by
the theorem is called the problem of second best. While some have questioned
the applicability of this problem to the case of political philosophy, let us grant
that it applies to our discussion.94 The worry here is that the ideal basic structure,
that is, the one we think is morally adequate, might be unrealizable, and if so,
seeking to approximate it might not be the next-best strategy.
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The problem is an expression of the general theorem of second best formulated by R. G. Lipsey
and Kelvin Lancaster. See Lipsey and Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best.”
93
Brennan and Pettit use Tom Christiano’s ideal democratic theory as an illustration. Given that
actual political officials often do not seek to advance the interests and wishes of the electorate who
voted for them, it would be remiss of us to put in place a close approximation of such a theory in
which political officials have substantial and decisive say over distribution of resources. Instead,
an alternative system in which their powers are limited and checked by a separate body (say, the
judiciary) might be a superior alternative. See Brennan and Pettit, “The Feasibility Issue,” 4–5.
94
For instance, see Wiens, “Assessing Ideal Theories." His central contention is that an accurate
formulation of the problem would only threaten ideal theory if we assume that the state of affairs
it proposes will never be realized by actual society. Without an argument for this assumption, the
problem fails to threaten.
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I want to make three remarks about the problem of second best. The first
is concessive. There is some uncertainty about how threatening the problem is.
In his new book, David Estlund argues that the problem of second best, contrary
to the standard formulation, is more generally applicable.95 For instance, he
contends that it does not require that the ideal or best option be infeasible, but
merely that it will not occur. Likewise, it does not require that there be a best
option, but simply that there be a full specification of elements in a set, a subset
of which might not generate effects that approximate that generated by the full
set. When pursuing a goal that is made up of distinct parts, the possibility that
those parts might not operate in isolation is sufficient to generate the worry that
realizing as many of them as possible is worse than pursuing alternative courses
of action. Notice however that if Estlund is right, then the problem is threatening
for all reform efforts, including those favored by piecemal theorists. The general
lesson for reformers is to consider carefully how the different elements in the set

of things we aim to realize interact, in case we are unable to realize the whole set.
We can apply this abstract lesson to the problem of incompossibility to see
why it is equally important for the piecemeal and holistic approaches. Imagine
that a set of institutional reforms A to E are incompossible, and that we have
justified reasons for thinking so. To overcome incompossibility, we could either
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David Estlund labels this problem the “fallacy of approximation." See Estlund, Utopophobia: On
the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, chap. 14.
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modify our reform proposals or abandon those generating the conflict. And
plausibly, we might seek to retain as many of the reforms as possible. But in doing
so, we would be assuming that they do not interact in ways that would generate
worse results than some alternative strategy (as per the problem of second best).
A piecemeal theorist should thus avoid blindly approximating in the face of
incompossibility unless she has sufficient reason to think that none of the
modified reform proposals will generate new problems, whether that be more
incompossible results or something else. Since the holist also aims at some
piecemeal change, she should be similarly mindful. In addition, the holist must
also work to ensure that approximating the ideal basic structure does not generate
worse results as the problem of second best warns us about. The wider point here
should be clear: the problem of second best raises a consideration that we should
build into our deliberations about what the right course of action is (assuming we
cannot achieve our desired set of reform proposals, whether that is due to
incompossibility or otherwise).
Of course, the nonideal theorist might deny Estlund’s point and claim that
the problem only affects theories that aim at ambitious normative ideals. This
brings up my second, clarificatory point. I argued above we should not read my
argument as justifying utopian reforms or the realization of full compliance with
the principles of justice. Given this, the mere fact that we ought to pursue the ideal
basic structure does not thereby render the holistic approach more vulnerable to
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this problem. Of course, if the content of our desired basic structures does render
it infeasible, then the problem of second best would come into play. But since
there is nothing inherent to a basic structure being ideal that entails that it is
unrealizable, we need not worry about such an eventuality anymore than if we
pursued basic structure reform as part of the piecemeal approach.
We can also say something in support of an ideal theory that does pursue
utopian reforms. For such a theory, the dangers of approximating raised by the
problem of second best serve as reminders to not approximate blindly. This
however, is compatible with thinking that such an ideal theory could still be

useful in helping guide action. Perhaps when approximating is a bad idea, we can
look to values and principles undergirding the theory to determine what forms of
feasible reforms would be the most appropriate. Perhaps we would need to
recalibrate the principles to take into account the dangerous ways in which
elements in the set of elements we seek to realize might interact. In their own
discussion of the problem, Brennan and Pettit argue that we should design our
institutional goals to be compatible with the incentives that affect the behavior of
ordinary people. Their claim, importantly, is not that there is no way to arrive at
alternative proposals to our ideal basic structure. For instance, they point out that
if perfectly open, free, and competitive markets are unrealizable, it does not
follow that the “best real-world alternative, say in the provision of medical
services, is to neglect real-world constraints and to go willy-nilly for market
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deregulation.”96 We should adjust our aims to fit with real-world constraints, even
if that means endorsing heavily regulated markets. The holist can take into
account such constraints when devising the appropriate second-best strategy.
There is a final, and wider challenge we can raise to the standard
articulation of the problem of second best (that is, not the version Estlund
defends). Since the problem essentially states that the second-best option need
not involve approximation, much more needs to be said before we conclude that
ideal theorists are misguided in their traditional focus on approximation. Of
course, the ideal theorist, as I have argued here, must consider the likely effects
of approximation, but this falls far short of saying that approximation is off the
table entirely. Critics of ideal theory cannot claim that the problem affects ideal
theory merely because it exists in the abstract.

6.

CONCLUSION
Despite my arguments in this chapter, the feeling might persist that the

position I have defended is deeply implausible. After all, it seems to be an
implication of my argument that in order to engage in any reform, we must first
figure out what the correct basic structure looks like, and focus on realizing it
first. Thus, it seems that all those working on the ground to improve the
conditions of victims of injustices all around might be engaging in morally
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Brennan and Pettit, “The Feasibility Issue,” 261.
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pointless activity. What they must do is wait for the holist theorist to finish her
theoretical investigation and take their cues from her.
Whether we are committed to this result depends on how we conceive of
the task of theorizing about reform of injustice. If we conceive of the theorist as
being tasked with informing all of us about how to reform society, such that the
reform must follow the recommendations of the theorist, then indeed, we would
need to wait for the theorist to get us all the answers. But notice again things
would not be any different if we had opted for the piecemeal approach. This
suggests that we should not conceive of the role of theorizing about reform in this
second sense.
By contrast, if we take the theorist to be promoting a way of thinking about
what is needed to remedy injustice, then anyone can adopt the approach I have
argued for to arrive at their conclusions about reform, and they need not wait for
the theorist to engage in reform efforts. Moreover, we need not think of this as a
relativistic endeavor, with each theorist or reformer considering and then
applying their preferred ideas about how to make the world more just. Instead,
all parties concerned can be in dialogue with one another. Thus, philosophers,
social scientists, policy experts, and activists can all come together to engage in
holistic theorizing about these matters.
But what about the activist or social reformer who lacks the time or energy
to contemplate whether her desired reform strategies are compossible? My
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suspicion is that many of those working “on the ground” to combat injustice do
not claim their approach to reform as the right way to think about all reform.
Instead, they prioritize injustices in certain domains or levels, and seek to address
them. Of course, this in itself is still problematic, for if they were to also hold that
others who prioritize a different set of problems can permissibly engage in
reforms as they wish, then they would in turn be endorsing the possibility that
their own reforms might be undermined by the latter. My inclination here is to
say that holistic thinking, as indulgent as it may seem to such activists, retains the
greatest fidelity to our moral commitments. Again, if we care about making the
world better, then we must be prepared to think hard about the likely impact of
our actions.
That said, I do not mean to suggest that we must obtain something like
certainty about the likely effects of our reform actions before pursuing them. As
I have argued, the incompossibility is an inescapable feature of our efforts at
reform, and one we must grapple with to the best of our abilities. My claim is only
that we engage in reform in a responsible manner, and that we consider how our
reform efforts affect or are impacted by the makeup of what we take to be the
correct basic structure.
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CHAPTER 3: THE FEASIBILITY OF IDEAL WORLDS
1.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many have argued that political theories which justify

principles of justice on the basis of idealizations like “full compliance” are
infeasible. The complaint here is that such theories inevitably yield prescriptions
that are beyond the reach of actual societies. The complaint has been made
against Rawlsian ideal theory in particular. This chapter examines this feasibility

objection to ideal theory, but its implications concern all theories that prescribe
seemingly ambitious principles concerning institutional design. The feasibility

objection concerns whether a political theory asks more of us than that which we
are capable of.97
I argue that a clearer understanding of feasibility can show us why the
various feasibility criticisms of idealizing political theories only establish the
improbability of realizing such theories. In particular, I focus on two criticisms,
advanced by David Schmidtz and Gerry Gaus. Schmidtz’s objection concerns the
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We should decouple this criticism from the distinct but similar-sounding worry that political
theories undermine our integrity by requiring that we give up what we should not have to. To
illustrate the difference, consider a theory that requires that we only eat as much as necessary to
be physically healthy and give any leftovers away to the poor who need it. Plausibly, everyone who
can afford to feed themselves is capable of fulfilling this demand. However, some might argue
that we are at least sometimes justified in indulging our gustatory desires even at the expense of
the poor and hungry. Even if we can stop ourselves from overeating, we should not have to do so.
This is the type of objection I will set aside here. The objection is also termed the alienation
problem. See Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 2 (1984): 134–171.
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infeasibility of complying and upholding the institutions prescribed by such
theories. I explain why determining whether such institutions are infeasible in
this respect involves looking at more than their present unlikelihood. Gaus, by
contrast, argues the ideal society is epistemically infeasible for us since we lack
knowledge about all but the workings of societies most similar to ours. In
response, I argue that Gaus’s worry either dooms us to the prospect of maximal
conservatism about social change, or it merely advises us to exercise caution
when enacting social reform, a message which ideal theorists can incorporate
into their theorizing. The responses I provide also shed light on feasibility’s
internal structure and the nature of its relationship to the practical, actionguiding aspect of normative political theory.
In the next section, I clarify what idealization consists in and distinguish it
from the related notion of an “ideal theory.” Then, in section 1.3, I summarize
what feasibility concerns and various constraints that might apply to it. After this,
in section 1.4, I contrast feasibility with the stability of an institutional
arrangement before briefly discussing the issue of feasibility standards. After
this, I articulate my responses to the aforementioned objections. Section 2.1
comprises my clarification of and replies to Schmidtz. Section 2.2 discusses the
plausibility of Gaus’s criticism. I conclude the chapter by discussing the general
implications of my arguments for both the idea of feasibility (in section 2.3) and
idealization in normative philosophy in 2.4.
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1.1.

Idealization and ideal theory

As mentioned, idealization involves imagining a falsehood, normally in
order to make the object being studied or theorized about more manageable.
Natural and social scientists standardly employ idealizations in their efforts to
simplify the measurement of the contribution a variable makes to the target
phenomenon. For instance, when measuring the effect that mass has on the
acceleration of an object moving down a plane, it is common practice to assume
away friction. Likewise, economists assume irrationality when considering how
economic factors like interest rates and fiscal policy affect consumer spending.
Such idealizations are thought to be justified insofar as their introduction merely
simplifies rather than grossly distort the phenomenon being studied. In
normative philosophy, of course, our concern is somewhat different.
Political philosophers are interested in ascertaining how things ought to
be. Even so, idealizations play a similar role here; they are supposed to help
streamline certain features of human psychology in a way that helps the
normative theorist get on with the project of identifying the right principles. Take
for instance the fact that people’s preferences for resources are influenced by
their absolute condition but also their situation relative to that of others in society.
In other words, we often care about how we are doing relative to others in society.
Rawls assumes away this fact about agents, arguing that it is irrational. Thus, the
“parties” who adjudicate between principles of justice in the Rawlsian Original
117

Position are assumed to be mutually disinterested, considering only the
improvements made by living under a candidate principle to their absolute
condition. Likewise, Hobbes assumes that rational agents situated in a state of
nature would choose to transfer their natural rights over to a sovereign. While we
do not always act rationally, what matters for him is that we are capable of
rational conduct. Idealizing away our irrationality is not imaging humans as being
different from what they actually are. Rather, such idealization allows us to
concentrate on what would follow from rational deliberation and conduct. This
rationale comports with the scientific case for idealization.
Discussions about idealization in political philosophy closely accompany
that of a related but importantly distinct idea: ideal theory. Ideal theory concerns
itself with identifying the principles for regulation of society under idealized
circumstances. The ideal theorist asks which of such principles we ought to pick
under the assumption that we would comply with them were they picked. Such
theory sets aside problems arising from non-compliance and other factors such
as the effect of migration and extreme scarcity. Rawls, who introduced the idea,
argued that ideal theorizing offers us the only means at a systematic assessment
of our fundamental political and social problems.98 The account of the just society
it yields is, despite the idealizations, one that is supposed to be feasible for us. The
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999), 8.
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goal of ideal theory’s companion, non-ideal theory, is to identify feasible and
morally permissible means of moving ourselves out of our present unjust
conditions and towards the ideal society.
The important thing to remember here is that ideal theory is more than the
idealizations it employs. It comprises both a methodological approach and a
substantive account of what the correct political principles are and what justifies
them. The Rawlsian Original Position and the arguments for the two principles
do just this. The question we aim to answer here is: given the idealizations

employed by such theories, can they be ruled out as being infeasible?

1.2.

Feasibility

Feasibility is a complex issue that cuts across several questions of interest
to normative theorists in ethics and political philosophy. Whether a theory is
feasible is a question closely linked to other questions, such as whether it is
sufficiently action-guiding, realizable, and morally desirable. It is difficult to
separate them. All these questions might bear on the theory’s overall
acceptability. Nevertheless, our goal here is to isolate feasibility from these ideas
and examine its workings so we can grapple with the debate between ideal
theorists and their critics.
It seems intuitive that our normative theories should only demand
something of us that we can feasibly realize. After all, “ought” implies “can”, or
so we might conclude. If a normative theory is supposed to be for us, then it must
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be achievable by us. Let’s accept then that the oughts issued by political theories
like Rawls’s must respect feasibility constraints.99 But which oughts are these?
Standardly, political and moral theories tell us how we should act. Rawls’s theory,
for instance, argues that we ought to realize the difference principle. It makes a

practical demand on us. But his theory does more. It also provides us a basis for
evaluating societies. A society that does better at realizing his two principles is
more just for that reason. Likewise, we might assert that “there ought not to be
any starvation in the world." Such a statement is merely evaluative in that it
merely describes a state of affairs that, if realized, would be morally desirable. 100
What the nature of such oughts is, and that of others not subject to the feasibility
constraint, is a separate matter.101 Since it is actions that are feasible or infeasible,

99

While we might take “can” and “feasible” to be co-extensive, such that accepting “ought” implies
“can” is equivalent to accepting “ought” implies “feasible”, we need not accept this view. We
might, as Stemplowska suggests, hold only that feasibility bears on the question of what we ought
to do. See Zofia Stemplowska, “Feasibility: Individual and Collective,” Social Philosophy and
Policy 33, no. 1–2 (October 2016): 273–91. For a fuller discussion, see Geoffrey Brennan and
Nicholas Southwood, “Feasibility in Action and Attitude,” in Hommage À Wlodek. Philosophical
Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, ed. T. Rønnow-Rasmussen B. Petersson J. Josefsson D.
Egonsson, 2007.
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Evaluative principles, as Wiens explains, “serve to comparatively assess and rank options
according to some set of normative criteria, where the relevant options include actions,
institutional schemes, or states of affairs.” See David Wiens, “Will the Real Principles of Justice
Please Stand Up?,” in Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, ed. Kevin Vallier and Michael
Weber (Oxford University Press, 2017), 152.
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Nicholas Southwood argues that oughts subject to the feasibility constraint are deliberative in
nature, and the ones that are not, are hypological. As he notes, this account deviates from the
popular one that holds the respective oughts to be the prescriptive and evaluative oughts. For
more, see Nicholas Southwood, “Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Feasible’?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 44,
no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 7–45.
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we might conclude that it is practical rather than evaluative oughts that are
constrained by feasibility considerations.
What makes something feasible? If we take feasibility to describe what we
are capable of doing, then an infeasible theory requires that which is beyond our
capacities. But which capacities are these, and how do we determine when a
theory fails to respect them? There are a variety of forces that limit what we can
do. Consider first the fact that we cannot do logically impossible things. Morality
thus, cannot require the logically impossible. Likewise, we are incapable of
violating metaphysical and nomological constraints. For any practical ought
issued by a normative theory, we can, miraculous technological possibilities
notwithstanding, clearly identify when they have failed to adhere to these
constraints. In the recent literature, these have been labelled hard constraints,
because they describe which actions are impossible.
The more interesting and challenging barriers to understanding feasibility
are the soft constraints. These include economic, institutional and cultural
limitations.102 While such limitations do not make political or social change
impossible, they might make them sufficiently difficult as to be infeasible. Thus,
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Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,”
Political Studies 60, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 813. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith are more hesitant
to count human psychology as a soft constraint. They argue that we should only admit pathological
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while practically no political theory might run afoul of the hard constraints, many
might be thought to violate soft constraints.
Of course, the most contentious of these is human nature. If human nature
is a certain way such that it cannot bend to the requirements of a theory asking it
to be any different, then it might perhaps be thought of as a hard constraint or at
least a difficult enough constraint that can be used to decisively rule out certain
normative proposals as infeasible. Of course, whether it is a hard constraint, and
if so, what the specific constraint it places on normative theories is, has been
much disputed in the history of philosophy. It is safe to say that until we can
obtain a decisive answer to this question from the social sciences, the debate
about feasibility limits will rage on. What then, can this chapter contribute to the
discussion on feasibility? My hope is to show that beyond this core debate about
whether and where the feasibility boundary lies, there are many other implicit
assumptions made that, once unpacked, can help us get clearer both on what
feasibility might really be about as well as the merits of the objections to ideal
theories.
Before closing this section, let me also distinguish the feasibility objection
from a similar objection often levelled at normative theories. Many argue that
morality cannot place demands on us that are unreasonable. Of course, one way
in which such demands might be reasonable is if they require more of us than we
are capable of doing. But there is another way they could be reasonable.
122

Normative theories can require that we set aside certain pursuits and concerns
that we should not have to. This is the type of over-demandingness charge that is
often levelled at consequentialist theories.103 Such theories require that we
forsake the needs and well-being of our near and dear in order to improve the
overall good. But since we do not have to forsake such things, they cannot be true,
or so the objection goes.104 Morality, it is suggested, must make space for such
concerns.105 We might call theories that fail to provide adequate space for
personal or non-moral concerns harsh as a way to distinguish those that are
infeasible.106 A theory might be feasible but still harsh if it requires us to forsake
certain concerns that we shouldn’t have to even if we are capable of doing so.

1.3.

Stability

Feasibility, given our discussion thus far, concerns our ability to realize a
particular state of affairs. Our ability to realize the institutions prescribed by
political theories, however, is only half of what normative theorists care about
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The objection is also termed the alienation problem. See Peter Railton, “Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 2 (1984):
134–171.
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The same point holds whether we think that choosing to prioritize partial concerns is justified
morally or non-morally. Those who argue that partial concerns are justified non-morally might
argue that morality’s demands do not override the relevant non-moral requirements. Thus, there
might be space for partial concerns that morality cannot trample over. For someone who defends
this type of view, see Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 8 (1982): 419–439.
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To be clear, the thing that morality needs to make space for is not just any commitment that an
individual happens to have. That doing the moral thing prevents me from focusing on my goal of
counting blades of grass does not yet make it demanding in this way. Rather, the relevant ‘partial
concerns’ are those that many of us share, namely our desire to spend time with and take care of
our loved ones, and pursue our personal projects and goals.
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I borrow this label from Estlund. David Estlund, “Utopophobia,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
42, no. 2 (March 1, 2014): 122.
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when proposing institutional arrangements. Institutions, even if realizable,
might not be stable. That is, they might be unable to withstand pressures that
threaten its smooth operation. This additional feature of political institutions
differentiates political theory from moral theory, where the prescribed actions
are synchronic in nature.107 Unlike discrete moral actions, institutions must
perpetuate into the future in order to instantiate the contents of the normative
principles that justify their existence. Thus, to return to Hobbes, it matters little
if the sovereign that we consent to subordinating ourselves to is unable to
maintain peace for long in the commonwealth. If political institutions are to
realize normative principles both in the present and the future, then their ability
to persist is itself an important consideration in their overall feasibility.108 Thus,
realizing political institutions, unlike performing the morally right action, is more
akin to building a bridge. No use if it collapses soon after. This is the diachronic
aspect of a political prescription.
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Of course, in some cases, the requirement might necessitate action across time. For instance,
the requirement “attend your daughter’s soccer game tomorrow” mandates that you not only show
up at your daughter’s game, but stay at the venue (and perhaps also pay adequate attention to the
goings on). We could understand this requirement as consisting of multiple distinct actionrequirements. Indeed, the fact that we might appropriately blame the father if he fails to perform
some one or more of these actions suggests that we think of the requirement as really consisting
of a cluster of requirements. Regardless, we should only note here that the sense in which such
an action-prescription is diachronic is still importantly different from a political principle that
also requires stability of the system prescribed.
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To be sure, stability does not matter in principle since any prescribed institutional arrangement
might be deeply unstable and yet always resurrect itself soon after collapsing. If so, then for any
extended stretch of time, our political principles are still realized albeit through a process of deep
and dramatic institutional change. In actual fact, such a resurrection is unlikely to happen, and
on the odd occasion when it does happen, it does so over a much longer stretch of time.
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We might then prefer to use the term realizability to describe what we have
thus far been calling “feasibility.” In turn, the term “feasibility” might be better
thought of as encompassing both realizability and stability. Indeed, stability was
the aspect of feasibility that Rawls does provide an extensive defense of. He
argues that those living under a Rawlsian institutional scheme will, for this
reason, develop a commitment to comply and uphold the laws and practices that
constitute it. A criticism of ideal theory can indeed challenge this claim as well as
the theory of moral psychology Rawls uses to support it, but for the most part, we
will set this aside to attend to the main target of its critics: its realizability.
Furthermore, since our concern here will be realizability and not stability and so,
we might, for simplicity’s sake, continue to use the term “feasibility” as the critics
of ideal theory have of late, to refer to our ability to install and run the various
institutions prescribed by such theories. That said, critics’ discussion of feasibility
sometimes glides over these distinct notions. When that happens, we will keep
this distinction in mind in our evaluation.

1.4.

Feasibility standards

How do we determine if a certain state of affairs is feasible? We might ask
whether we’ve realized it in the past. But even if we have, we might still be
skeptical about its feasibility given our present conditions. In other words, we
might think that assessments about feasibility must always be tied to the
particular context we find ourselves. If so, then the relevant test for feasibility
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might be, “How likely is it that we will realize a principle or theory given our
current socio-political conditions?” The problem with this standard (call it the

likelihood standard) is that it doesn't tell us how we should understand what our
“current socio-political conditions” comprise. Do they describe only the present
institutions we live under, or do they also describe our attitude towards them and
other possible institutions we might live under? If we plump for the former
reading, then we might simply constrain feasibility to the immediate present,
which seems to ignore a whole range of actions and practices that we might be

capable of realizing. If we opt for the latter, then we need to ask ourselves a
further question: to what extent are our attitudes towards our present and other
possible institutions alterable? A society might be inclined to support, say, strong
welfarist policies at one period but abhor them at another. That it might be
unwilling to realize welfarism at some later point then, might not then be proof
of the infeasibility of those policies. Rather, its reluctance might only prove their
temporary unlikelihood. If this is correct, then we should conclude that the
relevant determinant of feasibility is some more general fact about human
beings, something that might transcend their attitudes in a particular generation
or society. Perhaps, we should look at something like human nature to determine
where the feasibility boundary lies. This seemed to be the prevailing thought
amongst major theorists like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Feasibility implied
compatibility with human nature for them. There is much merit to this way of
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understanding feasibility, as I will eventually argue. For the present moment
however, let’s reserve judgment on this matter until we get acquainted with the
criticisms levelled at ideal theorists. Much of the disagreement between the two
sides lies in how they understand feasibility.

2.

FEASIBILITY AS LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLIANCE
Feasibility critics generally argue that we are unlikely to ever realize ideal

theoretic principles. The criticism of late has been that it is pointless to concern
ourselves with Rawls’s theory of justice since we are not going to live in the perfect
Rawlsian world anytime soon. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that this is
indeed the case. The question of interest to us is what implication this should have
for the feasibility, and in turn, the overall plausibility of a theory like his. David
Schmidtz has provided the most developed form of this objection. Schmidtz
develops his criticism of Amartya Sen’s arguments against Rawls’s theory. Sen
argues that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient to guide us in our quest
to make our world a more just place. Of interest to us is his non-sufficiency claim.
Ideal theory is not sufficient to guide action because actual societies fall short of
perfect justice in diverging and complex ways such that knowing what ideal
justice consists in is of little help to us when we attempt to address justice-related
concerns in our actual world.109
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For instance, societies A and B might depart from Rawlsian ideal justice in different ways: A
might contain violations of one of the basic liberties in Rawls’s liberty principle of justice whereas
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2.1.

Schmidtz’s conception of feasibility

Schmidtz takes this criticism in a slightly different direction. He suggests
that Rawls’s theory fails to be action-guiding because of his assumption of full
compliance. Assuming full compliance is akin to a bad scientific idealization
which, instead of simplifying a computational task by removing a distracting
detail, changes the entire problem situation itself.110 We want to know which rules
we should have in a world of conflicting interests and partial compliance.111
Assuming full compliance undermines this very project. Since our concern is
feasibility, we will set aside this worry. In a more recent work, Schmidtz’s
objections to the full compliance assumption suggest an underlying concern with
feasibility. In a passage, he notes the following:
Suppose an idea turns out to be predictably incompetent as a response to a
real problem, but all we ask is that it be an ideal response to a more
“perfect” problem. In that case, we are insulating ourselves from the kind
of feedback that tells theorists when their idea is not good enough.112

B might contain an infraction against another. How we should comparatively weigh the overall
justness of such societies is the problem not addressed by ideal theory. Similarly, ideal theory does
not tell us how to weigh different degrees of departures with respect to the same primary good or
requirement. Nor does it tell us how to comparatively assess “procedural departures [such as
violations of fair equality of opportunity] against infelicities of emergent patterns of interpersonal
distribution (for example, distributions of primary goods).” Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 1st
ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2009), 220.
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David Schmidtz, “Nonideal Theory: What It Is and What It Needs to Be,” Ethics 121, no. 4 (2011):
772–796.
111
As Schmidtz explains, “there can be such a thing as an ideal solution, but for S to be an ideal
solution to problem P, it must first be a solution to problem P. One thing we cannot set aside as a
distracting detail is the actual problem.” Schmidtz, “Nonideal Theory,” 777.
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David Schmidtz, “A Realistic Political Ideal,” Social Philosophy and Policy 33, no. 1–2 (October
2016): 5.
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What would render a proposal “predictably incompetent” at solving the

real problem of political philosophy? Well, one possibility is that it would not be
realized by people given their motivational inclinations. It would not, in other
words, be feasible. As an illustration of this point, Schmidtz contends that the fact
that “students predictably misread double negations is not a defect in our exam,
but littering our exam with double negations is…If your double negations confuse
students in a way that is not ideal, then your exam is not ideal and you need to fix
it.”113 The complaint here, then, seems to go beyond the idealizing assumption
Rawls makes in his theory. A theory that assumes that all its members would
comply with a set of rules might still end up being feasible, at least if we do not
take feasibility to require full compliance. And while such an assumption might
be methodologically unsound, Schmidtz’s worry is also about what the actual noncompliance of agents with Rawls’s theory means for its plausibility. He seems to
be saying that for it to be plausible, it must be true that people generally comply
with the rules that it requires them to follow.114
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Schmidtz, 9.

It might be tempting to conclude here that Schmidtz and Rawls are talking past each other. If
Schmidtz is right and Rawls is offering an ideal solution for an ideal as opposed to a real problem,
then perhaps a good Rawlsian should just accept the point and retort that there is still some worth
in thinking about solutions to ideal problems. But of course, this would be to mistake the aim of
Rawls’s project. Like social contract theorists before him, Rawls takes himself to be providing a
conception of justice that yields a practical solution to a real problem, namely the problem of
examining “deeply disputed questions and [seeing] whether, despite appearances, some
underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered” for the proper ordering
of a democratic society in our actual world. Schmidtz might maintain that Rawls has not given the
fact of philosophical disagreement and conflict of interest its due weight in his characterization
of the problem, but for present purposes, let’s assume that they are both concerned with the same
practical problem.
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Likelihood of success, then, matters for determining whether a theory is
feasible. We briefly remarked earlier that understanding feasibility this way
might be mistaken, but let’s explore this further now with Schmidtz’s objection in
mind. First note the conceptual basis for thinking that feasibility must be more
than merely likelihood of success. David Estlund illustrates the point using the
following example:
It is pretty easy to dance like a chicken in front of your boss. Put your hands
up under your arms, thrust your head forward rhythmically, and so on. It
is easy, but you and I both know you will almost certainly never do it…but
that does not show that you can’t do it, or that it is so difficult that you are
not responsible for it if you fail. You could certainly do it, you just are not
likely to.115
Questions about what we are capable of doing or are feasible for us need not say
anything about what is likely to happen. If we conflate the two, we risk delivering
the wrong result about what type of constraint really applies to oughts. Low
likelihood does not imply incapability (or infeasibility). Conversely, the mere fact
that it is possible for me to draw a king of spades from a shuffled deck does not
show that I have the ability to do so. If I did it I would just be lucky. Thus, mere
possibility does not imply capability (or feasibility) either.116
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David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 13–14.
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Southwood and Weins examine this issue in great detail, arguing that “actual” does not imply
“feasible.” They take their thesis to be a refutation of the common counterexample to feasibility
skepticism about political theories that points to dramatic political changes in history
contradicting prior predictions. See Nicholas Southwood and David Wiens, “‘Actual’ Does Not
Imply ‘Feasible,’” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 11 (2016): 3037–3060.
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If possibility and capability are distinct notions, then what should we make
of Schmidtz’s criticism? Again, assuming that ideal theories do indeed prescribe
improbable worlds, if his objection amounts to rejecting them because of their
improbability, then he has misunderstood what capability (or feasibility) really
concerns. But Schmidtz’s examples suggest a concern about a deeper feature of
human agents beyond their likely conduct. If students predictably misread
double negations and human drivers are likely to struggle to comply with trafficmanagement policies which reserve the direction of lanes — in another example
of his — then this might point to something like an incapacity on their part rather
than mere unwillingness. In other words, the reason we might fail to do what we
are told in such cases might not simply be because we are capable but unwilling,
unlike in Estlund’s chicken dance case. Perhaps we just cannot perform these
actions, even if we tried. If so, then his argument does concern something like
incapacity or feasibility.
I think there is merit in reading Schmidtz this way. However, even if this is
what his argument amounts to, it is still unclear why we should take his examples
as amounting to incapacities on our part. Let me provide two responses. First,
note that the failed compliance of the agents in his examples might still not
amount to incapacity. This is because their statistical unlikelihood of complying
might simply be due to a lack of sufficient effort or desire on their part. Perhaps,
if they really cared and tried, then they would succeed in complying with the
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rules. This possibility remains open. Frequent failure to comply with rules might
serve as a reliable indicator of genuine incapacity, but it might not constitute it.
Secondly, consider again Schmidtz’s two examples. In both, there exists
the possibility that our failure to comply is the result not of our unwillingness but
the cognitive load that the required actions place upon us. Having to comprehend
double negations under exam conditions and remember that the direction of
traffic has been changing after work ends might require more of us than we can
cognitively muster. But we have no reason to think that compliance with the
range of laws and policies that would be required of one under a Rawlsian society
will involve the same kind of mental bandwidth! Among other things, the
Rawlsian society would require members to respect various individual liberties,
respect non-discrimination rules, and pay one’s fair share of taxes. Which actions
one must perform in order to comply with these rules will depend on how that
society writes these laws and enforces them. But suffice to say, they need not be
cognitively demanding in the same way as those in Schmidtz’s examples.
Of course, Schmidtz could retort that the laws of a Rawlsian society might
be demanding in a quite different way. They might require more than we are

motivationally capable of doing. Perhaps compliance with the particular tax laws
and the possible restrictions of corporate freedom and market activity in this
society might be antithetical to what people can get themselves to do. Perhaps so,
but what reason do we have for thinking this is likely? Many societies, especially
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American and Western European societies have, at many points in their history,
shown that they can comply with such restrictions on individual conduct. If these
serve as counterexamples to Schmidtz claim, then we are not in short supply of
them. In light of this, Schmidtz would have to defend either of the following two
claims to sustain his criticism: (1) that the Rawlsian society would require actions
that have not thus far been demanded of us and that these actions would be
motivationally

beyond

our

reach,

or

(2)

that

despite

the

seeming

counterexamples, societies have in fact failed to comply with the types of laws
just mentioned. The second option would involve showing that our actual
compliance with Rawlsian laws has in fact only been for brief periods of time.
What we presumably need, is evidence that continued compliance with such laws
is within our motivational reach. Of course, even if it were true that our
compliance with Rawlsian laws has in fact not been for an extended period of
time, it would still be possible that we are capable of complying with such laws.
Thus, Schmidtz would have to explain why continued compliance with such laws
is beyond our motivational limits.
My third point concerns the appropriateness of the comparison we are
making. Schmidtz tells us that it is important to ask how well we do at complying
with a set of rules to determine their feasibility. But assuming that we live in a
world far different from the ideal Rawlsian one — even if it is still an imperfect

liberal democracy — we cannot perform the relevant test he wants us to without
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having Rawlsian institutions in place. To be sure, I am not saying that it is
impossible to make any inferences from our behavior in relation to our present
and past societies to how we might behave under an as yet unrealized society such
as Rawls. Rather, the point goes to what effects living under a particular
institutional scheme has on its members. It might appear to us that we are
incapable of complying with Rawlsian rules given our attitudes to our present
laws, but it is perfectly possible that were we to live under a different set of
institutions, and the aims and benefits of those institutions was made apparent to
us, then this would motivate our compliance. If this is correct, then we might still
be able to comply with Rawlsian laws were we to live under a Rawlsian society
and recognize what the benefits and burdens placed upon us are. The upshot of
this point is that our willingness to comply might be context-sensitive in this way,
and that our assessments of feasibility and capability must take this into account.
In other words, asking whether it is feasible for us to comply with a law might
require asking whether we would comply with it if we were living in a society in
which that law was part of the larger legal and political structure whose purpose,
value and impact we had sufficient knowledge of.
Let me unpack this point a little more. Our ability to understand and
evaluate the underpinnings of a society as we live under it bears on how we see
the role and position in society in relation to both the state and other members. A
society that has designed institutions which I recognize as advancing my
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fundamental interests is more likely to garner my support both in my compliance
with its laws and my desire to uphold and support its major institutions. And this
point is not threatened by concerns about free-riding. Even if I am compelled to
free-ride and gain the benefits from those institutions without making the
corresponding sacrifices they ask of me as part of my duty to my fellow members,
that most people are compelled to see the institutions as furthering their interests
in this way is sufficient to generate large enough compliance and support for
them. I take it that this point is somewhat intuitive, at least given what we know
of human behavior in societies. Additionally, it is a point made by political
philosophers. That an individual’s inclination to comply with a set of laws is
affected by whether she perceives those laws to be furthering her interests is
perhaps almost a banal psychological point. Of course, in many cases, the state is
able to create the impression that it is furthering the interests of people. But
again, I suggest that we ask whether those who live in a sincere Rawlsian society,
one that practices what it preaches, would be inclined to comply with it. My claim
is that Schmidtz’s counterexamples do nothing to suggest that members living this
society will not be inclined to adhere to its laws.
It is worth noting here that for any proposed set of principles and laws, it
is unlikely that they would be able to generate full compliance. Rawls’s
assumption of full compliance in ideal theory is in fact an assumption to the effect
that people will generally comply with his principles. Thus, universal compliance
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should not be the relevant measure for determining the feasibility of a social
order.
To be sure, this third point I have been making in response to Schmidtz is
compatible with it being the case that there remain certain actions that we are
incapable of complying with regardless of the society we live in. An example of
this kind of requirement might be the communal child-rearing laws under Plato’s
Republic. Perhaps owing to our evolutionarily hard-wired instincts, it might be
motivationally beyond us to agree to give up control over the rearing and
education of our children on a mass-scale. The question of interest to us is
whether the prescriptions of ideal theories like Rawls’s might mandate such laws.
I hope to have given us reasons for thinking that they would not.
Before I conclude this section, I should note that we have so far been
conceding a point about capability to Schmidtz and other such critics of ideal
theory that we need not. Recall that if it is true that we can’t do something, then if
“ought” implies “can”, then it would not be the case that we ought to do it. But
what about actions that we “won’t” do? Estlund notes again that what we won’t do,
regardless of its reasons, still does not tell against our ability to do it. That we
won’t cease to discriminate against people on the basis of race, gender and
sexuality does not mean that we are incapable of doing so, for instance. Thus far,
I have conceded that our failure to perform the relevant action, when done out of
an unwillingness on our part, might be indicative of a genuine inability to do so.
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My hope is to show that even with this concession, feasibility critics will struggle
to maintain their objections.

2.2.

Can we realize ideal institutions?

Schmidtz’s objection was concerned with whether we could comply with
the rules of an ideal society. There is another line of criticism that attacks not the
feasibility of complying with such laws but the implementation of the major
political institutions which administer them. This section explores whether we
can realize Rawlsian institutions. Gerry Gaus has offered the most developed
version of this type of feasibility criticism.
Like Schmidtz, Gaus develops his feasibility critique out of an objection Sen
raises against ideal theory. Specifically, the take-off point for him is Sen’s
contention that we would not need to know what a perfectly just society looks like
since we can make comparative assessments about the justness of actual social
arrangements without it. As Sen puts it, “we may indeed be willing to accept, with
great certainty, that Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the world,
completely unbeatable in terms of stature by any other peak, but that
understanding is neither needed, nor particularly helpful, in comparing the peak
heights of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley.”117 If this is correct, then
we can progress towards the ideal without a theory of the ideal justice. But of
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Sen, The Idea of Justice, 102.
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course, we might reply that progress towards ideal justice is not such a
straightforward endeavor.118 The path towards ideal justice might not be
straightforward one that involves linear improvements in justness, and thus, we
might still need the ideal to properly orient us. But if the ideal theorist argues that
her account of perfect justice is neither a straightforward target nor one that is
completely out of our reach for us, then it must be something that we can reach
but with difficulty. And this is where Gaus thinks the feasibility worry arises.
When we attempt to make our way up to the peak of justice identified by the ideal
theorist, we are faced with a dilemma: we could continue to do so at the expense
of ending up nowhere or somewhere worse than where we started from, or we
could opt for a more proximate peak which we are much more confident of
climbing up to given its similarity to our present location. Put in plain, nonmountaineering language, this dilemma that Gaus calls the choice is the
following:
in cases where a clear optimum within our neighborhood requires
movement away from understating of the ideal, we often must choose
between relatively certain (perhaps large) local improvements in justice
and pursuit of a considerably less certain ideal, which would yield optimal
justice.119
Thus, pursuing the ideal is a risky, treacherous affair since it requires
knowledge about how to move toward social worlds (or neighborhoods as Gaus
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For a good example of such a reply, see Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.”

Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society (Princeton University Press,
2016), 82.
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calls them) that are very different from ours on our way to the ideally just social
world. Since we do not possess such knowledge and would be forgoing nearfuture improvements in justice that we can be much more confident of, the
sensible thing to do would be to abandon the quest for the ideal.
Before we proceed, we should note that Gaus’s concern applies to a set of
actions that most political theories say little about. These are the actions one
would need to take in order to reform society and implement the various
institutions. Let’s call these reform actions. Reform actions might differ
significantly with those actions that members need to perform in order to comply
with and support the institutional structure of their society. What is needed to
reform actual society so as to realize Rawlsian institutions is a difficult question,
and one he does not say anything about. The thought, again, is that the Rawlsian
principles are compatible with human nature, and as such, we are capable of
realizing them. We might in fact view the issue of reform actions as one more for
social scientists and policymakers than for ideal theorists. After all, ascertaining
what it would take for us to reform existing law and policy is a complex matter
requiring understanding of ground-level political processes and the workability
of different measures. At least some of this work will involve convincing others
to get onboard with the reform plans. Even if political philosophers might
miraculously turn out to be adept at negotiating such matters, there is little reason
to think that the sole responsibility is theirs. This project, which Rawls would
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characterize as part of non-ideal theory, might benefit from collaborative work
from both theorists and experts at reform.
Even if we conclude that determining the methods of political reform is not
the business of ideal theory, notice that Gaus’s criticism would still hold. This is
because Gaus’s argument concerns what would happen were we to try to realize
the Rawlsian society. His argument is neutral with respect to who should lead
political reform. Whoever does, the trek up to the peak of justice is uncertain and
risky. We can thus proceed by focusing on the question of whether the necessary
reform actions mandated by ideal theories would be feasible.
Can we discover the map that would take us to the pinnacle of justice as
described by ideal theory? We might think that we can acquire it by looking at the
relevant social scientific facts to determine all the transitional stages we would
need to progress through to get there. Of course, we would have to make
assumptions to simplify our task since we cannot predict every eventuality or
setback we might face along the way. Perhaps this task is feasible even if we are
unlikely to accomplish it, and so, Gaus is mistaken.
However, there is I think, a stronger reading of Gaus we ought to consider.
Perhaps the reason why reaching ideal justice would involve a treacherous climb
is that it would require reliable predictions about the effects of our reform
strategy each step of the way. Even if we were to succeed in enacting initial
political reform to realize some Rawlsian institutions, future events might set us
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back in ways we cannot really predict. So, pursuing such a long-term goal when
we cannot predict nor control the numerous variables involved makes the climb
a foolish endeavor. In mountain-climbing terms, we would need to know enough
about our surroundings to know that the steps we’re taking up will not lead us to
a dead end, or worse, a blizzard-prone area. Since we would struggle to gain this
information, it is rational for us to head toward a more proximate peak instead.
There are three problems with Gaus’s argument, but before I articulate
them, let me also explain why I think the mountaineering analogy he imports
from Sen for his argument is importantly dissimilar to the feasibility of realizing
ideal political institutions. Note again the point of the analogy. Just like ascending
a mountain by pursuing one path will determine which later paths are closed off
to us, the political reform actions we enact will determine which set of feasible
actions are open to us at a later time. Political reform would only be feasible if we
succeed in performing actions that unlock other political actions that are
themselves feasible, and if those later political actions unlock still further feasible
political actions, and so on, till the desired institutions are realized. Since picking
the right set of actions to perform at each stage would require greater
understanding and predictive powers than we possess, such reform would be
infeasible for us. But notice what this obscures. Political reform, aside from
responding to external political events and being shaped by them, also shapes

them. In other words, as we alter our institutions and in turn affect the prevailing
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social norms, we might in turn be affecting the conduciveness of the political and
social environment to further change. In fantastical mountaineering terms, we
might say that as we ascend the mountain in some general direction, we can
gradually change the landscape around us in such a way that would make further
progress easier. But of course, this is likely to be beyond us when climbing a
mountain, since we can only affect the vast mountainous region we have trekked
in limited ways at best, at least under normal circumstances. By contrast, it is
much easier to affect social landscapes, even with limited resources. For
instance, efforts at reforming our imperfect actual institutions might generate
support and influence others to join in the reform process. This might involve
activism to influence changes in local-level laws to begin with, eventually
developing into wholesale political movements designed to get attention and
political influence. This is merely a sketch of how things might go. The relevant
point is that scaling the mountain of justice need not simply involve passively
interacting with one’s environment, and since active involvement is a possibility,
we should avoid letting our discussion be hamstrung to the limits of Gaus’s
analogy.
To be sure, nothing I’ve said so far shows that we are more likely to succeed
at the reform strategies we enact to secure just institutions. After all, the ability to
actively shape social norms and attitudes about socio-political arrangements also
brings with it the possibility that we might greatly err in our efforts. Perhaps, in
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our efforts to change law and policy and influence minds, we end up inciting civil
discord or greater antipathy towards Rawlsian ideals. The Gaussian point about
risk still applies. But what the preceding point about the disanalogy shows, is that
there is a greater range of actions that might be available to us at every stage of
political reform. With this comes the possibility that sound and competent reform
actions at some earlier stage might enable us to direct our later reform strategies
in more predictable and thus less risky ways. Talk of mountain-climbing, thus, is
still a distraction.
My first objection to Gaus concerns his claim that we should opt for the
more proximate improvement in justice over pursuit of the ideally just state of
affairs. What does this claim, and the rationale for it, have to do with feasibility?
It is true that were we to consider expected utility, then the low likelihood of
succeeding (which we have assumed) and high disvalue of erring when pursuing
ideal justice renders the alternative the better option. But does this show that the
pursuit for ideal justice is infeasible? Not at all. At best, what it shows is that given
society’s present unwillingness to instantiate Rawlsian institutions, any concerted
attempt to alter this fact would likely fail. But as we have noted a few times, the
fact that we are presently unwilling to realize some set of institutions does not
mean that we are likely to fail were we committed to trying and did so. Our
disinclination is not proof of incapacity.
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In addition, notice that Gaus’s exhortations for us to tread carefully are
ones that an ideal theorist can fully accept. In fact, Rawls explains that there are
moral constraints upon the means we can permissibly take when transitioning to
the perfectly just society.120 We of course are not provided with a precise list of
these constraints, but a filled out non-ideal theory that complements his ideal
theory would presumably do so.121 Thus, the mere fact that a political theory

argues for a pursuit for an ideal does not entail that it requires that we pursue it
at all costs. Ideal theories can build in conditions that can serve as constraints
upon their proper realization. They can deliver the same verdict as Gaus’s
objection.
The second problem with Gaus’s argument’s is that its success might
condemn all but the most conservative theories. If we ought to prioritize realizing
more proximate peaks over the highest peak, then so long as the highest peak is
even moderately difficult to climb such that our expected utility from climbing it
is noticeably lower than what we would gain from pursuing its alternative, we
should abstain from climbing it. But this would mean that we should be largely
conservative in our attempts to reshape society, even if the conservative changes
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Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 89.

As possible examples of such moral constraints, Simmons considers that “perhaps [Rawls] has
in mind policies condoning acts by public officials (in their pursuit of injustice-remedying
policies) that would be plainly impermissible, such as murdering the most stubborn opponents of
the policies. Or perhaps the “priority rule” for nonideal theory that was just discussed suggests
that it would be morally impermissible to remedy any less grievous injustice by instituting an
injustice that is more grievous.” Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 20.
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we make fall well short what we think justice, in its fullest sense, demands. Should
we endorse such conservatism? Again, I think that, qua concerns about the
feasibility of a proposed principle, the riskiness of the reform it might necessitate
tells us little if anything. But beyond this, I will concede that in at least some cases,
opting for conservatism might be politically sensible, especially, say, if one’s
previous attempts at reform have failed, or worse, have generated destructive
results. However, it cannot be denied that all social and political change is an
inherently hopeful one, and we cannot ignore the fact that, the discovery of
deterministic principles of social science notwithstanding, we are always engaged
in a social and political experiment no matter what we do. Even a decision to
maintain the status quo might in fact be a decision to reinforce the values and
dispositions in society that constitute it, in turn reducing societies inclination to
alter its way in the near future. If this is correct, then Gaussian conservatism
about political reform might be self-justifying in an insidious way that should lead
us to at least doubt it. It threatens to undermine the possibility of meaningful
moral progress.
The third problem with Gaus’s criticism is related to the second. If
epistemic uncertainty plagues all but the most modest of social improvements,
then Gaus’s conservatism potentially undermines his own proposed social ideal,
namely, the Open Society. Gaus describes the central features of the Open Society
as follows:
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Our shared public social world simply is a stable, shared, moral, and
political framework for living together. Its institutional structure provides
common categories, and common sources of interpreting those categories,
which allow us to share cooperative ventures characterized by what all
perceived to be just social relations. Nevertheless, it is an institutional
structure of our own collective creation. This is not to say that each
perspective literally participates in its beginnings, but that it is continually
maintained as a public perspective by the diverse perspectives that relate
to and endorse it; for each participating perspective, the artificial public
world is sustained by the way its categories can be related to the underlying
social world the perspective identifies.122
Thus, like Rawls and others, he describes certain institutional features that are
necessary for realizing the Open Society. What differentiates his preferred
society, according to him, is the absence of any substantive vision of justice (such
as Rawls’s “justice as fairness”) serving as the foundational basis. Rather, the
foundation of this society is “a set of public, shared rules that provide the basis of
shared normative and empirical expectations as to what others will demand of
one, and how competing claims will be adjudicated.”123 In other words, the ideal
Gaussian society eschews all ideals by providing the institutional framework for
all reasonable members of society to deliberate over and ultimately agree to some
shared understanding of ideal justice, which nonetheless, is ever-changing. But
is this not a vision for how we ought to order society after all, and so, isn’t Gaus
vulnerable to his own conservativism. After all, so long as we have not realized
the requisite shared social world required for such deliberation to take place, we
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are not living in the Open Society. But since we ought to instantiate the Open
Society, we ought to enact reform. But how much of change would we need to
make to our present societies? Evidently, many liberal societies today fall far short
of the requirements for the kind of social space Gaus envisions, and so, it seems
that more than minimal social reform is required. But now we face the Gaussian
epistemic infeasibility criticism, for we are again attempting to climb a mountain,
even if this is, as it were, a mountain at the top of which is a space filled with many
different peaks for us to pick and strive towards via collective dialogue and
experimentation. Thus, it seems, Gaus’s preferred society is itself subject to this
criticism. To be sure, Gaus could drop his defense of the Open Society altogether,
making only a negative point about the feasibility of ideal societies. This would
enable him to retain his epistemic infeasibility criticism. This at least is how we
might want to read his criticism, since the alternative is a seeming inconsistency
in his view.

2.3.

General lessons for feasibility

Let’s take stock. In much of the discussion thus far, my response to the
objections to idealizing political theories has followed a general strategy. I have
argued that, whether it is the objections to the feasibility of complying and
supporting ideal theoretic institutions or implementing them, there is little
reason to conclude that the practical worries raised establish their infeasibility.
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At best, what these objections amount to is the conclusion that such theories are
difficult to instantiate. This, I have argued, is because of one of two reasons: either
the various practical worries raised stop short of undermining feasibility, or they
misunderstand how even merely likelihood might be shown to be possible when
considered under the right conditions. An instance of this again is the third
response I made to Schmidtz’s criticism. The likelihood of me complying with a
counterfactual set of rules and institutions might not be determinable without
looking at how I might behave where I living under those laws and institutions.
Were I to live in that society, I might well recognize that complying with its rules
and supporting its institutions is in my interest and proceed to do so. Thus, we
might need to conditionalize our assessments of likelihood of compliance.
Likewise, careful and intelligent reform strategies might enable us to alter our
socio-political landscape as we traverse it, easing our path towards full justice.
Of course, I have not yet offered arguments to the effect that ideal theories

would succeed in being realized if we subjected them to these tests. There is
reason to think that at least Rawls’s theory would pass them. The two principles
of justice are supposed to secure the fundamental and higher-order interests of
persons living in a liberal society. Rawls argues that this explains why the
Rawlsian society, once instantiated, would be stable because its members
recognize the value in complying with its laws and uphold its institutions. In
addition, realization of the major Rawlsian institutions, is presumably not a far148

fetched goal since they have already been implemented in many liberal western
societies, albeit imperfectly. Whether other ideal theories would do as good a job
is an open question. But if Rawls is right, then we already have a rebuttal to
Schmidtz’s and Gaus’s criticisms.
What I hope to have offered then, is a clarification of the boundaries
dividing notions like feasibility and capability on the one hand, and those more
directly associated with action-guidance such as likelihood. I do think that
something like this distinction between the two sets of ideas might be instructive
for us understanding the action-guidingness of ideal theories. Assessments about
the feasibility of such theories might have little bearing on the question of how
we ought to act given their truth precisely because feasibility concerns our ability
to realize them in the long-run. What we should do in the immediate future with
respect to them is a different matter. Perhaps likelihood is the relevant standard
when it comes to ground-level practical matters, and perhaps we should follow
Schmidtz and Gaus in exercising caution when acting. The important point again
is that we not ignore or deem false theories that are feasible and yet not
immediately practicable. Since our goal is not just to identify political actions we
can successfully enact but to make genuine moral progress, we must bear in mind
how the courses of actions we take relate to what the best or correct theory tells
us, assuming it is feasible. Reform for reform’s sake is empty action just like
theorizing for theorizing sake is empty talk.
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3.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Where does the preceding debate leave us with respect to the value of

idealization in normative theory? Let me articulate one broad take-home lesson I
think we can clean from the discussion in this chapter. First, what the discussion
in this chapter shows, is that the objections that idealizing political theories meet
with have little to do with the fact that they idealize. Rather, the source of the
complaint from critics is essentially something internal to how the theory applies
a relevant meta-normative idea like feasibility. To see this more clearly, observe
that we might well be having the same debate about feasibility even if we abstain
from idealizing in our theory. The purported gap that the idealized theory is
supposed to generate between the ideal world and the actual world, is in fact due
instead to how the theory understands what the limits of political possibility are.
A theory like Rawls’s takes those limits to be much further out and away from
actuality than what Schmidtz or Gaus might tolerate. One’s understanding of
feasibility, then, determines how much license one has to idealize, which in turn
determines how utopian or ambitious the theory’s prescriptions are. The
idealization itself, is merely an intermediate theoretical apparatus that operates
within whatever bounds the theorist determines appropriate. It is possible that
our diagnosis of other objections to idealization in normative theory might deliver
a similar result. Take the case of the alienation. Critics argue that by grounding
our subjective good in the responses of idealized agents starkly dissimilar to their
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actual counterparts, ideal advisor theories generate accounts of the good that
alienate us. What I am suggesting here is that the problem might be in their
understanding of alienation rather than the fact that theorists idealize. At the very
least, it is the particular way that ideal advisor views understand the concept of
“alienation’ that explains why they idealize to the extent that they do. Whether
they are justified in doing so is another matter.
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CHAPTER 4: ALIENATION, IDEAL ADVISOR VIEWS,
AND OUR GOOD
1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly held that what is good for us must be tied in some way to
what we care about. However, our desires and judgments are often flawed due to
a variety of motivational and cognitive factors. Thus, many hold that our good
must consist not in our actual but our counterfactual desires. Idealized accounts
of the good aim to overcome the problem with tying our good to our actual desires
by grounding our good in the desires of our idealized selves.124 However, such
views face a standard objection: they alienate us from our good. Our ideal
advisors, it argued, differ from us to such a degree that their desires and hopes
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For instance, see Railton, “Facts and Values." Richard Brandt argues that our good consists in
what we would “rationally desire” when suitably idealized. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the
Right. Sidgwick’s “point of view of the universe” holds that one’s ideal counterpart must have full
information about the relevant future possibilities in a way that she can grasp. Sidgwick, The
Methods of Ethics, 7th Edition, bk. 5. Similarly, Rawls argues that one’s good consists in one’s
rational plan of life, which in turn consists in the plan one would pick if one had “full deliberative
rationality” and was in possession of and considered all the relevant information. See Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, 358–359. Harsanyi’s view of utility, likewise, reduces goodness to one’s fully
informed preferences. See Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior." David Lewis
endorses a dispositional account of value which is grounded in what one prefers if one were
properly acquainted with an object. See Smith, Lewis, and Johnston, “Dispositional Theories of
Value." Also see Dorsey, “Idealization and the Heart of Subjectivism”; Sobel, “Subjectivism and
Idealization”; Sobel, “Full Information Accounts of Well-Being”; Railton, “Moral Realism." In a
recent paper, Eden Lin argues that idealization is unnecessary to deal with our actual desires being
faulty in these ways. See Lin, “Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn’t Idealize."
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for us seem remote and unmotivating. Thus, what is good for us cannot be what
some ideal version of us would want for us.
My objective in this chapter is to put a major dent in the alienation
objection to idealized accounts of one’s good. Connie Rosati has presented the
most sophisticated version of this objection, and I respond to her formulation of
the objection.125 Following her, I will also refer to such accounts of the good as
Ideal Advisor Views. I argue that such views turn out to still deliver verdicts that
we would be inclined to care about. Where Rosati and others go wrong, I contend,
is in how they understand the relevant test that such views must pass in order to
not be alienating. A careful analysis of the matter should lead us to conclude that
what matters is not whether our ideal counterpart is similar to us, but rather
whether we would care about the processes that led to her desiring a particular
life for us. This paves the way for me to argue that we would, in many cases, care
about our ideal advisor’s final desires for us.
In what follows, I begin by explaining the kind of internalist position that
underpins the alienation problem in section II. In section III and IV, I summarize
ideal advisor views and describe how they are thought to be alienating. Then, in
section V, I respond to the alienation problem by first asking whether all that
matters to us is the kind of test Rosati has us employ to evaluate the results of Ideal
Advisor views. I provide reasons for rejecting her test and propose an alternative.
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Section VI asks whether Ideal Advisor views would pass this alternative test. I
argue that under ordinary optimal conditions, we would care about the advice
from our ideal counterpart she represents the version of us who is sincerely
committed to and best equipped for the task of examining our various possible
lives en route to telling us what her final desire for us is. I proceed to respond to
a few objections to my argument in section VII before concluding with a
discussion about what my defense of such views might amount to in section VIII.

2. INTERNALISM ABOUT ONE’S GOOD
The objection that Ideal Advisor Views are alienating hinges on a central
assumption of such views: internalism about our good. Internalists about one’s
personal good aim to distinguish what is good for a person from what is good
generally. For instance, If my good consists in becoming a better tennis player,
then, we might think, this must be true at least partly because of some fact about

me.126 This fact might pertain to my subjective motivational state or some other
stable property of me. Some have argued that any plausible account of what is
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In this way, the question about what one’s good consists in is separate from the question about
what is objectively intrinsically valuable. Questions about objective intrinsic value are often
discussed in relation to moral value. Happiness, utilitarians tell us, is intrinsically valuable. Kant
describes the good will as the only thing that is unqualifiedly good. These candidate answers to
objective intrinsic goodness are answers that are supposed to be true for all agents independent
of features any one of them might have. The question about a person’s good, by contrast, is a
question about subjective goodness in that, it concerns what is good for a particular person.
154

good for someone must accept this internalist constraint.127 For the purposes of
our discussion, we need only assume that a plausible account of one’s personal

good should comply with this internalist constraint.
This basic internalist intuition about a person’s good, however, leaves
unclear exactly what sort of connection needs to be forged between the good and
the agent. An initial attempt to characterize this connection might be as follows:

Simple Internalism: something X can be good for a person A only if A is
capable of caring about X.
Simple internalism captures the basic internalist intuition. The problem,
however, is that it is excessively permissive. Under the right conditions, there are
far too many things that we are capable of caring about which should not get to
count as candidates for our personal good. For instance, I might be capable of
preferring the torture and death of countless people to overspending another
week in solitary confinement. Similarly, undergoing hypnosis, intoxication,
religious indoctrination or surgery might render me capable of caring for things
I would otherwise not. That I might be capable of caring for a wide variety of
things when under such conditions does not show that they would be good for
me. Since we might not view our desires under merely any such conditions to be
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Rosati points out that the rebuttals of value monism and hedonism would not have their appeal
if it were not for the force of this internalist intuition. For any candidate monist value, we might
legitimately wonder whether everyone could get themselves to care for it. Nozick’s experience
machine suggests that what we care about is more than just hedonic value. See Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, 42–45. Peter Railton suggests that a conception of one’s good would be an
“incredibly alienated” one if it was incapable of engaging the agent in the right sort of way.
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decisive in determining our good, we ought to modify simple internalism. We
might instead attempt to ground a person’s good in her actual desires or
something close to it. Consider then the following:

Strict internalism: something X can be good for a person A only if she can
care about X without any alteration of her present condition.128
Strict internalism avoids the over-permissiveness of simple internalism.
However, it runs into the opposite problem; it restricts too narrowly the range of
things that might count as being good for us. As we noted earlier, our desires can
sometimes be the product of errors in reasoning, attentiveness, and insufficient
information. I might scoff at the idea of signing up for a retirement savings
program because I am convinced that investing most of my savings will make me
a millionaire. And yet, it clearly seems to be good for me to sign up. A more
careful, rational version of me would do so. Since strict internalism seems to rule
out such an analysis, we ought to reject it.129 In place of these versions, Rosati
proposes a two-tiered variant:
Two-tier internalism:
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Unlike the formulation here, Rosati’s characterization of strict internalism forbids any “marked
alteration”, but she in her discussion on what the correct view of internalism must capture, she
states that “ must not hold that something can be good for a person only if the actual, unaltered
person can care about it, for this ties a person's good too closely to her present condition, however
defective." Thus, my formulation more accurately captures her view of strict internalism. See
Rosati, “Internalism and the Good for a Person,” 303.
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This point mirrors the point in discussions about reasons for action that one’s reason to φ not be ruled
out by the fact that one does not actually desire to φ. See Williams, “Internal and External Reasons."
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1. Were A under conditions C and contemplating the circumstances of her
actual self as someone about to assume her actual self's position, A would
care about X for her actual self.130
2. Conditions C are such that the facts about what A would care about for her
actual self while under C are something A would care about when under
ordinary optimal conditions.131
Tier 1 captures the idea that one’s desires under counterfactual conditions
can determine her actual self’s good. Notice though that tier 1 also requires that
A consider what is good for her actual self as someone about to assume her actual
self’s position. Rosati argues that this addition helps ensure that A’s counterpart
A* would be concerned about what is good not for A* but A herself. That said,
Rosati views tier 1 to be insufficient at ensuring that the right sort of connection
between agent her and her good is present. All tier 1 secures, she suggests, is a
link between what one’s counterpart desires for oneself and one’s good. It does
not ensure that our actual selves would care about this fact.132 Tier 2 addresses this
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The response appropriate for determining the actual agent’s good is what her counterpart
would care about and not, a cognitive act such as what she would judge to be good. As Firth points
out, the reason for preferring the non-cognitive response is that it avoids circularity; if one’s good
was defined in terms of what one would judge to be good under certain conditions, then we would
have defined one’s good in terms of itself (assuming the counterpart’s belief is true). See Firth,
“Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” 326.
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Rosati, “Internalism and the Good for a Person,” 307.
132

For instance, my counterfactual self, suitably idealized, might desire that I become a vegan.
But this might appear alien to me since I cannot appreciate how giving up meat and dairy might
be good for me. We can generate many such examples. Whether we can care about our
counterpart’s desires for us seems to matter if we’re concerned about alienation.
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worry by requiring that we would care about our counterpart’s desires for us.
However, since our capacity to care about her desires might be affected by our
cognitive faults, Rosati suggests that we consider only what we would care about
under “ordinary optimal conditions”, that is, those conditions that we can
ordinarily enter into that are conducive for proper reflection of our concerns.
These would include not being under the influence of stimulants or hypnosis,
paying attention, being free of emotional states that might distort one’s judgment,
and not ignoring obvious information.133

3. IDEAL ADVISOR VIEWS
As stated, the conditions that most value theorists have considered to be
appropriate for determining one’s good are idealized ones. Idealization enables
the agent to rise above her various cognitive and epistemic limitations and see
clearly the matter at hand. What our ideal counterpart desires for us then, would
presumably have normative force for us since her doing so would be the result of
an informed opinion on the matter.
My ideal counterpart might do better than me at caring about the right
things when considering my good in two ways. First, she would be better
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What we would care about under such conditions would still reflect our actual self’s concerns
for two reasons according to her. First, ordinary optimal conditions while not always the actual
conditions we are in, are nonetheless proximal to the conditions under which we began caring
about our good. Second, what we care about, under ordinary optimal conditions, still possesses
recommending force. That I would care about my counterpart’s desires for me under some ideal
conditions if I was awake and thinking clearly has motivational force for me.
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informed about my future levels of happiness and desire-satisfaction and
consider how life might turn out for me if I make one choice over another.
Second, she would be able to reason better about what this information about my
future possibilities says about the best possible path for me. She would make no
egregious reasoning errors, for instance when considering which path might be
more likely to realize the deepest concerns of my present self.
Of course, my ideal counterpart’s epistemically privileged position does
not by itself render her a worthy advisor about my good. The reason she gets to
be my advisor is that she knows me well and has my best interests at heart. My
ideal counterpart is in essence, my guardian angel built in my own image.
While ideal advisor views modify various cognitive features of an agent,
they seek to leave her conative states intact. Since the motivation for idealizing is
to ensure that one’s good is the result of one’s rationally informed desires, such
views, Rosati argues, would undermine this motivation if they alter character
traits of the person and turn her into a different person altogether.134

4. THE ALIENATION OBJECTION
Rosati argues that when we consider what ideal advisor views would entail,
the resultant ideal counterpart they envision would not be someone like us, and

134

Brandt explicitly acknowledges this point and argues that his ideal advisor account avoids
altering one’s personality in this way. See Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, 13.
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thus, someone whose desire would have no normative force for us. Such theories
fail to satisfy the second-tier of her proposed internalist view.
What drives the alienation objection is the fact that merely stipulating that
an agent be fully informed and rational is insufficient for ensuring that she would
attend to the information she is given. Having information and appreciating it is
importantly different. Two people might come to gain the same piece of
information but one might appreciate it and the other not because of their prior
dispositions. Rosati terms this the “problem of appreciation.”135 For instance,
consider the case of informing a smoker and a non-smoker about the health
hazards of smoking. The smoker might not genuinely appreciate the information
given to him even if she understands it, unlike the non-smoker. The smoker might
be inclined to prioritize the pleasure she gains from smoking. This information,
thus, might simply not register emotionally for her.
In his discussion of this example, Brandt argues that genuine appreciation
can only obtain if we vividly represent the information to ourselves, and not
merely once but over and over again, and at the right time. Similarly, Railton
argues that our ideal advisor might have to undergo education and experiences
that will render the information adequately vivid to her.136 The problem, however,
is that once she undergoes these changes, she might become a different person.
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If so, then we might legitimately wonder why we should accept what she desires
for us as being good. Such an account of the good would appear to violate the
second tier of the internalist requirement, argues Rosati, and thus, be alienating.
It should be noted that in the literature, the concept of “alienation” is not
given a precise definition. The term is used to mean, roughly, that one is
incapable of, or would not find within herself the motivation to care about or find
compelling the thing in question.137 Of course, we could interpret this idea rather
strictly to mean that one must find within her subjective motivational set the drive
to care about something.138 However, since we ought to reject strict internalism
and opt for the second-tier of Rosati’s proposed internalism, interpreting
“alienation” this way would be too narrow. Instead, we might read it as expressing
just the idea captured by Rosati’s two-tiered internalism. In other words, to be
alienated from something just is, to not care, when one is under ordinary optimal
conditions. I will take this to be what alienation constitutes for the rest of this
chapter.139
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Two further clarifications are in order. First, when considering our reactions to our ideal
advisors’ desires for us, what matters is not whether we should but whether we would care about
them. For it to be an internalist view, Ideal Advisor views must hold that our good ultimately
reduces to what our desires are. Of course, our actual desires might be faulty, and so, what we
“do” care need not be the ground for our good. Instead, what we care about under counterfactual
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5. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PERSONALITY TEST
What does it take for me to care about my ideal advisor’s desires for me?
Rosati’s claim is that my ideal advisor must be someone like me. Let’s term
Rosati’s test for determining whether the resultant ideal agent is identical to the
actual agent the Personality Test.140 In this section, I want to motivate the idea that
we might care about our ideal advisor’s desires even if she was sufficiently
different from us. Consider the following case:

Time travelling Laurence: Laurence Hare is an 18-year old college student
born into a family of thespians. As a child, he spent many a year
accompanying his parents around the theatre-world, even playing
important roles in some of their plays. His parents are convinced he would
make a fine stage actor one day and encourage him to take up an
apprenticeship with a fellow stage actor to learn the craft. While he enjoys
the stage, Laurence is very passionate about physics and wants to pursue a
career in it in the hopes of unlocking the mysteries of the world. One day,
Laurence is visited in his dorm by an aging scientist who looks eerily like
him. The visitor is Yogi Hare, Lawrence’s 75 year old counterpart who has
traveled from the future to warn Young Laurence. He describes how his
initial life of intellectual wonder as a graduate student turned into soulcrushing labor as he sought and eventually acquired tenure. Yogi Hare is
now an ascetic living up in the mountains. He feels none of the passion for
physics that he did when he was younger and yearns only for inner peace
and spirituality after years of inner turmoil. In a final redemptive act, he
used his colleague’s time-traveling machine to warn his younger self. He
is what determines our good. Secondly, philosophers in the discussion on idealized theories of the
good employ different conative terms to describe an ideal advisor’s reactions. They might talk of
the “desires'', “wishes”, “hopes'' and “wants'', or the state of “identifying with” and “having an
affinity with” one’s advisor. These terms are all used loosely and interchangeably to refer to the
non-cognitive response of an ideal advisor upon surveying the various possible lives her
counterpart might lead.
140
I use the term “identity” here loosely. Rosati’s view requires that our counterpart be sufficiently
qualitatively similar to us. In the case of young Lawrence, his counterpart is also numerically
identical to him. As I will demonstrate later, only numerical identity between our actual selves
and our counterfactual, ideal counterparts is required for their advice to matter to us.
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advises Young Laurence to pursue other passions like stage-acting before
dying.
Do we have reason to think that Young Lawrence would care about Yogi Hare’s
advice? Young Lawrence, it is stipulated, differs markedly in character from his
older self, so much so that his older self appears almost unrecognizable to him
(behind his long, stringy beard, even his facial features have changed markedly).
and yet, it seems clear that young Lawrence would care. A natural explanation for
this is the relatability of Yogi Hare’s course of life. Even if we grant that becoming
an ascetic is rather dramatic, the process of undergoing burnout and
disillusionment in academia is one that Young Lawrence can appreciate if he
were even minimally attentive to the grim reality of life in academia for most
prospective academics. As a result, the advice that he steer clear of it, while not
something that he might ultimately act upon, is one that he would plausibly take
seriously, for he would not want to end up being bitter and jaded like his older
counterpart.
If this observation is correct, then what the preceding paragraph suggests
is that we need not be identical or similar to our epistemically better-situated

counterparts for their advice to have at least partial recommending force for us.
Instead, what seems to matter is whether we are capable of appreciating how (1)
we ourselves could well proceed on a similar journey in life that which our
counterpart underwent, and (2) how doing so might transform us into someone
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like our counterpart. Let’s term a test which requires that we appreciate these two
features of our counterparts the Appreciation Test.
It might seem absurd to talk about making sense of how someone’s life
might turn out. After all, luck of various kinds (circumstantial, causal and
resultant luck for instance) invariably affect our efforts to realize our long-term
plans. Even so, to the extent that it makes sense to talk about our good being
determined by desires for future states of affairs, there is nothing peculiar here
about the case at hand. The effect of luck is as much a problem for simple
internalist accounts of the good which ground it in our actual desires as for any
other. To consider how our lives might turn out if we choose one path over
another is merely to consider how the predictable course of events resulting from

our actions would bear on our life choices. Of course, if our counterpart’s life
strikes us as being thoroughly inexplicable, this might undermine any advice she
offers on the basis of her life experience.
It is clear that in the case above, Yogi Lawrence does not represent Young
Lawrence’s ideal counterpart, for his recommendations are borne out of his
limited perspective and the cognitive biases his experiences have generated in
him. His advice, as Rosati puts it, does not satisfy the “justification requirement”
to count as a satisfactory account of Young Lawrence’s good. Young Lawrence
thus would still have reason to consider but ultimately eschew his advice.
Nonetheless, it is significant here that Yogi Hare’s advice is not lacking in
164

normative force because of his dissimilarity to his younger counterpart, for it
suggests that Rosati has overemphasized the importance of you being your ideal
counterpart.
Rosati might object to my argument that it is sufficient for one to care about
how her counterpart’s life went in order to not be alienated from her desires for
one by claiming the following: in ordinary cases, we regard our own judgments
as being authoritative about what is good for us; my argument contradicts this
ordinary practice by suggesting that we take the judgments, or in this case, the
desires, of persons wholly unlike us, to determine our good. This argument thus
appears to violate a basic intuition of internalism that motivates the alienation
worry.
My reply to Rosati has two parts. First, it is crucial that we separate the
ordinary cases where our actual desires are taken to determine what we should
do from this case where we are considering what would constitute a good life for
us. When I am deliberating about which suit I should put on for a wedding, I might
consider various things, including, whether the color and design fit the occasion
and location, whether it looks good on me and whether it fits better than my other
suits. I engage in some deliberation. If I was told that an agent wholly unlike
myself would want me to wear the grey instead of the beige suit, then I would
scoff at the advice. His desires for me are, as Rosati suggests, his desires and not
mine. But what a good life for me involves is a very different matter. When we
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consider major life decisions, we generally exercise greater caution, consider
more possibilities, and examine each possibility more thoroughly. Along with
this, we also display greater willingness to consider how others have reasoned
about such decisions and what they have chosen. We seek the council of others
with greater experience and knowledge than us, which brings us to the crucial
bit: we seek their counsel about what we should do even if they are very different

people compared to us. What matters to us is whether we can make sense of their
advice for us and not so much whether they have the same desires, beliefs and
personal histories that we do.
If this observation is correct, then it puts a dent any parallel Rosati might
draw between ordinary cases concerning our reasons for action and those
pertaining to the good life. The considerations that go into determining what is a
good object for me might well be more restrictive than those that determine what
a good life is for me.
The second part of my reply concerns the upshot of the point just made. If
it is permissible to admit the beliefs and desires of persons unlike ourselves into
the process of determining what our good consists in, then it seems that an
account of one’s good could involve non-moral deference. Perhaps we could
simply defer to the judgments of an ideal advisor, even one markedly dissimilar
to us, as a way of identifying our good. Our good then might simply be constituted
by what this advisor would desire for us. I do not think that we need to commit
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ourselves to such a conclusion. Remember that Rosati’s internalism is two-tier.
Our current discussion concerns what the appropriate test should be for
determining whether our actual agent would care about her counterpart’s desires
for us. The good, nonetheless, is still constituted by what our actual agent would
desire, albeit under what Rosati calls “ordinary optimal conditions.” This means
that even if we plump for the Appreciation Test over the Personality Test, the
resulting two-tier internalist view remains unchanged. All that changes are the
conditions for determining when the second-tier has been secured. We would not
thus be departing from the internalist view of one’s good that motivated our
discussion about alienation in this chapter.
It is important to understand what is going on here. Rosati’s objection to
Ideal Advisor views hinges on their purported violation of the internalist starting
point that motivated the idealization in the first place. What is good for me must,
in some meaningful sense, connect up with what I want. Ideal Advisor views were
brought in to address the issue of faulty desires while respecting this internalist
starting point. My claim is that it is at least unclear why Ideal Advisor views could
not employ idealization in a way that renders the ideal agent dissimilar to us while
being one whose life we can nonetheless care about. It is the fact that we would
still care about our counterpart’s desires that makes the resultant account of the
good internalist and not, rather, that we identify with the kind of person she is.
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The space I am arguing we should allow for idealizing views of the good can thus
be provided without jeopardizing our commitment to internalism.
It might seem to us that this test would not work for certain individuals.
For instance, imagine that Young Lawrence was a 14-year old. Would he be able
to identify with the advice from his senior counterpart? This might seem much
less obvious compared to the version of Young Lawrence I considered. The reason
is that those below a certain age lack the relevant imaginative and rational
capacity to consider matters with the required degree of dispassionate rationality.
Those in their early to mid-teens are a classic example of this. Thus it might seem
that the Appreciation Test would fail to deliver a counterpart with satisfactory
recommendations for such individuals, undermining the view.
It should be clear that the Appreciation Test, or whatever is the right test
for that matter, need not work for everyone. Like children, 14-year olds might not
possess either the rational capacity nor a stable set of desires required to
meaningfully decide for themselves what is their good consists in. There is
nothing implausible about the idea that a rationally informed verdict of our
personal good can come only after we become capable of engaging in the exercise
required (after all, infants and small children are ruled out for this very reason).
14-year olds are like children with respect to their ability to consider matters in
ordinary optimal conditions. That is, they lack the ability to step back from their
immediate desires and consider matters more abstractly and rationally. This,
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combined with the fact that most 14-year olds have yet to form a stable set of longterm desires and values that would partly constitute their personality means that
running the exercise as a one of them is tantamount to running the exercise as
many different persons simultaneously. Ideal Advisor theory need not worry
about this concern.

6. WOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE ADVICE OF OUR IDEAL
ADVISOR?
In the previous section, I argued that we should reject the test Rosati
proposes for determining whether a conception of someone’s good avoids
alienation in favor of the alternative I offered, namely the Appreciation Test.
However, even if I am right, we still need an explanation for why we would care
about the verdicts delivered by our ideal counterpart. The cases discussed thus
far are of counterparts who are not fully rational and informed about the various
possible lives we could lead. Thus, as I noted earlier, their desires for us can, at
best, only have partial recommending force. But would our ideal counterpart’s
desires have full recommending force? I will argue in this section that they would.
To begin with, we can marshall the reasons just offered at the end of the
last section. If it is true that we are more likely to take seriously the advice of
others when making high-stakes decisions, then the door opens up for us to allow
the advice of others to have recommending force. But why would we care about
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the advice of some hypothetical being who we do not have any antecedent relation
to? After all, caring about the advice of a mentor or an aunt, individuals whom
you know and respect, is one thing. Caring about what some hypothetical version
of you who has god-like powers of reasoning and foresight seem to be another.
We do not share any special relationship with our ideal counterpart. So why take
their advice seriously? The answer I think lies in what our ideal counterpart
represents. If we grant that we care not merely about what we desire for ourselves
but also the desires of others for us, then notice that our ideal counterpart
represents, as it were, a “maxed-out” version of the individuals whose advice we
take seriously. For the very qualities that make these individuals good candidates
for advising us about our lives are ones that our ideal advisor possesses to the
maximal degree. Now of course, the issue remains that our counterpart is merely
a hypothetical being with whom we have no prior relationship. But this poses no
obstacle given the second tier of Rosati’s internalist view. Remember that what
matters is not what we would actually care about in relation to the desires others
have for us, but what we would care about under ordinary optimal conditions.
And since under such conditions, one is free of emotional states that distort one’s
judgment, we can make the case that one is free of emotional factors that would
cause one to take seriously the wisdom of epistemically limited agents one knows
but ignore the wisdom of epistemically unlimited versions of oneself. This
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establishes a strong presumptive case in favor of thinking that one’s ideal
counterpart would pass the Appreciation Test.
An immediate problem rears its head at this point. My ideal advisor, unlike
the counterparts considered earlier, is someone who has not herself undergone a
particular life as me. Rather, she is someone who is fully informed about and has
fully considered what it would be like to have undergone various lives as me. To
use Sidgwick’s language, she is a spectator with a bird-eye view of the various lives
that the various versions of me might live. She looks at each one carefully, with
maximal clarity and appreciation, as Railton suggests, and then compares each
before favoring the one she thinks is best for me. How then, are we to run the
Appreciation Test, which requires that we appreciate the journey in life she has
undergone? It seems that the requisite test for determining whether I would care
about her desire must concern either her desire itself or something related to it.
For there is no life of hers except the lives of the various versions of me that serve
as the basis for her final desire for me. More importantly, my task as the actual
agent deciding if I care for the desire of my ideal advisor cannot be to examine
the various lives I could lead since the various counterfactual versions of me do
not themselves express wishes unlike in the Young Lawrence case we discussed.
The pertinent desire is expressed by my all-seeing ideal advisor. Thus, what would
determine whether I care is something related to how my ideal advisor arrived at
her desire for me. In line with this thought, my proposal is this: in deciding
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whether we should care about our advisor’s wishes, our care or lack thereof would
pertain to the explanation our advisor offers for wishing that a certain life (or

lives) be the one we lead.141
Let me clarify the proposal just given. My good, according to Ideal Advisor
views, is supposed to be whatever is desired by my ideal counterpart for me. My
ideal counterparts would desire whatever they take to be the best life for me once
she has surveyed the various lives I might experience. I suggest that to determine
whether her desires for me are worth caring about, we look at the psychological
processes that compelled them to desire a particular life for us. This might
include her reasons, resultant motivations after she has surveyed the various
lives, and her intermediate desires that support her final desire for me.
The fact that my ideal advisor might have reasons that motivate her final
desire or wish for me should not strike us as problematic. Even though Ideal
Advisor views attempt to provide a naturalist answer to the question about our
good, the way they arrive at the answer might involve some cognitive content. My
desire for ice cream from the shop next door might be extinguished once I form
the belief that the shop is closed for the day. Likewise, my ideal advisor might
cease to desire life A for us, or life A over B once she forms certain beliefs about
how that life might impact the quality of my life or the fulfillment of the desires
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As Railton notes, there could well be two or equally good ways that your life could go, in which
case, your good consists in a disjunctive set of lives. There is nothing obviously problematic if this
possibility was to obtain. See Railton, “Facts and Values,” 23.
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strongest within my actual self. Thus, to evaluate what reasons and motivations
compelled her to favor a particular life for me is not to abandon the naturalist
project.142 The function of such an evaluation is to ascertain whether we would
care about the cognitive and conative processes that led my counterpart to her
final verdict.143
When considering whether we can make sense of the mental process that
led our ideal counterpart to arrive at her final response concerning our good, we
are faced with two difficulties, both of which relate to problems Rosati argues
render the idea of a fully informed and rational counterpart psychologically
implausible. Our ideal advisor is supposed to perform the super-human task of
(1) fully appreciating each candidate life we might lead and then, (2) considering
how each would compare to the others without ignoring any of the relevant
qualities of each life led while doing so. Since she is an idealization, we might
assume, as Railton suggests, that we could stretch what is psychologically possible
to generate an account of such an agent.144 Even so, we might still wonder whether
we would be able to make sense of how she performs each of these two tasks. If
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We would be abandoning the naturalist project if we required that our ideal advisor’s desires
are only worth caring about if they satisfy various epistemic conditions, such as consistency, truth
or justification. This would in effect reduce the good to various externalist conditions that would
make it mind-independent in the way that naturalist-internalists find so problematic.
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I use “verdict” here neutrally to mean either a cognitive or conative reaction.
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“It might be said that owing to the psychological properties of actual people, it is impossible to
bring them to a state of and vivid information, yet we may see them as possessing properties in
virtue of which they would be disposed to respond in certain ways to ever more complete and
vivid information (supposing a capacity to absorb it), and different kinds of people, to respond
differently.” Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” 24–25.
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we cannot, then it appears, we will fail to care about how our ideal counterpart
arrives at her desire that we lead a particular life over others.
I want to argue now that both these difficulties can be met by articulating
how the ideal agent would retain the information and conclusions she draws from
her assessment. When surveying each life, she must obviously be sufficiently
empathetic to the developments within it in order to understand and appreciate
how it would affect and change us.145 She must then extract from this experience
only the information necessary for comparison later. This information might
include, perhaps, how the life surveyed impacts the fulfillment of the desires and
hopes we have at the start of the journey taken by our counterpart in this life. Our
desires and hopes here might concern both our own happiness and that of our
near and dear. In addition, the requisite information might also include whether
the agent at the end of this life feels happy and fulfilled and whether these feelings
are epistemically faulty (e.g., based on obviously false beliefs). Our ideal agent,
we can assume, has faultless memory, and can thus remember at least this
distilled information about each life. What we would get access to is this distilled
information she draws from each experience. Similarly, when she goes about
comparing each life against every other, the particular way she compares them,
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I mean “empathetic” in the ordinary sense of the term, that is, the mental action of imagining
yourself in the shoes of others and thereby indirectly experiencing their feelings. This fits with
how Rosati thinks the term should be used in this context. See Rosati, “Persons, Perspectives, and
Full Information Accounts of the Good,” 322.
174

including, that is, the factors she considers, and how she gradually arrives at a
ranking of each life, would all be conveyable to us. This way, our ideal
counterpart would be able to give us her explanation of what motivated her
eventual verdict.
Would we care about this information our counterpart offers to us? There
is little reason, I think, to give the evaluation and resultant hopes of our ideal
advisor any less credence than we might give to our imperfect counterpart as in
the case involving Lawrence Hare. If we imagine that our ideal counterpart is
earnestly concerned about determining what our good consists in, then her
reports to us will have at least the same emotional weight that the advice of Yogi
Hare has for Young Lawrence. Our ideal advisor will be able to experience each
of those lives and feel its effects on her. But she would be able to do more. She
would be able to compare and contrast those lives in a rational and dispassionate
manner, something Yogi Hare would struggle with. Our ideal advisor extracts
from her felt experience of those lives only the information she needs later to
compare them. Of course, she will also need to appreciate this information she
collects. But she would only need to be able to appreciate it as the agent who has
a bird-eye view of the various life paths.
My argument for why we would care about the explanations provided by
our ideal counterpart, then, is the following: our ideal counterpart represents the
version of us who is sincerely committed to and best equipped for the task of
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examining our various possible lives en route to telling us what her final desire
for us is. As such, we can be assured that her evaluations and subsequent
explanations will be sincere. If we were carefully and seriously examining the
matter, as we would be if we were under ordinary optimal conditions, we would
have little reason to not be compelled by her verdict even if she herself has
changed as a result of the process of experiencing and comparing our possible
lives. There is nothing better we can hope for in our efforts to complete this
normative quest for our own good, and our ideal counterpart represents our best
and safest hope.146 If I would care about what my epistemically superior but
imperfect counterpart might want for me (as in the Lawrence case and in real life
cases where we accept advice from those wiser than us), then I would also care
about what a perfectly ideal counterpart would want for me.

7. OBJECTIONS
I want to spend the remainder of the chapter addressing several important
objections pertaining to my defense of ideal advisor theory. Note that the focus
here is not the overall plausibility of ideal advisor theory, but its ability to resist
the alienation objection. Other worries with the theory have been brought up in
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She is our safest hope in that she gives us the best chance of avoiding the effects of irrationality
plaguing our evaluations about our good.
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recent literature. Defending against the alienation objection would at least show
that the theory can fight off a formidable old foe.

7.1. The content of advice can be alienating
My argument in the previous two sections might also make clear a different
source of alienation not discussed by Rosati. The problem might lie in the fact that
someone whose life trajectory and decision-making we can make sense one can
nonetheless deliver advice whose content we find alienating. For instance,
someone who seeks to become a priest might find it alienating to be told that he
should live a life of indulgence and lavishness even if it comes from someone very
similar in character. The idea of living a life so antithetical to his values would be
deeply alien and abhorrent to him. But while the basis of the rejection of advice
is largely ethical here, it is nonetheless grounded in important values that
undergird what one is willing to accept as possibly compelling advice about one’s
life. But if this is right, then it suggests that the Appreciation Test is still alienating,
but not because of the arguments motivating the Personality Test. Perhaps what
also matters is whether the content of the advice we receive is alienating
It is apparent that this additional constraint on a recommendation being
non-alienating is too stringent. For even advice that meets the Personality Test
might fail to satisfy it. Granted that advice can be alienating simply because of its
content, this says nothing about who the advice can come from. There is nothing
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internal to this constraint which precludes the possibility of such advice coming
from an identical ideal counterpart. Perhaps even a moderately idealized
counterpart of ours might come to ascertain that the best life for us is very
different from what we wish for ourselves. This remains a possibility even on the
Rosati view. In fact, so long as the advice one receives is from someone else except
oneself, the advice can potentially be alienating. This shows that aside from strict
internalism, more permissive forms of internalism, including Rosati’s two-tiered
version, are susceptible to this objection.
Second, the argument I have for why we would care about our advisor’s
recommendations under ordinary optimal conditions is supposed to, in part,
guard against this objection. If we approach the question of our personal good
with utmost earnestness and prudential rationality, then we should see that even
surprising advice can be appealing if it comes from a comprehensible source.
Thus, the Appreciation Test offers us a more considered way to address the
objection by showing why the mere content of advice is not sufficient to
undermine its plausibility. By contrast, arguing that we would accept implausible
sounding advice merely because it comes from a source who is qualitatively
similar in identity to us does not, in fact, address the objection at all, for so long
as the one is not numerically identical to one’s counterpart, the possibility
remains that the content of advice undermines its plausibility in our eyes. The
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Appreciation Test does better by focusing on considerations beyond those
pertaining to personal identity.

7.2. Our ideal advisor must undergo a “transformative experience”
L.A. Paul has argued recently that many life experiences are
“transformative” in that we lack knowledge of their value prior to undergoing
them. The paradigm examples of such experiences she used in her book include
becoming a vampire, tasting a durian for the first time, and becoming a mother.
This phenomenon is supposed to be transformative in two senses: epistemic and
personal. It is epistemically transformative in that after undergoing such an
experience, we gain first-personal knowledge of the experience. It is personally
transformative in that it changes your “core preferences and how you experience
being yourself.”147 The idea that some experiences can be transformative bears on
the possibility of arriving at rationally informed decisions about how we should
plan our lives. If we lack the rational means of ascertaining the value of becoming
a parent prior to having that experience, then we cannot rationally decide
whether to undergo that experience antecedently. But since undergoing that
experience can also be personally transformative, and thereby change your
desires and preferences after the fact, it undermines the possibility of rational
planning even further.
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Paul, Transformative Experience, 16.
179

It's clear how this thesis threatens ideal advisor theory. For it challenges
the possibility of there being a rational route our ideal advisor can take to get from
where we are now to where she ends up after she has surveyed the lay of the land
and ascertained which she thinks is the best life for us. If we experiences major
life changes like pursuing certain career paths or lifestyle choices is epistemically
and personally transformative, then undergoing any such experience is
analogous to waking up one day as a giant insect like Gregor Samsa (but worse,
since we would also undergo a personality change unlike in his case). We cannot
make sense of how a series of smaller, incremental changes can eventually
transform us into the person our ideal counterpart experiences becoming. This
suggests that our ideal counterpart’s explanation for why she arrived at the
recommendations she did would be unintelligible to us.
I lack the space for a fuller treatment of Paul’s insightful argument. What
I wish to point out here is that there are two ways to conceive of the objection
from transformative experiences, the latter of which does not threaten my
proposal. The first conception of the problem holds that it is impossible to make
any rational plans about at least our long-term future in the absence of first-hand
knowledge of what it is like to undergo the experiences under consideration. Let
me offer three brief responses to this version.
First, this version would doom the prospect of any rational planning and
commit us to merely existing in the moment and planning for the very immediate
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future. It is unclear why we should accept this view. The vividness of firstpersonal experience would provide us with both sensory and non-sensory
phenomenal information about some experience, but this might not be necessary
for making rationally justified decisions about how to orient our long-term
future.148 Second, notice that this problem also affects the Personality Test, for
any counterpart who is sufficiently similar to you would still have to undergo
various transformative experiences in order to evaluate and compare the
different possible lives we could lead. Even if we stipulate that the counterpart
remains largely identical to us, we lack the epistemic knowledge she has to
evaluate her recommendations for us, even under ordinary optimal conditions.
The third response is the strongest. The possibility of transformative
experiences is one that ideal advisor views can deal with better than their
competitors in relation to the alienation objection. This is because our such views
provide scope for greater idealization to handle the worry. For instance, imagine
that you are considering whether to be a parent. Your actual desires incline you
to be one, but you worry that after having a child you would come to hate
parenting and that this would have a detrimental impact on other aspects of your
life along with your happiness. You wonder what your ideal counterpart would
recommend. But since your ideal counterpart is capable of undergoing the
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Nonsensory phenomenal experiences include “rich, developed experiences that embed a range
of mental states, including beliefs, emotions, and desires." Paul, 12.
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experience of becoming a parent as many times as she wishes, she can address
your concern by explaining what is likely to happen were you to become a parent.
While you lack her first-personal knowledge, you can nonetheless benefit from
her wisdom where it matters: you can safeguard against the likelihood that
undergoing a certain life experience would run afoul of your expectations. The
key here is that access to transformative experiences is valuable because it assists
us in making rationally informed decisions. But since our ideal advisor can
undergo them, and do so multiple times to get a representative sample, we can
nonetheless get an accurate assessment of how our life would turn out were we to
pursue that path. Greater idealization thus helps with addressing the objection
from transformative experiences.
A second way to conceive the problem of transformative experience is as
requiring us to exercise epistemic humility in making such momentous choices.
The thought here would be that transformative experiences are not actually
transformative, though the nature of the experience does require that we lower
our credences with respect to future benefits and losses accruing from living a
possible life. For instance, this could be because we can only gain only some
antecedent knowledge about such experiences but less than we previously
thought. To lower our credence here would not be to suspend judgment. Instead,
we might simply be required to insert a discount rate for the credences attached
to each possible life path we consider. What this discount rate should be, how it
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is to be determined, and whether it is standardized across all persons and life
paths is beyond the scope of this chapter. The relevant point here is that our ideal
counterpart can incorporate these discount rates in her rational calculations
when comparing lives on our behalf. She can build this into the explanation she
offers us. Perhaps some possible life-paths will get ruled out as a result of the
inserted discount rates since they cannot meet the threshold of intelligibility for
us absent direct experience with those lives. But such a result would hardly be
fatal to the edifice of ideal advisor theory.

7.3. The objection from self-defeating identity
The problem of self-defeating identity closely accompanies the problem
from transformative experiences. Much of Rosati’s objection to ideal advisor
theory concerns the complications surrounding the conative prerequisites and
effects of appreciating and evaluating the information our ideal counterpart has
access to. She notes that our ideal counterpart might have to undergo changes in
personality in order to properly appreciate each life she assesses and compares
subsequently. Worryingly though, if she changes, then she would end up losing
the very desires that characterize our actual selves which she would later need to
compare and rank our possible lives. This appears to be a deep problem for Ideal
Advisor views. Call this the Self-defeating Identity problem.
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We can begin to respond to this problem by first understanding the tension
it aims to bring out. The problem concerns the conflict between two requirements
an agent contemplating what our good consists in must satisfy:
I.

She must possess the desires of her actual counterpart whose good she is
evaluating.

II.

She must be fully informed about, and vividly imagine and appreciate what
it would be like to live the various possible lives as her actual counterpart.
Rosati argues that as a result of attempting to satisfy condition II, our ideal

advisor will fail to satisfy condition I. This is so in part because she will transform
into a qualitatively different person once she has undergone the personality
changes that would result from her satisfying II. My reply to Rosati thus far has
been that it would not matter that she would become a qualitatively different
person if we can make sense of her transformation. But this response only partly
negotiates the self-defeating identity objection. The problem remains that our
ideal counterpart, once she has considered and appreciated her various lives,
would lose the original desires that characterize our actual selves personalities.
But in losing these desires, she would thereby fail in her primary task: to identify
which of the lives surveyed would be best for our actual selves. The worry, as
presented here, is thus not that our ideal advisor’s recommendation for us is
alienating but that it is not adequately motivated since it results from an improper
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appreciation of the original desires which partly constituted our actual
personalities.
We should be able to see now that this problem is not peculiar to Ideal
Advisor Views. It affects any view that recommends that we adequately
appreciate the possible lives we might live before comparing their relative merits.
Since adequate appreciation requires vividly representing some information to
ourselves in a way that resonates with us, even the following view is vulnerable to
it:

Less Strict Internalism: something X can be good for a person A only if she
can care about X without any marked alteration of her present condition.
Strict Internalism, if you recall, states that what the good life is for me just is what
I or someone almost indistinguishable from me, would desire for myself. This,
we maintained, is perhaps the most deeply internalist way to express what our
good might consist in. Less Strict Internalism allows for some idealization, so long
as it does not result in a marked alteration of my personality. If vividly
representing, appreciating and considering different lives is necessary for our
counterparts to deliver authoritative recommendations about our good, then Less
Strict Internalism might fail in just the opposite way that Ideal Advisor Views are
accused of: it satisfies condition I but not II. It is easy to see why. If satisfying
condition II is likely to undermine our phenomenal grasp of our actual desires,
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then the maximal degree of idealization this version of internalism would allow
for would fall short of the degree required for satisfying II.
Notice also that even Strict Internalism might fall prey to the problem of
self-defeating identity. Some actual agents might be psychologically constituted
in such a way that sincere rational deliberation of every life they are inclined to
lead would cause a major change in their characters. Perhaps these agents are
such that they have few if any stable desires and the only way to not alter their
present desires is through their impulsively realizing their desires. For such
individuals, it is plausible to conclude that there is nothing that can constitute the
good life for them. They are simply hostage to their immediate impulses.
The problem of self-defeating identity is thus a worry for all internalist
views about our good. Since the problem consists in the tension between
retaining our actual desires while imagining and appreciating the effect of living
possible lives, internalist views would differ only in which of these two criteria
they fail to satisfy. Of course, to point this out is not to diminish the seriousness
of the worry. I think we should admit that if the problem was to materialize in the
case of any particular individual, it is deeply troubling. That said, let me now
briefly state how Ideal Advisor Theory can negotiate this problem.
Even if it was true that our actual counterpart would experience a change
in her desires — even her most stable and fundamental ones — as a result of
acquiring the conative traits needed to appreciate the information she now has
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access to, she would still be able to document how and why the changes happened

and were psychologically necessarily. On top of telling us what information about
each possible life of ours she came to gather, she would then also inform us about
how she changed as a person from one who was identical to us. In other words,
the alterations she undergoes in her character might simply be part and parcel of
the overall rational route to her eventually becoming the agent who desires a
particular life for us. Of course, even after undergoing this rational
transformation, she would retain information about her actual counterpart’s
desires. She would simply lose appreciation that comes with having those desires.
But Ideal Advisor Theory can do better than alternative internalist theories of the
good with respect to this: it can tell us why the loss of appreciation is warranted
given plausible transformation the ideal advisor would undergo.
To be sure, we might still think that our ideal advisor’s loss of phenomenal
appreciation of our actual desires is too high a price to pay. But if what I have
argued in the previous two sections is right, then it's simply unclear why such
appreciation would be necessary. Our ideal advisor will retain information about
our actual selves’ desires, and given her goal of identifying the best life for us, she
would still be able to consider how the lives surveyed would comport with our
desires. And this is all that is necessary for such comparative evaluation.
Appreciation of our actual desires would only pose a problem for this goal if we
either think that (a) lack of such appreciation undermines our ideal advisor’s
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ability to adequately compare possible lives or (b) Rosati’s Personality Test is the
correct test. There is no reason to think that (a) is true and we have already
concluded that (b) would be mistaken.

7.4. Ordering effects
At this point, Rosati might reply that our hope for such a rational
explanation being offered will be in vain since the reason our ideal agent would
prefer one life over another is the result of the arbitrary ordering effects of how
information is presented to her. For instance, if she was presented with life A first
before life B and B before C, the reason she might have desires P, Q, and R altered
in her is due to the changes needed to properly appreciate life A first, and then B,
and then C. Were she presented with information about life C first, and then B,
and then A, she might find an altogether different set of desires altered in her.
This, in turn, would lead her to a different ranking of preferred lives. Let’s call
this the problem from ordering effects.
I am also skeptical that this problem is as significant as Rosati claims. First,
consider the solution Railton suggests. She conjectures that if our ideal agent were
made aware of the potentially confounding effects of the order in which she is
presented information, it is less likely for her to be affected by its impact on her
evaluations; this comports with how actual participants respond when being told
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about ordering effects.149 Even if this does not fully address the problem, we can
again consider an impractical but possible solution offered by psychologists:
provide the agent with the information in all the possible orderings. 150 This
solution fully addresses the worry with ordering effects though it is difficult to
implement in experiments because of time and cost constraints.
Our idealizations, however, are not limited by such constraints, and so, we
are free to imagine the ideal advisor being able to consider the information in all
the possible orders. Of course, this solution would make a difference to the
explanation she provides for her character changes. But surely, she can also
provide at least a distilled account of why her character needed to change the way
it did after she considered the information in all the possible orders.
There is however a worry that the answer to the question “how would her
character change if it were to change only when necessary?” would be
indeterminate. Consider the following two orders of information presentation
pertaining to the life of Jim:
Order 1
Life A, then life B: Fundamental desires P, Q, R altered to appreciate A then
B.
Order 2
Life B, then life A: Fundamental desires X, Y, Z altered to appreciate B, then
A.
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Assume for a moment that Jim’s life can only take two possible paths, and
therefore, that these are the only two orders possible when considering what
Jim’s good consists in. Jim’s good appears to be indeterminate since whichever
order we pick will cause an alteration in an altogether different set of
fundamental desires if he were fully informed and considering the two possible
lives properly. The same point would hold for any larger combination of lives,
and by extension, orders being examined. Of course, it is an open question
whether the changes in fundamental (or stable) desires necessitated by
considering all orders will always be incommensurate in this way for all persons.
Perhaps for most people, some one or more fundamental desire will always
remain unchanged. That would be a happy accident, but not one we can
anticipate. Thus, the problem of ordering effects still remains a worry for ideal
advisor views.
My response to this problem is going to be similar to my response to the
problem of self-defeating identity. The problem of ordering effects, if it were to
manifest itself, will do so for any other view that does not tie one’s good to just her
actual desires. Even a moderately strict internalist position, which says that one’s
good consists in what one desires for oneself if one were moderately rational, that
is, free of just the most egregious cognitive biases, and engaging in some
comparison lives one might live, will fall prey to this problem. If being rational
and seeking to appreciate the kind of life one might lead involves comparing lives,
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then ordering effects might surface. That said, Ideal Advisor Views once again
provide us the greatest hope of negotiating this worry. Our Ideal Advisor can
represent the various lives in all the possible orders and thus undercut ordering
effects. While this does not guarantee that we can arrive at a commensurate
ordinal ranking of possible lives, it at least allows for the possibility of such a
ranking.

8. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We might have the lingering feeling that my defense of Ideal Advisor Views
amounts to a pyrrhic victory. In demonstrating that such views are not alienating
and not uniquely burdened by the problems of self-defeating identity and
ordering effects, it might seem that I have undermined the ability of such views
to offer us action-guiding prescriptions concerning our good. We might think this
because according to my proposed version of Ideal Advisor Theory, our ideal
advisor might be someone starkly different from us in personality and who
engages in an evaluative exercise impossible for us, namely, one in which she is
fully informed about and considers each possible life with full appreciation,
compares each life in all the possible orders to avoid ordering effects before
arriving at a rational recommendation based on our actual self’s desires. Since we
cannot perform these tasks, how can we ever figure out what the good life looks
like for us? If Ideal Advisor Views are supposed to help us answer this practical
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question, then my response to Rosati seems to have only made the challenge
greater. If we had struck with Rosati’s Personality Test, then at least we could
merely consult our own evaluation to answer this question since our ideal
counterpart would be someone qualitatively similar to us. My solution forecloses
this possibility.
I lack the space to consider this matter more thoroughly in this chapter.
What I will say is that the question about action-guidingness is only relevant if we
accept that this is a function of Ideal Advisor Views. In order words, we need to
ascertain what Ideal Advisor Views are supposed to be for. Parties on either side
of the debate agree that it provides an answer to the question, “What is the
criterion for determining what the good life for us consists in?." But the actionguidingness question is, “Which life ought I to live?." Do Ideal Advisor Views need
to answer this question?
My sense is that they do not, but I will remain agnostic about this here.
What is clear is that saying that the life I ought to lead is that which my ideal
counterpart would recommend for me is incomplete in the same way that saying
that you ought to maximize happiness is an incomplete answer to the question
about what you ought to do in some situation. These answers only specify a
criterion for right (moral or nonmoral) action whereas the thing we seek is a
decision procedure for action. But noticing this distinction, as pointed out by
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Railton, also naturally brings up a Railtonian proposal as a solution. 151 Perhaps
the decision procedure for figuring out how we ought to live is to be spelt in some
way other than how our ideal advisor comes to recommend a life for us. As such,
perhaps we need a supplementary account that fills in this space and in a way that
connects up with the criterion of right non-moral action specified by Ideal
Advisor Views. Defenders of these views might attempt to provide such an
account. Regardless, it seems less than clear that Ideal Advisor Views’ failure to
provide such an account is a reason for rejecting them. The project they are
engaged in simply aims at a different goal.
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CHAPTER 5: A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR IDEALIZATION
1.

INTRODUCTION
When it comes to matters of moral goodness, rationality, our personal

wellbeing, and the sublime, philosophers have often argued that the right
answers consist not in our actual responses but the responses we would have if
we were suitably idealized. For instance, Bernard Williams appeals to idealization
to ground reasons for action. He argues that what we have reason to do is what
we would do if we deliberated soundly, that is, our deliberations did not contain
false beliefs.152 Michael Smith contends that “what it is desirable for us to do in
our actual circumstances is what our more rational selves, looking down on
ourselves as we actually are from their more privileged position, would want us
to do in our actual circumstances."153 Similarly, Peter Railton argues that what
constitutes the good life for us is what our idealized selves (our “ideal advisors”)
would desire for us.154 In all these cases, our idealized responses are those
responses we would have were we constituted more perfectly than we actually
are, such as, for instance, if we did not have any relevant false beliefs, or were
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deliberating rationally. Many moral and political philosophers have sought to
defend views of this kind.155
In all of these influential accounts, idealization is viewed as enabling us to
step back and consider matters in an impartial, rational and informed manner.
The relevant test for what constitutes moral rightness, subjective well being,
reasons for action and other such normative properties is whether our idealized
counterparts would desire or recommend certain options for us from an available
set. David Sobel expresses the this idea in the following way:
The root idea behind this test is that if a person intrinsically prefers x to y,
independent of moral considerations, while fully acquainted with both
options, then x is more conducive to the agent’s well-being than y, no
matter what other properties x and y have.156
An important similarity between the views described here is their response-

dependence. All these views hold that the properties under investigation, such as
well-being and moral goodness, are grounded not in mind-independent facts but
in the responses of agents. Philosophers who hold these views argue that such
values cannot be divorced from our desires and subjective points of view. At the
same time, response-dependence views seek to ground such normative
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properties in the responses of idealized agents as opposed to actual ones. Since
actual agents like us often have false beliefs, are insufficiently attentive to the
relevant matters, commit errors in reasoning, and lack the requisite experiences,
response-dependence views have appealed to the perspectives of our idealized
counterparts instead.
In recent years, many have questioned whether the subjectivist motivation
that undergirds response-dependence views is compatible with its grounding
normative values in the responses of idealized agents.157 The most prominent of
these criticisms is David Enoch’s.158 Enoch asks why the subjectivist who endorses
response-dependence accounts of normative values privileges idealized
responses. He argues that, given their subjectivism, response-dependence views
are most naturally committed to grounding these values in actual responses. His
contention here is that the only reason such views appeal to idealized responses
is in order to get at what they antecedently take to the correct answers. For
instance, on Enoch’s reading, we can take Williams to be arguing that we do not
have a reason to drink from the glass that (unbeknownst to us) contains petrol
rather than gin since that clearly cannot be a reason for us. Enoch takes such a
rationale for moving away from actual desires to be ad hoc, since it issues not
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from the core motivations of subjectivism but our desire to attain extensional
adequacy, that is, satisfactory answers. His contention is that subjectivist theories
of normative entities cannot motivate their idealizations. If Enoch is right and
idealizing theories of normativity simply seek to rig the game in their favor
through idealization, then the influential practice of appealing to idealizing views
is actually without warrant. Thus, Enoch’s objection represents a major threat to
a long tradition within moral and political philosophy.
In this chapter, I provide an independent motivation for favoring the
responses of idealized agents over actual agents. I argue that while Enoch’s charge
against subjectivism succeeds, one who wishes to defend idealized responsedependence accounts can avail herself of an alternative motivation that avoids his
charge. I articulate this alternative by employing Joshua Gert’s pragmatic
approach to justifying response-dependence. Gert’s account, I show, provides a
non-subjectivist rationale for idealization that is nonetheless well-motivated. I
then explain how we could develop Gert’s account further in order to stave off
another element of Enoch’s charge against subjectivist theories of normative
properties.
Here is how the chapter shall proceed. In Part 2, I begin by briefly laying
out Enoch’s objection before discussing a prominent exchange he has with David
Sobel. Sobel offers a defense of the subjectivist case for idealization by offering a
new rationale to the ones Enoch considers in his papers. I summarize Enoch’s
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response before drawing three important lessons from their debate. Then, in Part
3, I develop Gert’s pragmatist account of the use of language and how this can
undergird the objectivity of normative properties. I explain how Gert’s “linguistic
naturalism” can motivate an idealized response-dependence theory. I conclude
this part of the chapter by discussing Enoch’s likely response. This sets up my
discussion in Part 4, in which I sketch ways that one might develop Gert’s account
in order to address Enoch’s predicted reply to Gert.

2.

AD HOC JUSTIFICATION
In this part of the chapter, I examine Enoch’s objection more closely before

considering how one might respond to it. In particular, I will be examining David
Sobel’s exchange with Enoch. Sobel’s reply to Enoch response to Enoch and the
latter’s reply to him helps clarify both the precise contours of Enoch’s challenge
as well as the severity of the threat it poses for idealized response-dependence
views.

2.1.

The failure of the common rationales for idealization

Let’s explore Enoch’s objection. His charge against such views concerns
whether they can sufficiently motivate their appeal to idealized responses given
that these responses are supposed to constitute the normative facts. To see the
problem more clearly, consider how we might otherwise employ idealization.
Imagine that we wish to calculate the sales tax for an item, but lack a calculator.
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Our mental calculations might enable us to work out the amount, but if we make
a mistake, then that is because our answer does not correspond to the correct
sales tax amount. Or take Enoch’s case of telling the time. A watch that is low on
battery fails to help us tell the time. In both these cases, the tools we use are
supposed to track the relevant facts. And if they fail, then idealizing seems
perfectly natural for it enables us to approximate the facts. Enoch calls this the

natural answer to the question, “why idealize?” for it reflects how we employ
idealization in ordinary situations.
Such use of idealization is importantly distinct from the way idealized
response-dependence views seek to employ it. In our ordinary usage of
idealization, the idealization is posited to help us track the truth. By contrast, such
views hold that the idealization constitutes the truth. Philosophers who hold such
views contend that there is no independent fact of the matter about what
normative values like moral goodness, subjective well-being and rationality
consist in other than the responses of idealized agents. Such values are grounded
in these responses. In contrast, the time our watch shows does not constitute what
the time is. There is some independent fact of the matter about what the time is,
or what the sales tax is, and the watch and our calculations do not determine what
they are.
Enoch goes on to argue that the constitutive relation between normative
facts and idealized responses undermines the common rationale that response199

dependence theorists seem to offer for their idealization. For instance, consider
what Lewis says one who deliberates about what is of value should do. He argues
they should,
think harder, and imagine vividly and thoroughly how it would be if these
putative values were realised . . . that would make his valuing a more
reliable indicator of genuine value. And if he could gain the fullest possible
imaginative acquaintance that is humanly possible, then, I suggest, his
valuing would be an infallible indicator.159
Lewis appears to propose a tracking rationale for idealization. But if this is the
rationale, then idealized responses do not make it the case that something is
valuable. Instead, they are merely epistemically useful for ascertaining them.
Lewis’s rationale, thus, fails to show that idealized responses are constitutive of
the normative. The fact that the natural answer to the question “why idealize?” is
not available to the idealized response-dependence theorists is deeply troubling
for the views, unless they can provide an alternative rationale. Enoch considers
two other candidate rationales and rejects them. Let me run through these briefly.
The first of these alternative rationales goes all in on the idea that
extensional adequacy could be achieved through idealization. The argument here
is that since achieving extensional adequacy is desirable for a theory, we should
idealize to achieve it. In response, Enoch asks why we could not achieve
extensional adequacy through other means. It is patently unclear that idealization
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is necessary or the best means for achieving extensional adequacy. Call this the

extensional adequacy rationale.
The second rationale contends that our normal practices of justification
seem to appeal to the idealized vantage point to determine answers to important
questions. We often seem to give greater authority to desires that are formed
under conditions of rationality and imaginative acquaintance. This seems to be
true even in the case of taste. Consider again how we would react if we were to
discover that the colorless liquid in the glass we wanted to drink was petrol rather
than gin. We would probably respond by saying, “well I guess I do not have a
reason to drink this liquid after all!." We would not think that our reasons have
changed upon discovering this new piece of information. So perhaps the best
explanation for our ordinary justificatory practices is that we grant superior
authority to idealized responses over actual or imperfect ones. Call this the

ordinary justificatory practices rationale.
Enoch rejects this second rationale on the grounds that a more plausible
alternative exists for why we ordinarily idealize. The more plausible explanation,
he argues, is that we are already committed to robust realism of normative
properties. According to this explanation, we idealize because it helps us get at
such facts. Thus, the justification for idealizing is again of the tracking kind, and
so, cannot justify the constitutive relation between idealized responses and
normative properties.
201

Enoch does not take himself to have provided an exhaustive account of why
idealization cannot be justified in a principled manner. Perhaps we can revise our
ordinary justificatory practices by doing away with the tracking rationale and
appealing to a different rationale for idealization. He stresses that the challenge
for theorists who wish to idealize, is to provide such an alternative basis for
idealization that does not appeal to some alternative realm of facts that
idealizations help track.
It should also be noted that a certain subset of idealizing views escape
Enoch’s objection, and Enoch acknowledges this fact. Consider idealizing views
like Rawls’s or Scanlon’s.160 Rawls’s distributive theory of justice grounds
principles of justice in the responses of idealized agents deliberating rationally
while being deprived of a variety of information about both themselves and their
societies. Similarly, Scanlon argues that we ought to treat each other in ways that
conform to principles that no one can reasonably reject. Reasonable rejectability,
for Scanlon, consists in not in what one does reject but what one could reject. Our
actual responses are rejected in favor of certain kinds of counterfactual responses
in both cases. Are such views not subject to Enoch’s criticism? Not so, he
contends. Enoch rightly notices that on such views, the normative is not grounded
in idealized responses. Rather, the ground is some further set of normative
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considerations.161 Rawls’s contractarianism bottoms out in considerations
concerning the liberal conception of the person and what terms of cooperation
are agreeable. The Rawlsian hypothetical contract situation is designed to
embody fairness, and it is this fact that grounds the moral authority of the
judgments that issue from it. This point applies just as well, if not more so to
Scanlon’s contractualist view. Scanlonian contractualism bottoms out in the
normative value of respect for persons. The agent who deliberates appropriately
within Scanlon’s theory deliberates morally. Unlike the parties behind Rawls’s
veil of ignorance, Scanlonian deliberators consider the interests of others and
what is needed to respect their freedom and equality as persons. It is clear then,
that such views have an easy way to justify appealing to idealized responses, for
these responses do not constitute the normative on such views. Importantly, this
rationale for idealization is not available to “metanormative idealizing views,
views that, perhaps somewhat roughly, attempt a reduction of the normative to
the nonnormative."162 For such views need to explain which nonnormative facts
the normative reduces to, and if they claim that the relevant normative facts are
the responses of agents, then why the relevant responses are those of idealized
agents.
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2.2.

Sobel’s rationale for idealization

David Sobel attempts to answer Enoch’s challenge by unpacking the
motivation behind why so many moral and political philosophers have idealized.
His justification for idealization employs the instrumental epistemic function
captured in “natural answer” and “extensional adequacy” rationales discussed
earlier, but in a way that still leaves space for the normative to be explained in
terms of idealized responses. I will sketch Sobel’s rationale before discussing
Enoch’s response.
Sobel argues that idealization does acquaint us with certain facts. For
instance, imagine that you were attempting to decide which ice cream flavor is
best. In order to ascertain this, you might attempt to employ measures that ensure
that your assessment is as objective as possible. You might cleanse your palate
before tasting each flavor. You might make sure to randomise the ordering of the
flavors so that ordering effects do not affect your assessment. You might wish to
avoid being more hungry before tasting any one flavor compared to the others.
Such procedures are characteristic of our attempts to go beyond our actual,
imperfect standpoints. Sobel argues that in all these cases, gaining more
information is indeed instrumentally valuable, but not because it helps us acquire

normative facts. Rather, what we gain is information about “what it would be like
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for [me] to eat this or that ice cream."163 In other words, idealization acquaints us
with the phenomenal facts concerning our option set. Thus, on his view, Enoch is
right in reading subjectivist theorists as viewing idealization as enabling us to get
at some facts. He simply errs by taking these facts to be normative ones
concerning the very properties being analyzed by them.
The second part of Sobel’s reply to Enoch concerns why appealing to
phenomenal facts is important. Sobel argues that the desires we form in the
absence of such facts, and thus outside of conditions of full (or adequate)
imaginative acquaintance, are not really “for the option as it is but rather for the
option as it is falsely imagined to be."164 To see this, imagine that I wish to watch
a light hearted comedy this weekend, but then somehow formed the desire to
watch The Joker. It seems that what my desires are really for is not The Joker but
some other movie that is actually a comedy. Or take the ice cream example again.
If I wish to try the chocolate ice cream thinking that it actually tastes exactly like
what strawberry ice cream tastes like, then there’s a sense in which, had I desired
strawberry ice cream instead, my desires would have been more fitting. Sobel’s
point here is just that access to the requisite phenomenal facts enables us to aim

more truly at our desires than we otherwise would. This suffices as a motivation,
in his view. As he says, “no independent account is needed to explain why the
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procedure must involve an accurate understanding of what the various options
would be like—this requirement is continuous with the subjectivist thought, not
independent of that thought."165
Enoch, rightly I think, pushes back against this second part of Sobel’s
defense of idealization. While he concedes that there is an intuitive appeal to
viewing informed desires as being more for their objects than less informed ones,
he notes that this rationale still does not flow from the subjectivist core of
response-dependence views. Subjectivism states that what is good for us must be
tied to our desires. As such, it is unclear why the desires that we form on the basis
of false beliefs are not our desires. From within, they certainly feel like our
desires. And we might argue that a large percentage of our desires are
uninformed in these sorts of ways (though the information that is lacking is not
always of the phenomenal sort). For instance, we might want to try out a new
restaurant because it is rated highly by others. The fact that we would end up not
liking the food scarcely shows that our desires were not actually for eating there.
Another way to express Enoch’s response is to say that even if our desires
are not really for the object in question if we want them on the basis of false
beliefs, they are still our desires. To idealize away those desires by appealing to
what we would desire were we better informed is to already depart from the
subjectivist foundations of response-dependence theory, all for the sake of
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accuracy. But again, if there is no independent fact of the matter about what
makes any particular desires most fitting, then why should informed desires win
out? Contrary to what he suggests, Sobel has yet to give us a rationale for
privileging idealized desires.
Even if we agree with Sobel that we do not actually desire some object if
our desire from it was formed on the basis of false information (or the lack of the
requisite phenomenal experience), Enoch points that that this rationale would
not save subjectivist views in cases where the error involves not faulty
information but something else like means-ends incoherence or intransitivity of
preferences. For instance, if we fail to infer that taking some means (about which
we have true beliefs) would enable us to satisfy a desire, then we simply desire
the course of action that would in fact not realize our more basic desires.
Similarly, desires borne out of intransitive preferences still seem to be no less
real. In all such cases, Enoch argues, the intuitive pull of informed desires being
more for the object than actual ones is much less strong.

2.3.

Implications of Sobel-Enoch debate

Let me highlight three implications from the debate between Sobel and
Enoch. Enoch takes the failure of Sobel’s proposed rationale, and the failure of
the other considered rationales for idealization, to be grounds for giving up
response-dependence views altogether. If we were to retain response207

dependence theory, and instead appeal to actual (non-idealized) responses, then
we would be forced to accept the very results that seemed to motivate many
subjectivists to idealize. Thus, Enoch thinks that we would be better off jettisoning
response-dependence altogether in favor of grounding normative properties in
facts other than the responses of agents. Of course, Enoch himself endorses a
non-naturalist view of normativity, but even if we were reluctant to embrace nonnaturalism, his proposal here is at least that we pursue other naturalist solutions.
We can draw a second implication from Enoch’s non-naturalism. A
corollary of subjectivism is naturalism about normative entities. To say that the
normative reduces to facts about the responses of agents is to ground normative
entities in descriptive features of our world. Indeed, many subjectivists are drawn
to response-dependence views in part because of its naturalism. If idealized
response-dependence was justified, then it would provide a naturalist,
subjectivist reduction of the normative. But this, Enoch argues, is precisely why
such views are even more under threat from his objection. As he states, “it is
harder to see how a naturalist, reductivist, internalist response-dependence
theorist—compared to one who is willing to reject reduction, qualify her
internalism, and indeed be flexible about her naturalism—can supply a rationale
for idealization."166 The question for naturalists, as it were, is, “why does the
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normative reduce to the set of natural facts you propose in your theory?" This
question might seem ambiguous so let me let me clarify how it flows from Enoch’s
critique.
We might interpret this question as merely posing the question, “how
could normative facts reduce to natural facts?" This is merely Moore’s open
question argument rephrased. Moore argued that, for any natural fact N that we
propose as grounding a natural property like goodness, we can ask, “sure, N is
natural, but why is it good?."167 His is an exhortation to the naturalist to provide a
plausible metaphysical explanation of how such a reduction would be possible.
But Enoch’s challenge to the naturalist goes beyond this worry. For even if the
naturalist could provide a compelling account of how such naturalist reduction of
the normative is possible, they would still need to show why the relevant natural

facts concern the responses of idealized agents. And if Enoch is right that the real
motivation among subjectivists for idealizing is actually the tracking variant, then
it turns out that what makes something good, right, or rational is really some non-

natural fact. Thus the subjectivist reductionist actually fails to show that the
normative reduces to the non-normative. Hence, subjectivists who merely
idealize to achieve extensional adequacy end up undermining their own

beliefs and subjective motivational states. I will take both terms to be synonymous throughout the
chapter.
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naturalist ambitions by doing so. This is why the naturalist is under greater threat
of Enoch’s objection to idealization.
The final implication we can draw from the Sobel-Enoch debate concerns
the prospect of finding a non-ad hoc basis for idealization from within
subjectivism. Each of the candidate rationales discussed is incapable of supplying
a motivation for idealization that flows from within their subjectivist core. A
plausible alternative in logical space to the one Enoch suggests is to give up on
subjectivism as undergirding response-dependence theory altogether. This
would still allow us to save response-dependence theory, if an alternative core
can be found. In the next part of this chapter, I will attempt to articulate such an
alternative.

3.

THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR IDEALIZED RESPONSE
DEPENDENCE
In contrast to the rationales examined thus far, Joshua Gert’s book

Normative Bedrock provides a way to ground idealized responses in a principled
manner.168 In this part of the chapter, I lay out the core claims of his theory of
response-dependence as they relate to the project of grounding the plethora of
normative values. As such, I will articulate his view in somewhat general terms,
with enough detail that we may proceed to evaluate its merits vis-a-vis Enoch’s
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objection. The particulars of Gert’s view are not relevant for our discussion and I
will skip them where necessary. In the last section of this part of the chapter, I
will consider how Enoch might respond to this alternative rationale for
idealization. Then in Part 4, I will consider how Gert’s project could be developed
in a more ambitious direction in light of Enoch’s response.
Gert advances a pragmatic way of grounding normative properties.
Normative properties, on his theory, are grounded in the responses it would be

merited or fitting for the appropriate sorts of beings to have. The notion of
meritedness or fitingness is a normative idea in his view, and this will be
important for our discussion in part 4 of the chapter. What makes Gert’s account
pragmatist is the way in which language, as it is ordinarily used by humans within
their linguistic communities, serves as an adequate basis for undergirding the
objectivity of normative notions.
3.1.

Linguistic naturalism

Let me clarify the central features of Gert’s pragmatist approach. Gert is
concerned not with identifying features in our natural world or in some nonnatural realm that can ground properties like goodness, virtue and well-being.
Rather, he wants to examine how talk of such properties operates. There is much
uniformity to how we engage in talk of such properties. For instance, we do not
think of “moral goodness” as applying to tables and chairs, but to agents and their
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actions. Likewise, we think that certain types of actions generally do not count as
“morally bad”, such as scratching one’s cheek. If one was to use these terms in
such erroneous ways, we would consider them to be mistaken about what such
normative notions consist in. And while there might be many explanations for
why such uniformity exists in what we take to be the proper use of normative
terms, the relevant one for Gert is the practical role that language plays. The
terms we employ and our common understanding of their use and misuse
developed as a result of the practical function of language for the cooperative
ends. The fact that certain usages have become entrenched and survived
linguistic change is evidence of their conduciveness to such ends. Gert takes the
survival and success of our use of certain terms to be evidence that they are good
working order. And this brings us to the core of the pragmatist approach he calls

linguistic naturalism.
Gert describes linguistic naturalism as follows:
At the most general level, linguistic naturalism views words as tools—
typically, sounds—that human beings use for a massive variety of
extremely different purposes. It also holds that the rules for the use of
these tools are passed on from one generation to the next by means of a
mixture of implicit and explicit training. And it holds that many
philosophical problems can be dealt with more easily by keeping these two
facts firmly in view.169

169
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A helpful way to understand linguistic naturalism is to contrast it with what we
might call scientific naturalism.170 Scientific naturalism holds that the only facts
that exist are facts about our natural world. For anything to count as a fact, it must
“fit neatly” into our understanding of the naturalistic world. For instance,
assertions about the existence of witches, unicorns, and divine beings do count as
facts on this view, since there is no way to incorporate them into our picture of
the naturalistic world. In contrast, linguistic naturalism endorses a narrow
conception of what it means for something to “fit into” our naturalistic world,
looking only at human behavior and our use of language.171 If our assertions about
entities align with our social and linguistic practices, then they get to count as
facts.
Linguistic naturalism might seem puzzling at first, but there is a plausible
rationale for it. Consider a whole host of facts that do not seem to fit into our
natural world, such as “facts about evaluative matters, facts about the meanings
of words, facts about conscious experiences, and about mathematics and logic."
A scientific naturalist would have to deny that such facts hold. In contrast, a
linguistic naturalist can appeal to our linguistic practices to justify their existence.

170

Gert calls this view “naturalism”, but this might be confusing given the term he uses to describe
his own view.
171
Gert notes that his view does not amount to the conclusion that our linguistic practices are
evidence for the structure of thought, and the ground for positing the existence of entities out in
the world. Gert’s view is not supposed to ground the existence of entities in the world, but merely
a way to justify our realist talk given how we use language.
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This provides a compelling motivation for linguistic naturalism. According to
Gert, the way we talk about normative and moral properties can serve as the
ground for their existence as objective entities.
Gert notes two assumptions within linguistic naturalism that are relevant
for assessing his eventual rationale for idealization. First, he takes the parts of our
language that are widely and consistently used across generations (the “stable
parts'') to be in good working order. Even if there exist worries about ambiguity
or incoherence at the margins, their usefulness to us thus far justifies their
continued usage. Second, he assumes that many terms are sui generis, in that they
cannot be explained through other terms. We often think that “normative
concepts cannot be fully explained in terms of non-normative concepts, that
temporal concepts cannot be fully explained in terms of non-temporal concepts,
and that similar claims are true for the domains of necessity and possibility." 172
Each set of concepts develops as part of its domain, each being a different
Wittgensteinian “language game” as it were.
So much for linguistic naturalism. In the next section, I will articulate
Gert’s linguistic naturalist approach to response-dependence, and how it can
provide space for idealization. Before we proceed, a point worth mentioning is
that linguistic naturalism is logically distinct from the response-dependence view
that Gert goes on to develop. As we have seen, there are other ways to justify going
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in for a response-dependence account, such as subjectivism. However, linguistic
naturalism provides an alternative to subjectivism. If a successful responsedependence account can be forged from it in a way that does not seek to merely
rig the game in favor of idealized responses, then we have an answer to Enoch’s
question “why idealize?."173
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that Gert is only
concerned with providing a reductive account of basic concepts. Basic concepts,
in his view, are those that we cannot say anything more about by appealing to
other concepts. Color properties, normative properties like “good” and “rational”,
and others like “pain” are examples of these. In contrast, a concept like “water” is
not a basic, since there is more we can say about what the concept is beyond
simply looking at a particular response (e.g., a sensory response, as in the case of
color, or affective response as in the case of moral properties). Furthermore,
Gert’s focus concerns only a subset of basic concepts. According to him, not all
basic concepts are response-dependent in nature (for instance, color is, but not
pain). And this is because his view about what response-dependence consists in
has to do with how we teach those concepts.
3.2.

173

The parity between color properties and evaluative properties

For more on this, see Gert, 75.
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How does linguistic naturalism motivate response-dependence, and what
types of responses undergird evaluative (or normative) properties?174 Gert’s
strategy here is to appeal to an analogy with color properties. Many have argued
that color properties reduce to the responses of agents. But this analogy between
the reduction of color and evaluative properties is threatened by the classic
objection by John McDowell. McDowell argues that there exists an important
difference between color and normative properties.175 Whereas color properties
can plausibly be reduced to our disposition to respond in certain ways, normative
properties employed are not reducible to bare responses. Instead, responses have
to be fitting or merited to count as relevant in the latter case. Gert’s way of
surmounting this problem is to deny that bare responses are sufficient even in the
color case. Let me expand on this.
If we endorsed a response-dispositional account of colors, then we would
take properties like “redness” to reduce to the responses that, say, normal human
agents would be disposed to have under normal conditions. The problem for such
accounts is specifying how much and what sort of agreement is required here.
For instance, if we take an object to be red if and only if 97% of all humans would
respond that they were seeing red, then practically no object would count as red.

174

I use these two terms interchangeably while noting that they are commonly differentiated.
Evaluative terms refer to a subset of the normative that is concerned with value rather than with
notions of duty, rightness and obligation. That said, our concern in this chapter has primarily
been about evaluative concepts, so the usage here is not incorrect.
175
McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities."
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Similarly, humans at different ages perceive colors differently. For any particular
number we choose, we could ask “why is that the threshold and not something
else." Vagueness and indeterminacy plague our ability to identify which set of
statistical responses should ground color properties.
As mentioned, Gert addresses this issue by appealing to the idea of merit.
Some color responses are merited and others not. What makes them merited? The
fact that they align with the stable uses of our color terms. Again, given that our
language concerning color properties is in stable working order, to speak about
color in a way that does not conform to normal linguistic usage is to diverge from
what we take to be true about colors from within that domain.
Gert infers that the same kind of story can be told about normative
properties. While he does not provide a reductive account of the particular
properties theorized by idealize response-dependence theorists, he does provide
such a reduction for “practical irrationality." According to his view, an action is
practically irrational if it is merited for humans to elicit puzzlement concerning
the intentions of the agent performing the action. It is an interesting question as
to which particular responses would be merited in the case of normative
properties like virtue, moral goodness and subjective wellbeing.
At this stage, we might wonder what meritedness has to do with
idealization. To put the question differently, if normative objectivity is grounded
in merited responses, then what role does idealization play in his theory? There
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are, I think at least two possible roles for idealization here. First, despite Gert’s
silence on what types of responses undergird evaluative properties pertinent to
our discussion, his fitting-attitude picture of response-dependence creates space
for idealized responses. Gert takes himself to defend the following type of claim:
X is good iff X is such as to merit desire from subjects of sort S under
circumstances C.176
The first way in which idealization can ground meritedness is by identifying the
counterfactuals in which the right kind of subjects desire X under the right kinds
of circumstances. Merit responses would simply be the responses of suitably
idealized agents under suitably idealized conditions. We need not spell out the
content of these idealizations. What is important is that, plausibly, an account of
the right set of counterfactual conditions is necessary for spelling out what a
merited response consists in.
The second way in which idealization can play a central role here is by
fleshing out the normative ideal that is meritedness. If normative properties
reduce to merited responses, then such responses are normatively binding on us.
But to say this is just to say that agents, suitably idealized, would desire such
properties under suitably idealized conditions. This use of idealization differs
from the first in that in this case, the idealization is both necessary and sufficient
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for explaining what meritedness consists in. For this reason, the ideal responsedependence theorist might favor this operational role for idealization within
Gert’s view. To be sure, we would need to spell out the details to get a full
explication of either use of idealization, but my goal here is merely to carve out
two possible roles within logical space that idealization can play within his theory.
At this stage, it is worth clarifying why this rationale for idealization is not
subject to Enoch’s claim that actual responses should be privileged over idealized
ones. The reason for this is that the underlying motivation for responsedependence offered here by Gert is neutral with respect to this issue. Whether
actual or idealized responses should count as the default is an open question, to
be answered by the particulars of the language-games we play when we use
evaluative terms. And it seems at least plausible that actual responses will not
constitute merited responses concerning normative terms, since our linguistic
practices converge around precisely the kinds of uses of such terms that
characterize subjectivist accounts of normative properties. For instance, it is at
least plausible that we take the well-being of person P to consist in the responses
that one would have if one were adequately informed and thinking rationally
about the P’s condition and her interests. Of course, this would need to be spelled
out further, with a more precise articulation of the responses that have merit. In
addition, the linguistic naturalist would have to offer a compelling account of why
this is the correct understanding of such terms given how we use them in our
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linguistic community. But these hurdles do not cast doubt on whether idealization
is well-motivated given the core commitments of the theory. Thus, Enoch’s
objection does not loom large over us while we fill out these details of the theory.

3.3.

What’s so special about our actual linguistic practices?

We might wonder whether the account just sketched really does offer a
principled basis for idealization. That our linguistic practices function a certain
way and render objective certain types of responses with regard to normative
entities seems to be a purely contingent fact about them. Its contingency can be
expressed in two ways.
First, for any linguistic community within which talk of normative notions
like goodness and rationality have stabilized in the ways that might provide scope
for idealized responses, things could have turned out differently such that the
linguistic practices might have coalesced around a different set of merited
responses. This undermines the objectivity that the uniformity of such responses
is supposed to ground according to Gert.
A second way to express the contingency objection is to consider the
differences in linguistic practices between different linguistic communities. It is
a known fact that the uses of both normative and non-normative terms, even
when such uses are stable and unified within linguistic communities, are diverse
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across such communities. Given this, we might wonder why the practices within
any such community should be treated as objective, especially if the set of
responses that count as merited within one are incompatible with those within
another.
Let me address these two worries in reverse order. With regard to the
second contingency worry, it might be pointed out that there is actually much
convergence across linguistic communities regarding the usage of basic
normative concepts. It would be unsurprising if this were true. After all, the
ethical vocabulary of different linguistic and cultural groups is heavily influenced
by regional and global events, such as migration, trade, war, colonization and the
consumption of cultural artifacts like literature and film. Whether this is so is of
course an interesting and complex question. We need only note here that it is at
least plausible that such overlap in the linguistic practices might exist in such a
way as to undermine the contingency objection.
The first version of the contingency objection might seem more troubling,
since even if such convergence were to be found across cultures, the fact that this
was merely due to contingent historical facts remains. But Gert’s pragmatism
actually supplies an answer. According to him, that our actual linguistic practices
are contingent is not a strike against them, since their survival and persistence
through the generations is evidence of their usefulness to us. In other words,
while mere contingency might be problematic, the fact that a contingent practice
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has survived and retained its usefulness for us is its own justification. And it does
not matter that such a practice was not “necessary”, since there’s no sense in
which any candidate set of linguistic practices would be necessary. Rather, if we
accept the core linguistic naturalist project, then the stable working order of
words is sufficient to ground their objectivity, for it is through the rules of our
language that we come to engage and evaluate factive referential talk.
3.4.

Won the battle but lost the war?

In spite of what I have argued thus far, Enoch might contend that the
rationale offered in this part of the chapter falters. Importantly though, the nature
of its failure consists not in its inability to provide a principled motivation for
idealization. If Gert’s project can specify which set of fitting responses normative
terms (and by extension, normative properties) reduce to, we would have a
satisfactory answer to Enoch’s “why idealize” challenge. However, there is a more
general challenge to idealizing views that we discussed earlier that remains
untouched. This is the challenge of showing that normative properties like
goodness and wellbeing are reducible to purely natural facts, such as facts about
what idealized agents would desire for us. Recall that Enoch brackets views like
Rawls’s and Scanlon’s which ground normative properties in some other
normative properties like fairness and respect. Unlike such theorists,
subjectivists sought to ground the normative in the natural. And as a result, it is
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even more imperative that they not idealize merely in order to achieve
extensional adequacy. Enoch will maintain that the proposal just offered does not
show that this challenge can be met. For since normative properties reduce to

merited responses of agents according to Gert, the normative notion of
meritedness grounds properties like goodness and rationality. In the next part of
the chapter, I will briefly outline how a naturalist might attempt to take on this
residual challenge.

4.

A NATURALIST CONCEPTION OF MERITEDNESS
To recap, the linguistic naturalist answer from Gert provides a promising

way to answer Enoch challenge to idealizing theories of normative properties.
Gert’s account is principled in that it does not explicitly or implicitly idealize in
order to achieve extensional adequacy. Instead, it provides a ground for
idealization within the stable linguistic practices we share with others. Normative
properties like goodness and rationality reduce to the merited responses that the
appropriate kinds of agents would have. However, since this account appeals to
meritedness, it still fails to show how normative properties can be explained in
terms of purely descriptive facts. Enoch’s wider challenge to the naturalist,
reductivist idealizer remains. Let me sketch how such an idealizer could begin to
meet Enoch’s remaining challenge.
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Consider the idea of meritedness. For Gert, meritedness, in the case of
color, is a thin normative concept that “comes for free with the idea of
representation."177 He takes meritedness with regard to normative properties to
be of the same kind. The idea here is that the appropriateness of certain kinds of
responses or reactions, comes already built-in to how we talk about the relevant
properties. And this is because we understand that our judgments about things
like goodness and color can be wrong. This much is already built-in how we
engage in talk of such properties. But nonetheless, to say that some responses are
merited is still to say that they have a different normative status. If we were to try
to explicate this, we could perhaps say that merited responses are those responses
that it would be good or right for you to have. However we explicate it, the fact
that the notion is normative is what renders his account analogous to Rawls’s or
Scanlon’s. But could we not perhaps attempt to offer a descriptive reading of
meritedness? I will now attempt to explain how this might work.
One way to do this is to explain what “meritedness” consists in, but in a way
that appeals to purely natural facts concerning the mental states of agents. For
instance, we could argue that what makes a set of responses merited is that they
issue from individuals thinking clearly and rationally about the property at hand.
Of course, this would raise the further question, “but what about them thinking
clearly and rationally about the matter renders their responses merited?" This
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would be analogous to Enoch’s challenge to subjectivists who favor the responses
of idealized over actual agents. But unlike subjectivists, linguistic naturalists like
Gert have a response. The response is again the fact that our stable linguistic
practices have converged around such responses. Unsurprisingly, our
evaluations of responses to redness and goodness might have developed in such
a way that they seem to favor those issuing from perspectives that are relatively
unplagued by errors in various cognitive and conative domains. For instance, in
the case of redness, we do not count something as red if the agent who responds
to it was in a room filled with red light. Similarly, we do not count something as
bad if the agent who responds to it was deeply depressed when doing so. It is of
course a contingent matter that this is how our color and evaluative responses
have developed, but again, this is not a strike against them. What matters is that
they have coalesced around certain kinds of responses that correlate with the
same responses that subjectivists privilege in their idealizations. That they have
suggests that perhaps we can unpack the notion of meritedness and further
reduce them to such responses.
Of course, it is also possible that such an agent’s rational and informed
evaluation might underdetermine what sorts of responses are correct. But again,
the claim here is different from the one that subjectivists make in their
idealization. According to subjectivism, “goodness” consists in whatever an
idealized agent would desire. There exists the possibility here that what an
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idealized agent desires diverges from what those who conform to our stable
linguistic practices do. But on the account that I am proposing here, the mere
responses of an idealized agent would not wholly determine normative
properties. Rather, it is still merited responses by agents under the right sorts of
circumstances. However, here we simply modify Gert’s own view by unpacking
the notion of meritedness by identifying the particular cognitive and conative
states of the agents who issue such responses. And the hopeful claim here is that
such responses are going to end up being the responses of at least a moderately
idealized agent, that is, one who is at least moderately rational, with a modicum
of true beliefs concerning the matter at hand, and who has a sufficient degree of
imaginative acquaintance, and so on. Of course, if this hopeful claim turns out to
be false, then this proposal fails, but given our acquaintance with how stable
linguistic practices concerning a plethora of basic color and normative
properties, it is at least not implausible that they would converge around
responses of such agents.
Now, one might argue that even if my hopeful claim turns out true, my
proposal that we reduce meritedness to some set of natural facts still fails, for
concepts like rationality are inherently normative. And since they are, I would
still be reducing basic normative properties like goodness to some further
normative ones, and Enoch’s wider challenge to the naturalist would persist.
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Let me conclude this part of the chapter with a brief outline of how we
might address this challenge. For the purposes of demonstrating the plausibility
of a naturalist reduction of meritedness, all we would need to show is that there
is a plausible way to reduce the constituents of rationality, whatever those are, to
some set of purely non-normative facts. And a recent paper by Alex Worsnip
appears to suggest how something like this would proceed. 178 Consider the fact
that rationality is often viewed as consisting in coherence constraints of certain
kinds. For instance, means-ends coherence is often viewed as being part of
instrumental rationality. Similarly, epistemic rationality appears to consist in the
ability to form a coherent web of beliefs, whether that concerns some subset or
the entirety of our belief set. It does not matter for our purposes what the correct
specification of coherence is, and what function coherence performs within the
wider notion of rationality. The relevant question is whether we can reduce
something like the notion of coherence to purely descriptive facts.179
In his paper, Worsnip proposes a dispositionalist account of coherence
according to which, if a set of attitudes (containing two or more attitudes) is
incoherent, then “human agents are disposed such that they are (at least
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This too is controversial, since many argue that coherence requirements are themselves
normative. For instance, Worsnip notes that the only way to make sense of Niko Kolodny’s claim
that certain enkratic requirements (that say we ought to do what reason demands) make up some
of the most fundamental rational requirements, is to conceive of such coherence requirements as
normative. For more, see Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?”; Broome, “Does Rationality Give Us
Reasons?."
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normally) not able to (or at least find it difficult to) sustain such combinations of
attitudes under conditions of full transparency."180 Worsnip notes that his account
of coherence “might be thought of as a kind of naturalistic, reductive realism
about this property”, but does not seek to defend this claim.181 Nonetheless, its
dispositionalist nature also makes a promising starting point for developing the
sort of account that would meet Enoch’s challenge to naturalists. Of course, it
remains a further question whether the kind of coherence (or incoherence)
conceived of here can fit neatly into Gert’s linguistic naturalist account. An
interesting question here concerns what form of coherence is presupposed or
built-in to our linguistic practices concerning normative and color properties.
Moreover, we would also need to ascertain whether there are other components
of rationality that figure into the set of responses that count as merited (and
therefore objective) given our practices. If there are other components, the
question remains whether we can provide a purely descriptive analysis of them.

5.

CONCLUSION
Regardless of the overall plausibility of the proposal suggested in the

previous part of his chapter, we should remember that we have at least succeeded
in answering Enoch’s challenge to idealization. The challenge, again, was to
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provide a non ad-hoc basis for appealing to idealized responses. And we looked
at how Gert’s account provides a principled basis for this. The remaining task for
normative theorists who wish to idealize is to fill out the details of the sort of
linguistic naturalist account defended by Gert so as to clarify precisely what types
of idealizations figure into the grounding story for normative properties. Of
course, it might turn out that linguistic naturalism is implausible, and that we
should reject it for something like the scientific naturalist alternative Gert
compares it to. But with regard to the Enoch’s challenge, this is orthogonal.
Subjectivism might turn out to be wrong for reasons other than the one Enoch
suggests.182 But with regard to its ability to motivate its idealization, linguistic
naturalism offers a more compelling story about why such idealizations are
justified given its core motivations. This much suffices to answer Enoch’s “why
idealize?” question satisfactorily.

182

For instance, it might turn out to be deeply alienating as Rosati argues. See Rosati, “Persons,
Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good.” Conversely, it is possible that we
should accept subjectivism as the right view about normative properties and reasons for action in
spite of its unmotivated idealization, as Enoch notes, if alternative theories face more problems.
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